HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V. JULY, 1912 NUMBER 3

# *WHAT IS DRIVING MEN TODAY BACK TO RELIGION?*

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He is but a superficial observer of the times who can think that the movement of life today is altogether against religion, and that only the denial of religion has the spirit of the age with it.

For, certain as it is that blatant denial still holds the public ear and is more and more permeating the masses, yet in the work of the intellect, and likewise in the depths of men's souls, the case is different. Here, with ever greater vigor, is springing up the feeling that religion is indispensable, the yearning for religion. What is understood by religion is often anything but clear, and often very different from the traditional forms of religion; but the demand is unmistakable for more depth of life and for the establishment of profounder inner connections than our visible existence affords. In the spiritual life of the present day, molecular transformations are taking place, inconspicuous at first but constantly increasing, which will eventually burst upon our view, and which will necessarily provoke essential changes in the entire condition of life. Today this movement is still an undercurrent, and on the surface the tide flows in the opposite direction. But more and more the undercurrent is rising to the surface, and unless every indication fails, it will soon come into control.

The most fundamental reason for this tendency may be indicated by a single sentence. It is caused by the increasing dissatisfaction with modern civilization, or at least with those aspects of civilization which now occupy the surface of life. All

the splendor of the external successes of civilization cannot hide the fact that it does not satisfy the whole man with his inner needs, and that the amelioration of the world around us which it has accomplished does not compensate for the inner emptiness of its excessive concentration of effort on the visible world, its secularization of life.

We moderns have set ourselves at work with all our might, have acquired technical perfection, have combined isolated achievements into great systems. By the increased efficiency of our labor we have increasingly subdued the world, and at the same time have imposed upon human society a far more rational form. But, while we have given every care and effort to the means and conditions of life, we have exposed ourselves to the risk of losing life itself, and while performing astounding external feats, inwardly we have become smaller and smaller. Our work has separated itself from our souls, and it now reacts overmasteringly upon them, threatening to absorb them utterly. Our own creations have become our masters and oppressors. Moreover, as the division of labor increases, work constantly becomes more specialized and engages an ever smaller part of each individual soul; the whole man comes less and less to activity, and we lose any superior unity of our nature. Thus more and more we become mere parts of a civilization-machine.

The dangers thus arising were not felt to be so serious a menace, so long as religion and a culture controlled by ideals kept before men's minds another conception of life. But now that these are weakened and repressed, this trend toward the visible world meets less and less resistance. Yet it is true that as a result of the same process the accompanying loss is at least clearly seen and keenly felt. The victory itself is thus calling forth a counter-movement, and the outer triumph, by letting us plainly discern the limits of human power, is being transformed into an inner defeat. An independence once gained for the spiritual life can be temporarily obscured, but not permanently destroyed. At one and the same moment the craving that life should have more soul and depth is expressing itself with elemental power, and, on the other hand, it is becoming clear that, if the All is without soul and no new spiritual world stands open

before us, we humans, too, can have no souls. The result is that we are again driven into the path of religion, since without religion life cannot find the longed-for depth.

This craving for soul is accompanied by a craving for continuance and eternity.

Modernity has abandoned religion's mode of conceiving life and the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, has left eternity colorless and empty, in its uncurbed desire to plunge full into the current of the time, to uplift conditions here, and from this world to derive all its forces. In all this a special importance has attached to the idea of development. Instead of thinking their position to be fixed and unshakable by the appointment of a higher power, be it God or fate, men have come to think of our life as still in flux, and its condition as susceptible of measureless improvement; above all the immaturity and all the losses of the present has arisen the confident hope of a better and ever better future. Such a conviction has led men to devote endeavor entirely to the living present and carefully to adjust effort to the existing stage of evolution. That contributes great freshness and mobility to life; all rigidity is dispelled, all magnitudes become fluid, infinite increase multiplies the abundant forms.

Without in any wise attacking or disparaging all this, one's own experience of life yet makes it more and more clear that this trend has its dangers and limitations. To yield to the tendency of the times seemed at first to bring clear gain, for a group of persistent convictions still maintained themselves and supplied to the movement a counterbalancing repose. More and more, however, the movement drew into itself these survivals; more and more exclusively it mastered all life. It constantly became more swift, more hurried, more agitated; the changes followed faster and faster, one moment crowded on another, and the present was reduced to a passing instant. But in this process it has become apparent that this passionate forward striving leaves no room for true life. And, further, all courage must needs perish, so soon as we are forced to the conviction that everything which we today revere as true, good, beautiful, is subject to change and may tomorrow become unstable, that what is today acclaimed "modern" may tomorrow be cast aside as obsolete. He who un-

reflectingly lives merely for the moment may in all seriousness look upon that moment as the acme of the whole; but he who looks a little farther cannot doubt that it will be no better with us than with those who went before us, and that the saying still holds which according to Indian doctrines the spirits of the dead cry to the living: "We were what you are; you shall be what we are." In fine, if life is all strung on the thin thread of successive moments, each crowding back its predecessor, so that when the moment vanishes all action at once sinks again into the abyss of nothingness, then, in spite of all the exciting activity of the moment, life becomes a mere shadow.

If only we were quite sure that all our pains and care and haste were bringing about progress for the whole of human life! But that, again, we are not. True, we are constantly advancing in exact science, as we are in the technical mastery of our environment; we are compelling the elements into our service; we are freeing our existence from pain and enriching it with pleasure. But are we by all that winning a closer connection with the depths of reality? Are we growing in spiritual power as in ethical sentiment? Are we becoming greater and nobler men? As life gains in pleasure, do our inner contentment and true happiness increase in due proportion? In truth, we are growing only in our relations to the world outside, not in the essence of our being; and hence the question is not to be evaded, whether the unspeakable toil of modern civilization is worth while. We work and work, and know not to what end; for in giving up eternity we have also lost every inner bond of the ages and all power of comprehensive view. Without a guiding star we drift on the waves of the time.

As soon as this becomes a fact of clear consciousness and individual experience, either all courage to live must collapse or we must again discover within our domain, and resuscitate, something durable, something eternal, to give us support against the flight of the moments and to permit us to work for durable aims. Otherwise, our life has no sense and no value. That a longing for such an eternity, for a superiority to mere movement, pervades our time, is revealed by many signs. But such a craving leads, if not directly to religion, yet near to religion, as the chief representative of eternal truth.

Again, men crave more love and more solidarity in the human race than modern civilization affords, and that, too, is driving men to religion. Christianity not only had made love the kernel of religion, but also, starting from a Kingdom of God, it had established an inner human solidarity and created an organization on a spiritual foundation. For the modern age, however, so far as it went its own way, other aims came to the front. The chief thing came to be the individual, his emancipation from all hindrances, the development of all his powers, their unlimited enhancement. In all departments of life the independent development of the individual is a chief trait of the modern world; each of the great civilized nations in its own way has contributed to it, according as each has found its high level in art and literature, in religion, or in political and social life. Now for a time this individualism did not come into collision with the old ideals, for the individual found the totality of a spiritual world present within him, so that each one in his proper station could make it his chief task to stamp his own peculiar form on this inner world and to render it his peculiar service. But the situation altered as soon as that world of the spirit faded and disappeared. With it vanished everything that inwardly united individuals and bound their souls together. One individual became inwardly indifferent to another, and the way was opened for a man to make his highest aim his own personal advancement and utmost selfish gain, in total unconcern for any one else.

The same principles which govern individual conduct are extended to social groups and entire nations; self-interest is the single rule of action, the moral solidarity of mankind is relaxed and dissolved. The danger is imminent that the end may be a war of all against all (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). Undoubtedly the resulting rivalry and strife has effected much that is great; it has given life a thorough shaking up, and banished all idle repose. And on this new foundation cohesive forces are by no means lacking. Such a force in particular is Work, which with its growth to great combinations perfects organization, assigns to each single element a definite part, and binds them all firmly together. But such gearing together of performances by no means amounts to harmony of sentiment; if it did, the antinomies of the social

question and our economic conflicts would be impossible. In truth, combination in work does not prevent wide divergence of conviction and opinion, or even mutual hatred and strife. Sects and parties are increasing; common estimates and ideals keep slipping away from us; we understand one another less and less, and are falling deeper and deeper into a confused Babel of tongues. Even voluntary association, that form of human unity peculiar to modern times, the free union of many individuals, unites more in accomplishment than in disposition, brings men together outwardly rather than inwardly. Thus, among the monstrous confusions of the present time the demand for stable connections grows insistent, connections which shall take concern both for the common weal and for the individual. If, however, this demand plants itself wholly on the basis of the visible world and denies everything invisible, it must inevitably assume the form of a harsh oppression and compulsion, for it can produce its effect not through conviction but solely through force. In the social-democratic movement of the present such a danger already shows itself in full distinctness. But while the modern man struggles with all his soul against such a compulsion, a solution of the entanglement is to be sought in no other direction than that of a recovery of inner human bonds and of recourse to an inner world, common to all, of convictions, faith, ideals. We need to upbuild humanity from within, and this cannot be done without a profound deepening of life, and this in turn is not possible without religion.

The fact that today, with the greatest abundance of external points of contact, we are internally getting farther and farther apart, necessarily leads to inner isolation. Amid the stupendous driving-gear the individual sees himself left to his own resources and completely indifferent to everyone else. Such isolation is painful, yes, unbearable, especially for finer natures. All the fulness of human activity, highly as it is to be prized, cannot make good the lack of inner union and essential love. It affords no sufficient counterweight for the self-seclusion of man in his special circle of interests, for the preponderance of selfishness. Yet this selfishness, which separates all from all, turns out to be too narrow for the man himself; irresistibly

a longing arises for a greater harmony of our spirits and for a value for each individual that shall transcend himself. But how could such a longing push its way to victory against the indifference of nature and the corrupt doings of men, unless a kingdom of love, a world of love, come to man and lend him a value? But that is exactly what religion represented, and what it brought to mankind.

Soul, eternity, love,—these are not brought to us quickly and painlessly by the world about us; they require an inner elevation, they demand a new world. And beyond these individual aspects doubts are also awakened and transformations made necessary by the totality of human nature. It was a main point of religion, especially of the Christian religion, not to accept and recognize man as experience presents him, but to require of him a complete transformation, an inner re-birth. The modern age has more confidence in man, it awakens in him the consciousness of strength more than of weakness, it summons him to the full development of all his slumbering powers. And in fact it has been shown that man is capable of far more than he used to be given credit for, that he can actively put his hand to the world, and successfully strive to realize the rational and rationalize the real. While, however, man in the past thought highly of himself and bravely undertook high things, he formerly felt himself to be still living in the spiritual associations which he had inherited, as member of a Kingdom of God or as sharer in a world of reason; and this consciousness disciplined and enlarged his power. But these associations have gradually vanished; the tendency toward man has gradually passed into a rude opposition to any superhuman world, and constantly takes a more hostile attitude toward religion and toward any invisible order. Characteristic of this is the well-known saying of Ludwig Feuerbach: "God was my first, reason my second, man my third and last thought." In contrast to such a conception of man, which limits him to himself alone, the saying of Hegel in his *Philosophy of History* has its truth: "The consequence of putting man into the highest place is that he holds himself in no esteem. For only with the consciousness that a higher being exists does man attain a standpoint which allows him true esteem."

It cannot be denied that by giving up all connection with an invisible world and by complete limitation to visible existence man has been growing smaller. First of all, his place in the sum of reality has been reduced. He is now a mere bit of nature, and cannot claim a superior position and a peculiar work. In contrast to the enormously expanded space and time which nature has opened to modern research, the whole human circle is shrinking into tiny littleness. Rightly did William James emphasize the fact that for one hundred and fifty years progress seems to have meant nothing but a continual magnifying of the material world and a steady diminution of the importance of man.

And not only has the external position of man grown worse, he has also retrograded internally. When man is limited to sensuous existence, he loses all motive and all capacity to raise substantially his spiritual level and to counteract with any vigor the petty, low, self-centred part of his own being. He has to accept what he finds in himself, and exclusively follow the impulses awakened in him by nature; all resistance to them necessarily seems folly. That was endurable while an optimistic point of view glorified man, and lent him greatness and dignity in his own eyes; it becomes intolerable as soon as a more candid consideration causes us to discern and recognize the limitations and defects of man, understood as a mere natural being. And it cannot be denied that the experiences of modern life have given decisive preponderance to this unfavorable estimate. Whereas the eighteenth century could not exert itself enough to exalt the dignity and greatness of man (*la grandeur de l'homme*), we of today, when we picture man to ourselves, are far more inclined to think of what is petty, low, self-centred, the "all-too-human" (Nietzsche). And since we do not intend to yield without a struggle to this humiliation, we are developing a zealous endeavor to elevate man of himself, in his own sphere. Some hope to attain this by uniting individuals into great masses and considering those masses as the bearers of reason, in agreement with the doctrine set up by Aristotle of the accumulation of reason in the mass; such have a firm belief in the reason of the multitude. In exactly the opposite direction, others wish to exalt single eminent individuals as high as possible above the masses and to

make them the centre of gravity of intellectual creation. Thus the former through aggregation, the latter through isolation, hope to be able to make more out of man. But, whatever relative justification these two tendencies may have, they do not reach the main goal. For by no readjustment within the human circle can greatness be given to man, if human nature is not capable of elevation from within, if man is a mere natural being. So we continue to press on to a mere human culture and civilization; we see through its inadequacy, and yet cannot emancipate ourselves from it or lift ourselves above it; we can neither discover new aims nor develop new powers other than those which it supplies. The fact, however, that, despite the vast amount of earnest work and the restless movement of today, we yet lack a satisfying aim for this work, an aim that ennobles and inspires the work itself,—that fact makes the present state of civilization absolutely intolerable. Man can bear much hindrance and hurt and not lose his courage; but he cannot endure to have his whole life aimless and meaningless. Just because our life is ever growing more intense and more laborious, we must unconditionally demand that it be given an aim and a meaning.

Therefore in all deeper souls today is stirring a demand for an inner uplift of human nature, for a new idealism. And this demand will necessarily have to seek an alliance with religion. No matter how many opponents religion may still encounter, nevertheless, stronger than all opponents, stronger even than all intellectual difficulties, is the necessity of the spiritual self-preservation of humanity and of man. Out of the very resistance to the menace of annihilation will proceed elemental forces,—which are the strongest thing in the world.

Thus, though it be through a course of hard fights and radical upheavals (as history indirectly tends to prove), religion will surely come to new ascendency. But the return to religion by no means signifies a return to the old forms of religion. Through modern culture too much in the condition of life has been changed for us to resume these forms unchanged. Religion will win back men's souls so much the sooner, the more energetically it harks back to its original sources, the more sharply it separates the tem-

poral and the eternal in their own spheres, and so brings the eternal to new effectiveness and sets it in close and fruitful relation to the real needs of the present. The superiority of the eternal consists not in that it persists unchanged within time, but in that it can enter all times without losing itself in them, and from them all can elicit that particular portion of truth which their endeavor holds. "The old that ages, he must let go, who would hold fast the old that ages not" (Runeberg).

The fundamental mood of mankind today is essentially the reverse of what it was at the beginning of the modern period. At that time the freshness of new vital power lent a rose-colored hue to all reality, and it was possible to hope that an immanent culture would bring about the complete satisfaction of all man's spiritual needs. The experiences of the period have shown man his limitations; great complications have arisen, much unreason has become apparent in our circumstances, our ambition has encountered greater and greater obstacles. But the recognition of so much unreason in our world forces us to the following alternative: either we declare ourselves powerless against unreason,—then all the courage and strength of life must collapse and we succumb to pessimism; or, on the other hand, wrestling manfully, we gain a connection with an invisible world and the depths of reality, draw thence new power of life, and take up with new courage the fight against all unreason. That course will result in a well-founded and serious optimism, radically different from the superficial optimism of the market-place. The false optimism ignores complication and unreason, and hence inevitably loses all depth of life; the true optimism knows and appreciates these, but is not warped and deterred by them. It possesses a resource superior to every hindrance, and from opposition only gains new might and courage. I should like to think that such a genuine and well-founded optimism corresponds to the intrinsic nature of the American people. But without Religion genuine optimism is impossible.

# *IS FAITH IN GOD DECADENT?*

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Much the most important change in theological opinion which has taken place during the last half-century has reference to an altered conception of God, and, as an inevitable consequence, of his relations to the world of things and of men. This change was originally neither initiated nor approved by theologians themselves. It was rather commended to them, or even forced upon them, by modern science and modern philosophy. The attitude, however, of these two sources, or prime causes, of change toward the questions involved and toward the then reigning theological position on these questions was in certain important respects markedly different. Physical and natural science, proceeding painstakingly but rapidly by means of experimental methods, and making use of the facts discovered by these methods as a basis for induction, arrived at a quite new conception of Nature. This conception was either frankly or tacitly, but always quite decidedly, opposed to the idea of a Divine Being as a supernatural person and worker of miracles, interposing within, or acting contrary to, the working of a mechanical system under the control of natural laws. Thus during the greater part of the nineteenth century these sciences were regarded by the most tenacious adherents of the dogmas of orthodoxy as distinctly anti-theological, if not also anti-religious.

Meanwhile philosophy, so far as it was faithful to its central aim of finding some Idea which should appear to harmonize all spheres of human experience and to satisfy the demands made by all sides of human nature, undertook to reconcile the new views of natural forces and natural laws and of the history of natural evolution with the essential faith and practices of religion. In other words, it undertook so to conceive of the being of the world as to adapt the conception of the physical and natural sciences to the demands of religion for a superhuman and morally worthy, if not in the strictest sense of the word *supernatural*, object of faith and worship.

At first, and for a considerable time, this attempt of philosophy was regarded in theological circles as little, or not at all, less dangerous and irreligious than the tenets of modern science. Indeed, there were certain obvious reasons why philosophy should be met with a more hostile attitude than it seemed convenient or necessary to oppose to the new scientific conception of nature. For the latter might be considered as simply "science," and so as moving in a plane different enough from that of theology to make it impossible that the two should come into a square conflict. This was, indeed, only a "might-be," a mere seeming. The actual fact was that the new conception of the world and its possible relation to any personal God was essentially incompatible with the older forms of theological dogma. In a word, modern science was slowly but convincingly proving either that the world is a godless world or that the conception of God and of God's relations to the world, as held by the then dominant theology, must be essentially changed.

But if much of science was deemed to be atheism by the orthodoxy of this period, the attempts of philosophy at reconciliation were almost universally deemed to be a more or less skilfully disguised pantheism. In some sort "pantheistical" they certainly were. But so far as they were not systems of pantheism, like the naturalism of Strauss or the materialism of Haeckel (to take examples standing in time at the extremes of the period we are considering), they were not more pantheistical than is Biblical religion; they were less so than are all other Oriental religions, if we include the mystical sects of Mohammadanism and exclude its more rigidly orthodox forms of monotheism.

Already theology has gradually yielded to the influences which it so hotly and fearfully contested, has gone a notable way toward absorbing the positions of both science and philosophy, and has somewhat radically changed its conception of God and of his relations to the world both of things and also of souls. We say "also of souls"; for although the abolishing of the sharp distinction between the natural and the supernatural in the sphere of physical things and events was the first to yield to the efforts at harmony of reflective thinking, the inevitable result of extending the same point of view into the realm of mental and

spiritual affairs was soon reached. Thus the changed conception of the God of nature was followed by a change in the conceptions of revelation, inspiration, sacred Scripture, and of the conduct, ideals, and growth of the religious life.

In some such way it was that the older forms of deism and theism, with their common belief in a quasi-personal Divine Being as the creator of a Nature capable of running itself, and their bitter controversy over the question whether this Being ever intervened by way of enacting a miracle or other supernatural event, have been alike discredited. Quite commonly now, by theologians, philosophers, and men of science alike, God as the object of religious belief and worship is thought of as immanent in nature and in humanity, the Life, present everywhere and ever, of the world of things and of spirits. As supernatural,—being from the ideal point of view over and above, but not outside of or unconcerned with, nature, the world, the universe (choose what word you will for the sum-total of all phenomena, whether regarded as causes or as effects),—he is not parted from the natural. Natural and supernatural must never be looked upon as mutually exclusive spheres. It is not true of some things and of some souls, or at certain times only, but of all nature and of all humanity, and at all times, that in Him is life, motion, and being.

It is interesting and suggestive in this connection briefly to notice the more recent tendencies of opinion in science, philosophy, and theology,—the three ways of looking at one and the same problem. It is not too much to say that there is notably less crude and open antagonism between theology and the physical and natural sciences than there was during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. Nor is this fact wholly due to changes in the positions of theology. In most questions of the details of the constitution and history of nature, science has, as was right and inevitably to be expected, triumphed over theology. But science itself is more cognizant than it formerly was of its own barrenness and insufficiency in attempting to give a final account of nature. It is more ready to admit the claim, confirmed both by psychology and metaphysics, that the notion of a unity of forces operative in the universe, really argues for

the dependence of all individual beings on One Will. It is disposed to confess that the term "law" (even when spelled with a capital), if it means anything more than the expression of an unexplained fact, namely, that there is generally a partial and approximate uniformity in the sequence of similar phenomena, implies the control of active ideas as innate to the deeds of that One Will. And in general, its entire theory of the universe as a closed and impenetrable mechanism has of late shown the plainest signs of breaking down utterly.

On the other hand, theology, when once the outer barriers to a new conception as proposed by a reconciling philosophy had given way, has hastened—sometimes in quite unnecessary and even unseemly fashion—to defer, even though that might compel the relinquishment or important modification of some of its most cherished doctrines, to the newest, as yet unverified tenets of evolution, or to the unrecognized "authority" of the private caprices of some novice in natural science. Thus it has happened that not a few theologians have become quite superfluously heretical as judged by the ancient standards, while of the body of clergymen in general it is not too much to say that no other class of persons are more easily gullible by "oppositions of science falsely so called."

Meanwhile philosophy has in several quarters been outstripping science, and urging on theology to make friends with those whom only a few years ago it had considered as belonging to the mammon of (intellectual) unrighteousness. Hence there has arisen a large crop of new and bizarre forms of the "theory of reality."

On the whole, however, it does not admit of doubt that the conception of God and the divine relations to the world which characterizes the reflective thinking of the age is, from the purely intellectual point of view, a vast improvement over the conception which it has superseded. Its establishment, its convincing influence over theology, in spite of the opposition which it has somewhat persistently encountered from theology, is the most important contribution to a new and improved system of theological thinking which the last century has to show.

If now we seek for some expression which shall picture, if it does not accurately define, the important change which we are

considering, it would be a true though somewhat startling description of it to say: It is little less, essentially considered, than the *rehabilitation of the ideal of a Living God.* The Divine Being, as conceived of by the French and English deism, was a barren abstraction, invented chiefly to supplement the theoretical explanation of the beginnings of things in terms of the crude physics, chemistry, and biology of the time. As has been truly said, it had not the life in it, nor the power over human life, of the conception of God held by the North American Indian. But the Divine Being as conceived of by the theism which, in the interests of piety, opposed this deistical belief was, in his immediate relations to nature, too spasmodic and incalculable to satisfy the demands of the natural sciences or the conclusions of reflective thinking. God as immanent in the world, God as the abiding "Ground" of the evolution of physical life and of the development of the life of reason, God as the personal and ethically perfect Will, realizing his ideals in the universe of things and of spirits,—this is a conception which has been welcomed by thousands of the most profoundly thoughtful and deeply religious souls as one on which science, philosophy, and theology might cordially unite.

The most unreserved claims of superiority for the modern—which is at the same time the more ancient—conception of God do not, however, afford an off-hand answer to the question we are now to consider. For there is a very great difference between holding a conception and having a faith; and this difference is apt to be greatest in matters of religious concernment. The question, "Is faith in God, as a matter of fact, decadent?" can be convincingly answered only by an appeal to the facts of the moral and religious life,—the sphere in which the faith corresponding to the conception ought properly to be apparent and to be dominant. But these facts are vastly more complicated and difficult of access than are those facts on which we may rely for establishing changes in philosophical and theological opinions.

How, then, shall we discover whether this improved way of *thinking about* God has become an active principle in the *soul's attitude* and in the *conduct of life*, as from moment to moment in the immediate presence of God? To take a census of all who make profession of such a faith is plainly impossible. To rely on

vague general impressions for the answer to such a question is easy, but it can scarcely be called satisfactory as the basis of a conclusion. But the question is a pressing one, and its true answer would determine much as to the direction of our hopes and our fears, as well as our practical activities, respecting the future of religion in this country; and likewise of all the other interests which depend so largely upon religion as a form of faith controlling life.

It is with no pretence of affording a convincing argument, but in the modest hope of stimulating inquiry, that the following suggestions are offered as bearing on an affirmative answer to this grave practical problem.

If we read the religious books current among the men and women of two generations or of one generation ago, we can scarcely fail to notice how much they dwelt upon the unquestioned right of the divine commands to control the conduct of life, and upon the divine all-seeing eye as taking unceasing cognizance of the way in which these commands were recognized and obeyed. That this is not true in the same way and to the same degree on the part either of the writers or the readers of the religious books of today, it seems to me impossible to deny. But here let not the point of the consideration be misunderstood or wholly missed. It is not that our way of trying to find out what are the divine commands has so largely changed; that pious people no longer open the Bible at random and find therein God's word everywhere alike, without raising the questions, by whom, to whom, when and where and for what purpose, this alleged word of God was spoken to men. To make these inquiries is an obligation which follows as a corollary from the improved conception of God. The discouraging token of this literature is, rather, that it is neither written nor read as though all of man's life must be lived, in order to be lived aright, as in the sight of an ever-present and living God. The same characteristic regard for the divine command is to be noted in the letters and diaries of pious folk of fifty and seventy-five years ago. I have been reading of late much of this form of testimony. These old letters and diaries seem to be pervaded with the comforting conviction that life's duties and trials are to be accepted—those discharged, these borne—as in the presence

and with the help of a living God. I know that not a few—perhaps the majority—of those who could be dismissed from one church to another with a certificate of "good and regular standing" would look upon the language of such antiquated type as suggestive, if not plainly expressive, of cant. But here is not the temptation of the Christian Endeavor Society, of the teacher or practicer of Christian Science or other form of so-called faith-cure, or even of the class-meeting in some Methodist church. Here is the soft breathing, in private, of one soul's experience with God into the sympathetic ear of another soul; or—what is still more significant—of one lone soul into the ear of God. No; for my part I do not believe that this form of testimony to faith in God is to be suspected of any considerable measure of cant. And if the present lack of such expression be accounted for as due to the increased modesty or secretiveness of the modern man and woman, the reply at once suggests itself: In what other notable respects are the professedly pious people of today more modest and secretive than were their forbears?

But it may be said that deeds speak louder than words, and that this is especially true of the religious life under modern social and economical conditions. No really pious person can be otherwise than sincerely and heartily glad at the present increased interest in the social and economic welfare of the great body of the people; and no student of history can fail to recognize that much of this interest has been, and still is, the direct or indirect result of religious principles and of the religious motive. On the other hand, we are led to raise the inquiry whether most of the awful pressure for the radical reform of existing moral, as well as economic and social, evils, is not due to the lack of a practically operative faith in God as the guardian of the poor and the oppressed, and as the avenger of the unrighteousness and crime which inevitably grow out of greed, cowardice, and selfish political and social ambition. In a word, the very evils which demand an increased faith in an ethically perfect Divine Being, and an intimate experience of him in the effort to realize the ideal of Jesus, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect," seem to indicate a widely prevalent decadent condition of this kind of faith.

There are three dependent forms of faith in a living God, the

existence and efficacy of which in practical ways might afford a measure for testing the answer to our main inquiry, as to whether faith in God is decadent. These are the faith in God as Providence, the faith in God as the Giver of eternal life, and the faith in God as the indwelling Redeemer of humanity.

That the conception of God and of his relations to the world which, under the influence of modern science and modern philosophy, has of late more and more prevailed, is opposed to a certain form of the theological doctrine of providence, admits of little doubt. This doctrine selected a certain set of persons, and certain relations and occasions, within which somewhat too exclusively it stood ready to admit a divine control over human affairs. In this selection it was tempted to give the preference to such events in the life of the individual as seemed most favorable to the success of the individual's own plans. Thus not infrequently it became the gratification of human wills which was thought to give token of some special action of the Universal Will. But the conception of an immanent personal Life in and through all nature and in every event of human history logically requires a much more closely fitting and truly universal doctrine of providence; and it is eminently adapted to foster a much more devout, as well as reasonable, faith in God as providence. It permits and it demands that each individual shall lay the foundations of his creed and of the conduct of his life in what Luther declared to be the hardest thing of all to believe: "I am Jehovah *thy* God." It lifts above the mirage of mere sentiment and the uncertain clouded regions of emotion into the heights of rational faith, the exhortations and the experience of Jesus. It regards the lilies of the field, the birds of the heaven, even the sparrows that are sold at two for a penny, as wholly within the sphere of the divine providential care. How much more, everything that concerns the discipline of a soul which aspires to realize the calling of a son of God! Such a soul will make no meaningless babble or formal recital of an address to "Our Father in heaven." And when its prayer is for the gift of daily bread, or for deliverance from that which is evil, there will accompany these petitions a steadfast and embracing trust that these, and all other requests, will be answered wisely and faithfully, in and through each experi-

ence in our human lives of the indwelling divine Life. It is this kind of faith in God as providence which animates the question of the Rig Veda, "Whom shall we worship but Him who is the sole King of the seeing and living creation?"; which inspires the resolve of Augustine, "I will pass beyond this power of my nature also, rising by degrees unto Him who made me. . . . Yea, I will pass beyond it, that I may approach unto Thee, O sweet Light"; and which above all others furnished the *motif* and the explanation for the words and life of Jesus: "Yea, Father, for so it was well pleasing in thy sight."

By common consent of those competent to pass judgment, the present is an age of dissatisfaction and unrest, world-wide and profound, beyond anything belonging to the past history of the race. Instead of this condition abating, as the opportunities for comfortable living are more widely distributed and the amenities and moralities of civilization are rising (for so the case stands, according to general but not universal agreement), it is becoming more prevalent and more intense with every year. As the price which providence exacts for these advances in material welfare and social privilege rises in correspondence with their increase, the revolt against the exaction becomes more open and more pronounced. In some it takes the form of avowed and determined, or hesitating and spasmodic, attempt to escape the evils of living in a world that gives no proof of being governed in the spirit of tender pity by a so-called heavenly Father; in others it stiffens into defiance or relapses into sullen despair; in still others it takes the form of callous indifference. In how few does the experience of these evils, when they invade one's own life-circle, awaken a still more reposeful and comforting faith in God as providence!

Is then the faith in God as providence decadent in the present age? Are men, whatever their theory of the divine immanence may be, really living, more than a half-century ago, as though in a godless world? It is indeed again impossible on this precise point to take a census of individual experience. No one would venture to say how many, what percentage of the entire population or of the Christian churches, there be, who do their daily work, accept their share of ordinary vicissitudes of evil and good, and of extraordinary trials of grief, disappointment, and loss,

with an abiding and reposeful faith in providence. Certainly, the more obvious phenomena of business, of menial labor, and of domestic administration, of politics and of social intercourse, do not on the surface indicate that the number of those who *realize* the doctrine of a providential control of the universe, as a compelling and comforting principle for the conduct of a truly pious life, is very large.

The attitude of faith in God as providence is a matter of the most intimate personal experience. Its essence is founded largely in a deed of the will. It involves a choice between being in rebellion against the universe because it does not treat us as we think it ought, and placing ourselves on terms of confidence and affection with this universe as knowing better than we what is best for us and for all mankind. It represents the practical side of an ideal conception of nature and of human history, that sees behind the more obvious appearance of the facts a meaning which they do not readily, or of necessity, disclose to each observer. It requires prophetic vision and apostolic self-renunciation to believe reposefully in God as providence, and to shape all one's life in the confidence of this belief. The sort of "practicalism" demanded by much of the current philosophy, by most of the customs regulating social life, and by all the usages of politics, diplomacy, and business, is opposed to this faith. One must be something of a mystic to have faith in God as providence. And although it follows logically from that conception of the Divine Being which affirms that all life, motion, and being are in Him, it can not easily overcome the obstacles which it encounters from the characteristics of this so-called practical age.

The case is not the same with the second form of that faith to which we addressed our appeal in the effort to find some answer to the main inquiry we are discussing. How, now, in the popular favor stands the faith in God as the giver of eternal life? From time immemorial the immortality of the human soul has been regarded as the doctrine standing nearest to the belief in a personal God, and almost equally essential for maintaining the foundations of the Christian religion. God and immortality were two of the three beliefs which Kant undertook to establish on foundations of moral intuition, after he had removed by criticism

the pretence of theology to establish them on grounds of scientific demonstration. The attempt of Kant in its negative result was seemingly successful. Less and less, since the Kantian criticism prevailed, have the arguments, as such, for the soul's immortality seemed conclusive to the reflective thinking of modern men. Even the reasoned conviction of a *posse non mori*, established on moral grounds, with which this criticism displaced the *non posse mori* of the older theology, has been assailed with experimental proofs by science in the form of biology and physiological psychology. This assault has not only modified, but has almost destroyed, the confidence with which theologians were wont to announce the doctrine of immortality as a matter of almost indisputable proof. It has weakened or dissipated the faith of thousands in their own conscious existence after death, and for these same thousands the hope of meeting the loved ones who have preceded or shall follow them into that which lies beyond death. Nor has that effect upon the conduct of this life which depends upon the faith in God as the giver of eternal life been of small account.

As the guardian and inspirer of true religion, the fear of future punishment and the hope of future reward, when impressed by external influences upon the individual, have never been of real and enduring value. It is not to be regretted, therefore, that the motives they once furnished to lead the life of religion have been greatly diminished in these latter days. On the other hand, the essential nature of true religion is such as to make it a matter of grave doubt whether it could continue in existence for long, if the support of a belief in the immortality of the individual were wholly withdrawn. For it is the continuity of life, and of the issues of life, and of the character formed by the discipline of life, that renders the practical faith in immortality of so essential value to religion.

If now we consider that attitude of science toward the theological doctrine of immortality which has shaped itself to accord with recent biological, physiological, and psychological investigations, it would seem more favorable, or at least less hostile, than it was twenty-five and even fewer years ago. In the judgment of the writer, the latest results of cerebral physiology and

of physiological psychology are distinctly more concessive, if not conducive, to the view which advocates a reality and possible separate existence for the soul in independence of the present physical organism. But even this improved attitude of science is of scarcely more than negative value in the argument which aims to establish the theological doctrine of immortality. Still further is it from producing the practical faith in God as the giver of eternal life. It does, indeed, remove some of the obstacles to continuing in this faith under the temptation to abandon it for intellectual reasons; in certain cases it may suggest this faith to those who, for reasons chiefly emotional and sentimental, are already well disposed toward its espousal. But to science it is as yet in vain that we appeal for proof.

In his "Aphorisms on That which is indeed Spiritual Religion" Coleridge speaks of "certain convictions" under which one "can tranquilly leave it to be disputed in some new Dialogues in the shades, between the fathers of the Unitarian Church, on the one side, and Maimonides, Moses Mendelssohn, and Lessing, on the other, whether the famous passage in Paley does or does not contain the three dialectic flaws, *petitio principii*, *argumentum in circulo*, and *argumentum contra rem a premisso rem ipsam includente*." As a matter of fact, in all the more thoughtful and spiritual religions it has been a conscious attitude of loving and trustful communion with Him who is the Life of the world of souls and of things that has engendered and supported the belief of the individual person in his own immortality. The basis in reality for this conscious communion is to be found in the essential unity of ethical spirit, which is perfect in the Divine Being, and which is struggling toward perfection in all the sons begotten of this Divine Being. Therefore it is no unmeaning paradox to say that the faith in God as the source and giver of eternal life is its own best argument. It can not, indeed, be communicated to others in the form of arguments. It can be obtained only in the form of an experience; but it may be made reasonable by a knowledge of the collateral evidences which are afforded in the conception of God as the immanent Life of the World and so in a very real and special way the source of eternal life to all his sons.

It was a measure of this faith which prompted the Stoic slave

Epictetus to exhort us: "Dare to look up to God and say, 'Make use of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of the same mind. I am one with Thee.'" It is this same faith which inspires the declaration of the Bagavadgîtâ: "He who has known me as the Lord of sacrifice and of penance, the mighty Ruler of the worlds, and the Lover of all beings, goeth to peace." But pre-eminently is this true of all Jesus' teachings and of all his deeds, where, to employ the words of a German theologian, "the approach of eternity awakened in Jesus the recognition of all that is essential, of all that endures in the sight of God." Indeed, it is the characteristic and dominant thing about the Christian faith that with all God's dear children eternity should ever be near at hand, in the mind's eye and in the affections of the heart. The veil between the two worlds is thin; indeed, there are no two separate worlds, but only one—the realm of the Father—in which the life of the men of filial spirit is spent. This is the attitude of mind and will toward both lives, the present and the future, the earthly and the super-earthly, which essentially accords with the religion of Christ.

But is this, in fact, "the attitude toward both lives" which prevails in the Christian world at the present time? It is indeed true as the writer just quoted also says: "Even though later on the eschatological drama receded ever farther into the background, and this earth and the present raised their claims on man ever louder, yet eternity surrounds us ever in the garb of time, and its demands are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. . . . Jesus' words condemn his own church down to the present day."

Whatever we may think as to the relative morality of the Christian world in comparison with previous ages, and whatever one may decide as to the question whether it is worse or better; whatever we may claim as to improvement in creeds and increased interest and activities touching social welfare; and highly as one may appreciate and praise the advances made in these and other respects, one can scarcely avoid the confession that the claims of "this earth and the present" were never more loud and insistent than at this very present time. Never before were they more inclined to confuse and overwhelm the faith and the practice dependent upon the conscious nearness of the world unseen and eternal.

That the theological doctrine of the immortality of the individual is not accepted with anything approaching the unanimity of a generation ago, there can be, I think, no reasonable doubt. Even those who adopt a certain conception of God, as at least a sort of Unity of intelligent force in nature, and as a power making for righteousness in human history, find themselves unconvinced as to the belief in the continuance of the conscious life of the individual after the dissolution of the physical organism. The demonstrative arguments employed by the pre-kantian philosophy and theology for a natural indestructibility of the soul seem as inconclusive to most psychologists as does the argument of Plato from his theory of reminiscence and prenatal ideas. Even as a belief relying on the teachings of Scripture and the promises of Jesus, this doctrine has not, apparently, anything like its old-fashioned power to comfort the mourning, assure the dying, and bring peace to those who are in hopeless conflict with what are for them the present and prospective conditions of temporal and earthly welfare. There are few to whom the future joys of heaven seem to afford any measure of compensation for the unseized or unattainable benefits and pleasures of the present life.

For such a change of mental and practical attitude toward the doctrine of immortality I can find no adequate account in the increased strength of the objections derived from modern science and modern philosophy. These objections are not essentially different from those which have been urged against the belief from the time men began seriously to question its grounds. In modern times the most acute form of the physiological contest has never been a clear victory for either side. To the unprejudiced expert the battle, as waged on this level, has always seemed to result in a draw. And, as I have already said, the vitality and cogency of the scientific objections have of late been diminishing in force. There seems, therefore, no other so obvious explanation for a decline in belief in the doctrine of immortality as a positive decadence in the faith in God as the giver of eternal life,—and, indeed, a lack of interest and appreciation for those eternal and unseen things in the right attitude toward the values of which the essence of the Christian religion consists.

From this new and improved conception of the Divine Being should follow, logically, a more reasonable and firm faith of a practical sort, in God as the redeemer of humanity. And, surely, never before were the demands upon such a faith more strenuous and insistent than at the present time. If we look the civilized world over, we may note everywhere a more or less clearly conscious apprehension of important and somewhat awful political and social changes, impending and not for long to be delayed. The faces of an incalculable host of human beings, some wan with hunger and disease, some pale with anger or despair, some flushed with envy and hatred, some lighted with the dawnings of a new intellectual and moral experience or with expectations of a coming victory, are seen gathering for a determined assault upon the political, economic, and social, and even upon the legal and religious forces that for nearly two thousand years have held the world of civilized men under their control. With enormously increased vigor and portent the lower and the lowest ranks of the democracy are coming to the front in human affairs. Observers are dividing themselves in opinion as to the result into schools of optimism and pessimism, and, as to the methods of dealing with the problems which this rise of the democracy creates, into schools of co-operation, of conciliation, or of armed resistance to the very end. Some anticipate the vast improvement, and some the utter destruction, of existing institutions, when Socialism succeeds—as it now seems destined to succeed—in carrying through its avowed plans. Some rely on education, some on the laws of that vague and uncertain thing called "social science," and some on the police and the army. Religion relies on God,—but not as an abstraction, or as a blind mechanism, or as an absentee spiritual force, but on a Living God, immanent in and operating through all the economic, political, and social forces for the redemption of mankind.

Those whose memories reach back toward the middle of the last century remember with what hope the new age was anticipated; it was to be renovated by modern science; its wants were to be supplied by modern industry; its wisdom and obedience to natural and social law were guaranteed by modern education. That the hope has not been realized in all its fulness is a mild

statement of the truth. So far as statistics can establish anything, they confirm the prevailing dissatisfaction with the reigning systems of politics, of education, of church administration; and with the prevalent tone of the moral and religious life.

It is notable that in all the great and successful reforms of the past, those who have worked and suffered in them have done all with the persuasion that God is in the world, and that the strength of all workers for the uplift of humanity has its source in his omnipotent and benevolent will. Thus in its broadest and profoundest meaning the religious motive has been the most powerful of all in effecting reforms. The work of destroying evil may well enough be done in the spirit of the evil one; the healing of the evil and the substitution of the good in its stead is best done—if indeed it can otherwise be done at all—in the spirit of God, the redeemer of mankind.

And that God is indeed in and through it all, as the ethically uplifting, convicting, and illumining Spirit of humanity, is an indisputable corollary from the thesis proposed by the conception of Divine Being which modern science, philosophy, and theology encourage us to construct and to hold. This conception is that of a Living God, immanent in nature, in history, and in the soul of man, for the redemption of the world. It is the practical faith in this truth which summons all the true sons of God to work in the spirit of sympathy and obedience with the Father for the realization of that far-off divine event.

Has this form of religious faith become of late less confident and effective? That the social obligation was never before so keenly felt and the value of social co-operation never before so highly estimated, we may gladly admit. But has it not lacked that fine touch of religious enthusiasm, confidence, and patience in hope, which comes from the faith that God is in the world bringing the world back to himself? It is this that makes one man who has it worth a thousand who have it not. For in spiritual conflicts that is true which Napoleon declared to be true of battles fought with carnal weapons, "*À la guerre les hommes ne sont rien; c'est un homme qui est tout.*"

# *THE DIVINE REVELATION AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION* [1]

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With the dawn of the modern era there came a new interest in nature and the human mind. There was a withdrawal of attention from the supernatural to the natural, from the eternal to the temporal, from the divine to the human. This world with its interests came to its own. The secrets of nature were studied; its facts gathered; its laws formulated; its powers utilized; and its beauties appreciated. And the greater secrets of the human mind, too, were eagerly studied. The ideas of the mind were examined to discover whether they were innate or acquired; the relation of the data of the senses to the structure and the function of the mind was noted that the rise of knowledge might be learned; the legitimacy of the use of the categories of thought to interpret nature and the validity of our knowledge was called in question; and aspects of experience and powers of mind other than the distinctively rational came in for new appraisal.

The effects of this new study of nature and mind are seen in the practical concerns of daily life, in the world's commercial interests, in the political formulations of new states, and in the greater cultural values, like art, philosophy, religion, and theology. Many theologians began to find new arguments for the existence of God in the structure and the processes of nature, and to turn this new knowledge to religious and theological uses. They subsumed this new natural religion under revealed religion and, indeed, practically identified the two. Other thinkers, however,

[1] The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 2, 1912, on the following subject, prescribed by the founder, Paul Dudley, in 1750:

"The confirmation, illustration, and improvement of the great articles of the Christian Religion properly so called, or the revelation which Jesus Christ the son of God was pleased to make, first by himself, and afterwards by his holy Apostles, to his church and the world for their salvation."

reversed this order of natural and revealed religion. The one group levelled up natural religion, the other levelled down revealed religion. In the one as in the other the identification was practically complete; the only difference was the plane on which it was made.

Soon, however, came a separation of the two and their opposition. Some found in nature and in the human mind and the ordinary experiences of life the adequate sources and content of religion. They felt no necessity for recourse to a supernatural revelation. On the other hand, the apologists of revealed religion began to discredit the power of reason and to cast doubt upon the truth of its deliverances, to point out its failures and to explain them by its corruption through sin. Revelation, it was held, was thus seen to be necessary, and it was conceived as supernatural in its source and miraculous in its method. It required, and received, external attestation through miracle and prophecy. The apologists thus entered into the two spheres in which scientific thought and philosophic interest were most keen. They contended for the intervention of God in the natural order by miraculous events and in the psychological realm by miraculous predictions. Not the intrinsic character of revelation, but its external and miraculous evidences, engaged their attention.

Then came Hume upon the scene and did his destructive work. He undermined the presuppositions of those who based all upon natural theology by calling into question the legitimacy of the use of the causal principle and the validity of our knowledge, and left men only with *beliefs*. And, on the other hand, he undermined the position of the apologists by opposing to their claim of miracle the experience of the orderliness of the world. The sceptic had done his work; he had served his day and generation. After the destroyer came Kant, the reconstructor, whose aim was to reinstate the mind and the world in a vital relation, by way of knowledge on the level of sense, and of faith on the plane of moral experience. The task of building the world anew in our bosoms was thus given.

As one looks over this phase of thought, which we have rapidly sketched, and tries to estimate its value, he notes that beneath all the superficial reasonings and inconclusive arguments there

was a deep undercurrent of experience. In the Reformation there was a return from the church to something more fundamental in life,—to the religious experience of the soul which men found in the Bible; and in the Renaissance there was a movement of the mind from things established and written to life in its contact with the world and experience in society. The desire was for fresh experience and first-hand contact with the world and the sense of living.

In this inner sphere of experience there are many elements, or aspects. The religious element is there as well as those elements which come from contact with the world and general human life. What estimate is to be placed upon these several aspects of experience? How shall this total experience be systematized? This is the problem which confronted both the rationalists and the apologists, and it remains with us still. Their efforts at the solution of the problem no longer satisfy us. The apologists in their efforts at solution depreciated too much the value of the experience derived from contact with the natural order, degraded the reason of man as the organ of knowledge, sought external supports for revelation in miracle and prediction, and identified revelation with the total contents of the Bible; and they also failed to make the revelation of God in the orderly processes of nature and the moral experiences of the soul and the historic career of the race, the fundamental basis of religion. The mistakes of the apologists are now perfectly plain to us.

Now on the other hand there is a growing sense of our debt to the rationalists, for never more than at present has there been such an appreciation of the experience that underlies the conception of natural religion. It is the finding of something worth worshipping in and through the natural order and the ordinary experiences of our common life. This discovery is revelation, and it makes for religion. This is the truth in their contention, and it has rendered us much service in our thought of the meaning of revelation. It has tended to make the idea of revelation natural, normal, and native, whereas apart from this influence the tendency was, and still is, to regard revelation as miraculous, abnormal, and alien, or at best as something given *ab extra* of which there is no reasonable explanation or justification.

This grounding of revelation in the natural order and in the nature of the soul is a contribution of permanent value.

Nevertheless the inadequacy of the rationalistic interpretation of religion is now deeply felt. It conceives the object of religion (that is, God) in far too static a fashion to give us a true understanding of the divine nature or to satisfy the demands of religion. God stands in the shadow and waits there to be discovered. Religion is primarily man's search for God and discovery of him rather than God's seeking and finding man. Still further, rationalism is too intellectualistic, for it regards the intellect as the supreme or the sole organ of knowledge. Then, too, it gives us an insufficient content. It takes the common elements of all religions rather than the distinctive elements of the highest religion. It takes what men in any age or place are supposed to have discovered and constitutes these the essential elements in religion. The richest and most significant content of life which the race possesses is not used for its interpretation of God or of man's life in the world. This procedure is at once unhistoric and unphilosophic. No one would think of giving an adequate interpretation of art in the terms of the common art-products and ignoring the great masterpieces of such artists as Phidias and Praxiteles, Raphael and Michel Angelo, Beethoven and Wagner, Dante and Shakespeare. To give us a natural religion without taking into consideration the profound experiences of the prophets, the psalmists, and Jesus is to cut one's self off from history, to refuse one's rich racial heritage, and instead of becoming original to become commonplace.

Moreover, these very values, inadequate as they are, are not sufficiently grounded in the nature of the ultimate reality to provide the essential elements of religion. They are primarily human values, produced and passed on by the race. In shifting the emphasis in revelation from the supernatural to the natural, and its method from the miraculous to the normal, and its basis from the ultimate reality to the native capacities of the soul, there has arisen the question whether these values are anything more than human? Do they have any other than a subjective basis? Are they grounded in the nature of ultimate reality?

Thus for many this diminishing of the content of revelation

has made religion impotent, and this positivizing of revelation has made religion impossible. If the content of revelation is not as rich as the deepest experience of the race and of the best soul in the race, then it is too poor for the soul's high demands today. And if the content of revelation does not express the nature of the ultimate reality and is not grounded therein, the soul remains in the phenomenal, bereft of its divine companion, and, however nobly it may strive to live its life, it falls short of the distinctively religious experience. Religion can live and be potent only when men have the deep experience and the firm conviction that they are in touch with ultimate reality. The deeps in man call to the deeps in the universe, and only as there is response, and this believed to be from God, is the soul satisfied.

We are still left with the problem of the right estimate and relation of the various aspects of experience. There can be no question now as to the necessity that the religious experience should fall in with the other experiences, that it must come to the mind in accordance with the normal functionings of its powers, and that its events in the world happen in accord with the ordered working of natural forces. If religion cannot come today in this way, if revelation is not by natural and normal methods, then there is little hope either for religious experience or for its claim on attention of serious-minded men.

On the other hand, religious experience means little or nothing if it is not a revelation of the ultimate reality. Through the other aspects of experience we are consciously related to the phenomenal order; through the religious experience we are consciously related to the noumenal order. Here is the fundamental truth for which the apologists were contending in their defence of the idea of revealed religion. Their interpretation of the truth, and their method of its establishment, and much else besides, we must abandon, and indeed have abandoned; not so, however, the truth for which they contended. This is still the basic truth in all deep thinking on ultimate things; it gives meaning, worth, and power to religion; and it needs accentuation today for the deepening life of the race. Much effort for a long time has been given to make our beliefs rational, and all this has been necessary

and salutary. The time has come, however, to give more time and thought to making our religion deep and spiritual, and this we can do through a higher appreciation of the reality of the revelation which created, and culminated in, the Christian religion.

Natural religion views man as searching for God, seeking where he might find him, reaching lame hands of faith and stumbling up the world's great altar-stairs. This is a noble conception. It does justice to one aspect of human experience. It is characteristic of much in our modern religious life and thought. There is, however, another view which grows out of a richer experience and gives a deeper insight into the meaning of religion. It is that of revelation. It is the experience of the disclosure of the divine reality in the human soul and the race. It is the experience of God seeking and finding man. It is the sense of the reality of the divine which becomes the most certain fact in life. The bearer of divine revelation is not, as Schultz has well said, in the first instance a philosopher who concludes from the data of experience and the wonder of the world that God is a reality; but rather he is a prophet who is conscious of the divine reality that has come into his life, stirred his soul, quickened his conscience, gripped his will; and this experience compels its proclamation. The philosopher moves toward God through the world and man; the prophet comes from God to the world and man. The one is in search for God; the other is found of God; the one longs for certitude, the other has it. It is from God that every prophet and founder of religion comes with his revelation.

This is the experience that gave rise to religion in the first place and has continued it until this day, and which has purified and deepened it in proportion to the growing insight into the meaning and power of the divine revelation. Some revelation there was of the divine from the very beginning. Something other than nature and deeper than the human disclosed itself. Crude indeed were the interpretations of these disclosures of the gods, bizarre the methods devised for the discovery of their wills, and low the level on which all these occurrences took place. Yet the experience of the revelation of the divine, the sense of its reality, the consciousness of its power, the realization of some-

thing mysterious seizing the soul and wrestling with it, lies back of all these ideas and makes the disclosure of the divine real and potent. And the religious progress of the race means an ever-deepening experience of the incoming of this divine reality into its life, an increasingly higher level of interests on which the divine and human meet, a constantly growing spiritualization of the media through which the divine comes, and a progressively larger interpretation of the meaning of this experience.

For the true interpretation of an experience we must have recourse to its best instance. This shows more clearly its real nature. This brings us to the place in the progress of revelation of the Christian religion. The divine revelation in the Christian religion is taken as the fullest disclosure of the nature of God on the ground that it is the converging-point in which the religions meet and find the fulfilment of their meaning, that in it the experience of the soul in fellowship with God satisfies all human needs and cravings, that its interpretation of God in the terms of divine fatherhood, and man in the terms of sonship, and the final end of life as a kingdom in which all men realize their nature, is alone adequate, and that the outlook it cherishes of the external world at once inspires and purifies. This does not mean that there is no revelation of God elsewhere; on the contrary, it presupposes that there is, and that this universal revelation becomes the more certain and significant through the divine revelation which culminates in the Christian religion. It is therefore with this religion that we are now concerned and from it we get our idea of the meaning of revelation. Only as we remain on this high level we shall rightly interpret the significance of the divine disclosure.

What then, we ask, is the nature of the divine revelation?

The answers given to this question on the lower levels of religious experience are manifestly inadequate. The interpretation of revelation in the terms of information by means of divination, soothsaying, prediction, or oracle-giving concerning the will of the god in petty matters, or his dangerous power, or ritual requirement, no longer avails us. Though on a somewhat higher moral level, yet not much more adequate is the interpretation of revelation in the terms of guidance in special situations or for the

establishing of an ecclesiastical institution. These interpretations have this in common: they refer both the content and the purpose of revelation to something which in the first instance concerns man rather than God; the revelation is conceived primarily for man rather than of God. Another idea of revelation is that it is information communicated by God about himself. This is the common view. It has been held by the church from the time of the Greek fathers. It has various forms. Some think revelation to be the attestation of the truth which men have thought out for themselves, in their philosophic endeavor to interpret the meaning of the world, man, and God. Others think it gives men knowledge of the truth about the world, man, and God which they cannot acquire by their own powers. It either restores the knowledge they once had but lost, or gives it for the first time. Still others think that it is the imparting of those distinctive truths of the Christian religion which concern our salvation. Theological doctrines are the content of revelation which we must think if we would know the truth, and must believe if we would be saved. This interpretation, in so far as it makes revelation refer primarily to the disclosure of God, is nearer the truth than the other. Its defect, however, lies in its notion of the content revealed. It is information about God rather than the manifestation of God himself. It gives knowledge about God rather than experience of God. The idea is too intellectualistic. It is conceived in the terms of knowledge,—either attested or restored or imparted; and the sole organ of revelation is the intellect. We are still kept at a distance from God; there is as yet no real divine self-revelation.

The only adequate idea of revelation is that which conceives it in the terms of self-manifestation.[2] This is the conception for which we are largely indebted to a succession of German thinkers: to Schleiermacher, who saw that religion was something deeper and more vital than the orthodox thinkers on the one side and the rationalists on the other had realized, and that at the very basis of religion was the fundamental fact of revelation; to Rothe, who turned the thought of his day from questions

[2] Ihmel, Centralfragen der Dogmatik, pp. 56 ff.

of inspiration of the Scriptures to the inspiration of men as the condition for the manifestation of God; to the Erlangen school, and to Frank in particular, who in the God revealed saw the redeemer of men, whose revelation therefore has redemption for its purpose and history for its great sphere; to Ritschl and his followers, for whom revelation culminates in the disclosure of God in Jesus, and has for its purpose the establishment of the Kingdom. For one and all of these theologians revelation is no longer the communication of knowledge but the manifestation of God and the impartation of his life. God himself is the content of the revelation.

These theologians have sent us back to the Scriptures, the great record and source-book of the experiences of men to whom this revelation of God came, and we find that the Biblical historian thinks first, last, and always of God in the events of the world; the prophet feels the presence and sees the power of God in social affairs and proclaims his message; the psalmist finds God in the depths of the inner life. In like manner, the New Testament shows us men to whom God is revealed; and the revelation is deeper and truer, for the God disclosed is greater and more loving. Thus in the divine revelation in Christian experience it is God himself who is unveiled. His life in the soul produces the experience that makes for the conviction of his reality and the knowledge of his character.

And this manifestation takes place in the soul. The ultimate reality registers itself in the human consciousness. Revelation is not in the outer realm, but in the inner through the outer. The mystic is right in his insistence that the soul is the dwelling place of God; that the mind of man is the candle of the Lord; that revelation is of spirit to spirit. There is no real revelation where the human spirit does not realize the presence, experience the power, and rejoice in the life of God within. It is when there is a reaction to the influence of God in the soul that revelation takes place. This is the reason why no ready-made knowledge of God can be imparted. The experience of the soul in touch with God in its contact with the world and in its participation in historic movements is the stuff out of which it elaborates its knowledge of spiritual realities and makes its interpretations. As sense-

experience has its knowledge-value when elaborated and transmuted, so has religious experience its knowledge-value when it is pondered on and interpreted. Revelation provides the experience and the soul makes the transmutation. The reality, however, in and through all these experiences and interpretations is God.

Now the experience of this revelation of God within the soul makes possible and more easy the discovery of God elsewhere. The light of God in the soul shines out also upon the world, and in his light we see light. This revelation of God is mediated in several ways. It comes through one or another aspect of the total reality. There is nothing in the vast universe which may not come trailing clouds of glory from God who is its home. There is nothing created by God which does not serve as his organ of expression and the means of his coming into contact with the soul of man.

Thus nature is a medium for the revelation of God. It is true that some go through nature to God, but it is more true that God comes through nature into the life of man. This is the point of view of religion. It is the experience and the conviction of religious persons that God comes in and through this wonderful world into the secret places of the soul. He reveals himself through those objects and forces which condition man's earthly life, and which manifest his beneficence and create in man the grateful heart; in the stars, which, as they go singing on their way, declare the glory of God and produce awe in the soul; in the vastness of the world, which discloses the infinite reach of his power and gives man the consciousness of the ever-present divine help; in its order, which proves his faithfulness and invites man to take the attitude of trust; in its purposiveness, which manifests his providence and assures man that his life is safe in the divine care and keeping.

In the great pages of the Bible, in the prophecies, the psalms, the apostolic letters, and above all in the teaching of Jesus there is the manifold expression of the experience that God thus comes into the life of man through nature. And the best literature of last century is replete with the same thought. As one sings,

"Earth's crammed with heaven,
And every common bush afire with God."

And yet this revelation in nature is inadequate. It raises problems which trouble us keenly today. There are many things in nature which we cannot understand, occurrences we cannot explain, methods used which we cannot justify, results produced which we cannot approve. And there are times when the world is to us only a vast machine. We do not see the Spirit in the wheels discerned by the prophet with which our spirits can meet, consequently for many a man today there is no converse with the divine, and religion has ceased to be, and the soul finds itself solitary, sad, and hopeless.

"Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the resistless forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power."[3]

Nature considered apart from man is an inadequate organ for the expression of the divine thought and an imperfect medium for the impartation of God's life to the soul. Things are never the adequate means for the revelation of one mind to another; even at their best, when they are raised to a high level through artistic modification by man, they are still inadequate to the expression of his deepest life. Far more with the expression of the divine life and thought. It is only through something greater than things, however vast, complex, and ordered, that God can express his deeper thought and realize his greater purpose. If we remain

[3] B. Russell, Philosophical Essays, p. 70.

on the level of nature, we shall not receive the greater divine disclosures, and we shall always be exposed to those dark-shadowed experiences of doubt and despair. At its best, nature is but the flowing garment of God; we long, however, for the vision of the divine face, and this comes through other media.

It is in human life that we find the fuller expression of God's life. Through the person rather than the thing, however great, comes the deeper revelation of the nature of reality. In the coming of man there arrives a better medium for the divine disclosure. Here is a mind that can think and interpret the meaning of its life and penetrate into the secret recesses of the world, delight in its beauty and grandeur, enter into intimate relation of love and friendship with human beings, and know the joy of life in fellowship and service; find his vocation in subjugating the passions of the flesh in the interests of the higher nature, in developing the distinctively human powers, and building here on the earth the kingdom of heaven; and in and through all his moral tasks live in communion with the eternal Spirit.

It is just through such a personal medium as this that God enters more directly and completely into this human world. It is this personality with all its human experiences, with its love and moral passion, its high tasks and noble endeavors, its joys and sorrows, its suffering and sacrifice, its distress and peace, its sins and their forgiveness, its tragic defeats and great victories, which provides for God the greater medium through which he can reveal, far better than through nature, his moral character, and more fully impart his life. It is in these deeper experiences that God comes to the soul, makes his presence realized, his power felt, and his grace experienced. It is through these experiences that we come to realize the revelation of something greater than the world and deeper than human life.

And, on a greater scale, through the action and interaction of men and the world, in the sphere of history, God comes into human life. Revelation is not a matter of the individual life alone, in its depths and solitariness; it is also, and indeed far more, a great historic movement. It is in the sphere of history that the thoughts of men are tested and tried out; here love builds homes and links the successive generations; here men pro-

duce their great cultural values; here the consciences and wills of men clash in tragic conflict in decisive battles; here the soul's longing for the infinite and the eternal builds temples and cathedrals. In and through this great historic life there comes the larger and more certain revelation of God. The men of deeper insight in all ages have found the disclosure of the divine, not only in and through their inner lives, but also in and through social interests, noble institutions, great national events, and the historic process of the race in its upward movement to the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves. This religious experience is long prior to the philosophic interpretation of history in the terms of teleology.

Now in our social world and in the movements of history there are certain persons through whom God comes into the life of the race in greater measure and with greater clearness than through others. He is best revealed through those persons who tower far above us in their moral majesty, whose hearts are full of devotion to the race, whose minds see deep into the spiritual realities of the universe, and whose souls dwell on the mount of vision in fellowship with the Eternal. Even the dull Israelites could not fail to see the divine glory on the face of Moses, and the prejudiced Saul could not be blind to the radiance of the angelic countenance of Stephen. The greater the soul and the richer its experiences, the clearer and the deeper is the manifestation of the ultimate moral reality and the more real has God become through them to others. Through the long line of the prophets, psalmists, apostles, saints, and founders of religions the great disclosure of the divine has most fully come. It has become more significant in meaning, richer in content, higher in worth, and more potent in influence, in proportion to the development of personality and the achievement of character. The greater the soul, the deeper disclosure of the divine. The difference in the meaning and worth of revelation is thus due to the difference in the persons through whom it came.

Since the deepest revelation always waits on the greater personality, the coming of Jesus provided God with the adequate medium for the consummate manifestation of his moral character and spiritual nature. The human race knows nothing, as

Ranke said, that can be brought into comparison with the moral greatness of Jesus. In the long line of great souls through whom the divine revelation has come, he stands alone on the highest pinnacle. He is the soul through which there has come to the human race the deepest revelation of the divine and the clearest vision of God. Without depreciating other personalities or minimizing the reality and the worth of the revelation through them, the Christian finds in Jesus the unique medium for the manifestation of God. For the Christian church there is no question concerning his moral greatness and the reality of the divine revelation through him. What differences there are in the interpretation of his significance for religion arise from the different understanding of what constitutes his uniqueness.

Some think this uniqueness consists in the miraculous manner in which he came into this world and the miraculous way in which by resurrection and ascension he returned to the eternal world. Since no one else ever had such an experience, this constitutes his uniqueness, and provides the major part of the content of his revelation, and establishes his truth and certainty. His revelation is a reporting of what he knew and remembered far more than of what he learned on the earth. Others find his uniqueness in his twofold nature, from the divine part of which came the divine revelation. Since it was like revealing like, there could be no question of its reality and worth. This interpretation moves in the right direction, since it seeks in experience the fact and the meaning of revelation.

Still others see his uniqueness in some philosophical idea which can be deduced from his character and then detached from the historic reality of his personality.[4] They find the significance of Jesus in his having been the occasion for the rise in the consciousness of humanity of the idea of the God-man and in his serving the purpose of the identification of the idea and the person by the religious imagination, which always seeks such symbolic representation. Or they see his significance in serving as the "Christ-principle," a principle which is true not simply in Jesus but in reality only as the idea of Christianity itself, which maintains the essential unity of the infinite and the finite

[4] See Faut, Die Christologie seit Schleiermacher.

spirit. Jesus is the bearer of the principle and the guarantor of its realization in others.

In kinship of thought, though not in ecclesiastical affiliation, we find another group who trace their origin through the mystical succession back to the Pauline christology, and find the real significance of Jesus as the bearer of revelation not in his historical career and his achievement of character and his production of moral values on the earth, but rather in his exalted state and mystical relation with men today. What meaning, however, can be given to the mystical Christ apart from his historical reality, it is difficult to see. The tendency of all these interpretations is to lose sure footing on the earth and to get out of close touch with historic reality. To avoid this, we are forced back from the skies to the earth, from the mystical to the historical, that we may get our conception of the significance of his life as the revelation of God. It may be that here, too, as in the ancient legend contact with the earth will give strength, touch with historical fact bring greater meaning and power.

It is therefore in the historical Jesus that we find the supreme revelation of God. He stood rooted in his nation. He was conditioned by his people. He was nourished by its great literature. He felt its deeper currents pass through his own life; he knew himself as in the mighty succession of the prophets; he saw the great movement converging upon him; he penetrated into the inner reality of its hopes and expectations, and felt that they were realized in him. Much that he thought and lived, in its essential greatness and also in its transient form, he derived from the history of his race and from his own day and generation. Deeper, however, than both these sources was his own inner experience in contact with God, living his own life, thinking his own thoughts, feeling deeply the great movement of his own heart, taking his own direct attitude towards moral reality and living his own inner life of fellowship with God. The deepest thing in his life was his consciousness of God. His vision was clear; his insight penetrating; his spiritual certitude immovable; his communion unbroken. This religious experience was the controlling factor in his life. It made him what he was; it gave him his message; it made his moral consciousness function with sympathetic ap-

preciation and with inevitable unerringness. It kept him in touch with all sorts of men; it gave him his consuming passion for men; it sent him on his redemptive mission; it kept him true to his vocation; it led him to the cross.

It is in and through these great experiences of Jesus that there was given to the world the deepest revelation of God. It was through this spirit that the eternal Spirit disclosed its deepest depths; through this mind, the everlasting truths of life; through this moral consciousness, the nature of the ultimate reality; through this moral passion for man's redemption, the revelation of his supreme interest and his forgiving love for the race. The life of Jesus spells for us the character of God.

The purpose of this divine revelation is the creation of the Christian religion. It is to bring the divine and the human spirit into fellowship. The manifestation of the one spirit to the other is that they may both live together. The great purpose of God, as far as we can read it in revelation, is the establishment of right relations between him and the soul, and of all that this involves in the other relations of life. It means the fellowship of thought between the two minds in their common interest in truth; the fellowship of love between the two hearts for all holy things; and the fellowship of work between the two wills in the realization of divine ends.

The divine spirit is not, however, to be conceived as an isolated reality. The God with whom we have to do, and with whom we are to be in right relations, is not the God of the soul alone but also the God of the world and humanity, of time and eternity. To be in fellowship with God means to find him in his world, with all its forces and in all its laws; and to live in harmony with them and in obedience to them. It means, also, that we must find God in all souls, and serve him in and through them, and serve them by working for the realization of God's purposes for their lives. It follows then that we are to have fellowship with the God of contemporaneity; to find him in our day and generation, in this flux of things, in this seething stream of the world. But while "modernity is good, eternity is better," and the God of eternity, mirrored in the glassy sea of heaven, must be the supreme concern of life and thought. Revelation

is thus for fellowship, and in this fellowship religion is perfected.

But the realization of this sublime purpose of the divine revelation involves redemption. If religion is the end of revelation, redemption is man's great need and God's sure means for its realization. Through his spiritual ignorance man is blind to his true life. He does not know wherein he is to find the satisfaction of his soul; he thinks that things are the great values; he grasps at the tangible; he seeks for the material; he lives and moves in the phenomenal; he experiences an arrest of his soul's ascent; he does not go beyond the world or man in his search for the ultimate, wherein alone he can find his true and enduring satisfactions. The world, and certain aspects of human life which should be transparent media through which he could see the ultimate realities of life, are opaque and he remains with them. And while afflicted with spiritual blindness he is also in moral bondage. His passions bind him; his appetites drive him; his ambitions make him cruel; his selfishness makes him indifferent; and his egotism makes him godless. The person he was meant to be and can be, he is not, because of the stunting effects of his sin. There are powers in him which do not have the opportunity for development, since the life he lives is not in accord with his true nature.

The purpose of revelation, interpreted in the terms of the Christian religion, is realized in the redemption effected by Jesus through his moral greatness and spiritual power. Men and women came to a new sense of God through him. When they were in his presence and had insight into his moral greatness, they became conscious that they were also in the presence of God. Contact with this greatest moral reality of their human world made them realize the ultimate moral reality. Their own consciousness of God became clear, keen, certain, and controlling; and two different kinds of experience resulted. On the one hand they had a profound sense of the moral character of God and a deep conviction of their sin. No one was ever as sympathetic with sinners as Jesus, but no sinner ever confused the moral issues of life in his presence and in his relation to the God of whom he made men conscious. Moral confusion, no less

than intellectual perplexity, has often resulted from theological doctrines of the atonement; but neither the one nor the other befell the men who realized the august moral realities of life through Christ. They experienced a new conviction of sin, a new consciousness of guilt, and the absolute need for a moral change of life. The moral despair, however, which often results from this new experience was not theirs. They had the assurance of forgiveness. Terrible as was the righteousness of God seen and felt through the life of Jesus in its judgment on sin, yet these men felt that, in and through Jesus, God was seeking them and finding them. It was not so much his teaching that assured them, nor the promises he made them, rather it was his life of redeeming, forgiving love that convinced them, and in this they found absolution for their sin. Their consciences might condemn them, but Christ was greater than their consciences, and his attitude towards them made them realize the forgiveness of God.

This forgiveness, however, is for fellowship. It culminates in communion. Forgiveness of the past which does not restore personal relations is of no avail. The returning prodigal is received into filial fellowship. The father and the son are once more in loving relation. It is in this fellowship, intimate, deep, and comprehensive, that the divine revelation finds its purpose realized, and the Christian religion is established in power and permanence. It is in this fellowship that the redeemed soul finds the growth of its nature, and the release of its powers which make its life a larger reality, its experience more significant and worthful, and the dynamic for the undaunted and victorious struggle with the world, its suffering, sorrow, and death.

These great redemptive experiences which culminate in communion with God and the moral life triumphant over the world have been reproduced in the lives of men in all the centuries since Jesus' time. Through the record of his life and insight into its meaning they have come into a relation with God like his. As one is brought face to face with the beautiful in the contemplation of some great painting, with truth through the thought of some great thinker, so also, though in a deeper way,

are we brought face to face with God through this great soul. In and through this life the consciousness is produced that we are in right relation with the ultimate moral reality. Through this historical Jesus we find the eternal God, and are at home in worlds hitherto unrealized. While the revelation is thoroughly historical, it is more. It is personal; it is continuous; it is contemporaneous. The distance between our country and Palestine is overcome; the centuries are annulled; the God and Father of our Lord Jesus is disclosed to us here and now; and we interpret the God whom we find today in our souls and in the world and in advancing humanity, in the terms of the truth of the mind of Jesus, the love of his heart, and the purpose of his life.

This divine revelation which created the Christian religion and culminated in it is the only adequate disclosure of God which we possess. The Christian religion cherishes the conviction that there is no different or greater revelation to come than that which has been made in and through Jesus. Theologians have given expression to this conviction in their interpretation of this religion in the terms of its truth, or finality, or absoluteness. By these terms they have meant that in the truth of the Christian religion we have the real expression of the mind of God; in its finality we have the goal of the religious movement of humanity; in its absoluteness we have the realization of the deepest nature of man and the disclosure of the ultimate depths of the life of God.

This religious conviction, on the one hand, and its theological interpretation, on the other, are confronted today by objections which arise from other ideas and reveal other attitudes of mind. To speak of any finality today is to be met at once with the reply that nothing has reached its end, that every thing is evolving, that the universe itself is still in the process of creative evolution. And to speak of any thing absolute is to be met with the assertion of the relativity of all life and ideas, and even of the forms of thought and moral principles. Our life is so deeply involved in the phenomenal, the historical, the relative, that we find it hard to transfer our minds to the point of view of the superhistorical, the absolute, the ultimate. And yet it is just in

this region that religion lives and moves and has the secret of its being.

There can, however, be no question about the claim of finality on the part of the Christian religion. The evidence of this claim is clear enough. The movement of the historic process through which God reveals himself has as its objective the coming of Christ, and finds in him its culmination, since he was the realization of its mighty hopes and the fulfilment of its sublime aspirations for uninterrupted fellowship with God and for the establishing of his reign in the hearts of men and in the affairs of the world. Far more significant, however, is Christ's own consciousness and conviction on this matter. He interprets his life as the fulfilment of prophecy, regards himself as the Messiah than whom none other is to be expected, declares that he alone knows the Father intimately, adequately, and truly; and that his great mission to the world is to be the bearer of this revelation.

And the experience and conviction of the first Christians have borne witness to the same claim. They saw in Jesus the Christ of God, they found in him the revealer, they experienced through him their redemption and their personal fellowship with God. From this experience they conceived Christ as the one in whose name all nations were to be baptized; the cosmic process itself had come to its culmination, and they expected all the future progress of the race to be the deeper realization in life and thought of this revelation of God in him.

It is well for us to mark the limitation of the idea of the finality of revelation. It is not meant to cover the field of science, nor the sphere of philosophy, nor in large measure the region of history. The man of science has not yet come to his final conclusions concerning the nature of the forces he studies and the formulæ of their action. Nor has the philosopher given us the final interpretation of the meaning of the world, man, and the ultimate reality in their relation one with another. And certainly the historian must wait on events yet to occur before he can give us the meaning of the historic process even of our own day. Non-finality in all these aspects of reality characterizes our effort. It is this fact which keeps open for these students the great realms of the world for their study and makes us eager for their

discoveries and interpretations. In all these extensive regions of knowledge we are far from any finality or absoluteness in our knowledge. Consequently, any claim made by the theologian in the name of the Christian religion to the final interpretation of things in these spheres is not justified by the facts, or by the nature of the divine revelation. To make this claim for things which belong to the discredited and discarded world-view of the Bible is to endanger the spiritual reality which must be central in our thought. The idea of finality is something which concerns not the framework of things but the nature and character and purpose of God. Revelation is the disclosure of God. It is the manifestation of his deepest nature, his absolute moral character, his final purpose in the establishment of his kingdom in the world. In the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ we have the self-disclosure of the Spirit of which all truth is the expression, all beauty is the manifestation, and all love the embodiment. A higher term for our thought of God than christlike we do not possess. Not only do we baptize nature in the name of Christ but we baptize our idea of God in the same name. For us the ultimate reality is christlike. At the heart of all things there beats the loving heart of God. And in our fellowship with God we have the experience which for the soul is final. Not that the soul has entered into it completely, nor that it understands it adequately, but that in this experience the ultimate is reached, and nothing in God, or in the soul itself, is to make it a passing phenomenon. The right way is taken for the complete communion of perfect fellowship. Growth into Christ's experience takes us ever deeper into our fellowship with God on all the great moral and spiritual interests of life. Religious experience apart from Christ impoverishes our lives and leaves us uncertain of the nature and purpose of the ultimate spiritual reality. And we find in the spirit of Jesus in every critical situation and in all human relations the perfection of the will in its moral attitudes. To have the mind of Jesus is therefore to see into the moral depths of life, to be in right relations with all persons, and to make the affairs and interests of the world subserve social welfare. Personal moral progress is made in and through the realization of Christ's type of life, and the welfare of society

is secured through fidelity to his moral principles and social attitude.

This suggests our final consideration. In the divine revelation and the Christian religion Jesus has a permanent place. By some it is held that the divine revelation may indeed have been given through Jesus as through no one else, but that now that others know it, he is no longer essential to it. Once the great truths of life are made known and are capable of being thought by others, the person who first thought and expressed them may be wholly set aside or forgotten. No one need think of Euclid in working out present problems in geometry, or of Archimedes in dealing with problems in mechanics. How little did Buddha care for his fate at the hands of the universe or even in the memory of his disciples! Mahomet thought little of his person in view of the greatness of his bequest of the law to the people.

All this is perfectly true, and if the Christian religion were only a set of truths or a group of laws the same would be true of it. But since it is primarily a life in fellowship with God, the case is different, for it is in and through the life of Jesus that we know God best and are brought into fellowship with him. If revelation were not primarily *of* God but were only *for* man, we could dispense with Jesus, but since it is of God, and this in and through the life of Jesus, we are compelled to recognize his personal place in the Christian religion and his abiding significance for the soul of man. As Troeltsch says in his address before the Liberal Congress of Religion in Berlin:

> There is . . . also the fact that there is no other means of holding the Christian community together than that of acknowledging Jesus; that it is impossible to keep alive the peculiarly Christian idea of God without seeing in Jesus the life-giving embodiment of him; that all the more important and characteristic ideas of Christianity, grace which enters into and possesses us, that sense of security which is offered us, that strength which elevates and subdues us, depend on a religious estimation and interpretation of Jesus as the revelation of God. To sever the Christian belief in God in every sense from the person of Jesus would mean cutting away this belief from its roots in the past, from methods which have been employed to represent and contemplate it, from all the greatness which so immeasurably surpasses that of the average of man,—ultimately in fact destroying the belief itself. . . . Jesus is the embodiment

of the transcendent power, ever illuminated afresh through the centuries, whose pulse beats through the whole of Christendom, just as the vibrations of a ship's engines are felt in every part and corner of the vessel. For this reason he will always remain a living force wherever the Christian prophetic faith in God abides; and the belief in him will, only by looking upwards to such a personality, raise itself to full power and security over the common weakness and poverty of mankind. If this is the case, then the image of Jesus will remain inseparable from all efficacious Christian belief in God.

The passing centuries, instead of removing us further from Christ and making him less significant, serve more and more to show his real greatness and his permanent worth for the race. It has been said that it is the fate of great thinkers to be obliged to make and wait for the coming of men who can understand them. This is still more true in the region of the moral and spiritual life. Christ must produce Christians in order to be fully understood; and the more Christian the race becomes, the more deeply will it penetrate into the meaning of his life, and the more truly appreciate the grandeur of his soul, and in and through it find God and have fellowship with him. The traveller in the valley of Chamounix is deeply impressed with the towering greatness of Mt. Blanc; but it is only when he climbs Mt. Brevent, which lies opposite, that he truly sees how far Mt. Blanc towers above the surrounding peaks and how majestic is its snow-capped dome. The race, through the passing centuries, will climb to ever-greater heights, but these heights will only serve as a vantage-ground to show how divine is the soul of the Master in and through whom God comes to men; in him they will see the Father and it will suffice them.

# *THE LUKAN TRADITION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER*

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In its effort to determine the historic sense of the New Testament records, and thus to understand them genetically, modern criticism has developed no instrument more effective than the method of comparison. In former days the aim was harmonization, because the interpreter started with the assumption of a mechanical agreement among the witnesses. Today the aim is distinction, because mechanical coincidence is neither assumed nor desired. On the contrary the broader the contrast in point of view, the surer the ultimate inference. Stars so remote that they give no parallax, their rays seeming to come at precisely the same angle no matter from what point of the earth's orbit the observer takes his measurements, afford small hope of determining their real position. There must be difference of angle when the earth has swung round half its orbit, or there is no basis for measurement. Fortunately for the problem of the historical Jesus, the rays which come to us from him do not travel along precisely parallel lines. On the other hand the problem is enormously complicated by the process of mixture; for the testimony of one witness has visibly affected that of another, detracting from its independent value. Paul's conception is indeed distinctive in itself, strongly marked and characteristic. Little as he tells us of the common tradition, his own point of view is definable, and moreover he both expressly differentiates it from certain views which he opposes as reactionary, and also asserts its essential agreement with certain doctrines and traditions which he declares to be preached by all, "whether it were I, or they." The "apostolic" conception, on the other hand (if we may use the word "apostolic," in a Lukan rather than a Pauline sense, to include only the personal associates of Jesus) is hard to differentiate in its purity. The material embodied by Luke, espe-

cially in the early chapters of Acts reporting the speeches of Peter, admittedly shows the widest divergence from Paul's conceptions of the person of Christ and the work and message of redemption. Late as the work of the third evangelist may be,—its date in our judgment is not far from 100, and it is certainly later than Mark's gospel, which it incorporates as its very framework,—its author claims to have proceeded after the manner of a conscientious historian in examining and utilizing the work of his "many" predecessors, and we must to the following extent at least give credence to his claim. He has certainly embodied other sources along with Mark, and that not merely as did Matthew,—an evangelist whose historical interest is quite subordinate to that of teaching men to "observe all things whatsoever [Jesus] had commanded." Luke has not contented himself with Matthew's almost slavish dependence on the narrative of Mark as a framework for the body of precepts. Taking up most of this "logian" material in common with Matthew, though not in great agglutinated blocks of discourse, but with a sincere attempt to rearrange it "in order" as consecutive history, Luke also adds a goodly amount of material, both narrative and "logian," found in neither Matthew nor Mark, yet so clearly interconnected and so distinctive in type as to have won from modern analytical and literary critics the designation the "special source" of Luke. And this "special source" is strong precisely where the collection of precepts so dear to Matthew is weak, namely, in the story of the passion and resurrection. Here more than anywhere else Luke drops even his Ariadne's thread of Mark, and boldly strikes out an independent course. Often, indeed, this departure is in the interest of rhetorical beauty, sentiment, and edification, rather than of history; but instances of real gain in historical verisimilitude are not wanting, as in the account of Jesus' detention and abuse by "the men who held him captive" in the courtyard of "the house of the high-priest" until his taking away by "the whole crowd of them" to the trial before Pilate in the morning. Here the probability is very greatly on the side of the special source, as against Mark's impossible story of a trial before the entire Sanhedrin at midnight of passover night (!) For in Mark the Jewish senate is successively con-

vened and dismissed and reconvened at the high priest's house between cock-crowing and dawn (Mk. 15 1), with no advantage gained by the process, save a publicity and responsibility they are really anxious above all things to avoid, together with an opportunity to indulge (the Sanhedrin!) in personal abuse of the helpless victim. Here the simplified Lukan version extorts at least the verdict, *Si non è vero, è ben trovato.*

The weakness of the method of literary or source analysis in the gospels is the lack of external criteria by which to check and verify its results. Besides the far more complete digestion and assimilation of source-material in an author such as Luke, as compared with one of the compilers of Hebrew history such as $JE^r$ or $JEP^r$, there is the lack of a well-defined relation between historical praxis and literary presupposition. The deuteronomic and priestly codes introduce revolutionary changes in the national cultus, so that we can say with confidence, The period before Josiah cannot possibly have known Deuteronomy; or, The period before the exile is unaffected by religion as understood in P. But it is exceedingly difficult to trace variations of observance in various branches of the apostolic and post-apostolic church. We know something of its two great rites, baptism and the breaking of bread, though little as to their origin and the differences of meaning attached to them at various stages of their development in different quarters. We know something of the later disputes over the observance of days and seasons; but what would we not give to be able to trace to its real beginning the observance of "the Lord's day," or the annual fast and feast of the quartodeciman "true passover of the Lord"!

Of the relation of the widely variant accounts of the resurrection in Paul on the one side and gospel tradition on the other to "primitive observance" we have spoken elsewhere.[1] It remains to be seen whether it may not be possible similarly to correlate research into the origin and significance of the Lord's supper with literary analysis of the gospels, in such wise as to

[1] See The Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance. Yale University Press, 1911 (reprinted from American Journal of Theology for July, 1911), and Beginnings of Gospel Story, Yale University Press, 1909, pp. 190–232.

reflect light in both directions. A large amount of able and scholarly criticism has lately been expended upon the historical problem of the origin and significance of the sacraments, the point of departure being practically dictated by the historical references of Paul in 1 Cor. 10 1–11 34, with the Synoptic Gospels as check, and the aim a differentiation of the Pauline surcharge of new and mystical significance leading over to the sacramentarian conceptions of the Fourth Gospel, Ignatius, and the church fathers. We can scarcely hope to define this process of development more clearly than has been done, for example, by Heitmüller in his admirable discussions of the subject[2]—if indeed we guard ourselves from too much emphasis upon the new elements contributed by Paul. The factors of Paul's personal contribution were twofold: (1) his own religious experience, (2) the influence exerted upon him by Greek ideas indirectly through hellenistic Judaism and directly through his adaptation of his message to the capacity of Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking communities. But we must beware of overestimating the new constituents. A. Schweitzer's [3] keen and insistent criticism will serve here as a mentor of sleepless persistence and alacrity.

Heitmüller's classification of the sources for our knowledge of the institution of the Lord's Supper may be adopted as commanding general assent. We have really but three forms of the tradition in the New Testament; for Mt. 26 26–29 is an almost identical transcript of Mk. 14 22–25, and in the Fourth Gospel the sacrament is not instituted at all. There Jesus gives only a symbol and interpretation of it in the miracle of the loaves and the discourse in Capernaum on the bread from heaven,[4] as the Baptist in the opening chapter gives a prophecy and symbol

[2] Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus, 1903, and "Abendmahl" in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, i, pp. 19–51.

[3] Das Abendmahlsproblem auf Grund der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des 19. Jahrhunderts und der historischen Berichte, 1901; and Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung, 1911, pp. 141–180.

[4] Jn. 6; cf. Jn. 13. The discourse of Jn. 15 f. develops eucharistic themes, and thus throws an indirect light on the problem.

of baptism (conceived as exclusively a Christian ordinance) which Jesus in the two succeeding chapters interprets.[5] This leaves as actual reports of the institution only (1) Paul's references in 1 Cor. 10–11; (2) Mark-Matthew; (3) Lk. 22 15 ff. Moreover, to get at strictly independent testimony we have still to subtract from the evangelic records of 70–100 A.D. the element absorbed from the Pauline, which dates in this form from 53–54 A.D., but gives evidence of transition from an earlier to a later mode of observance and interpretation of the rite.

In the case of Lk. 22 15–20 the process of removal of the Pauline element is simplified by the testimony of the textual authorities. So decisive is the evidence of "Western" texts and versions to the absence from the original of verses 19b–20, and so obviously is the latter passage constructed on the basis of 1 Cor. 11 24 f. and interpolated in the context, that Westcott and Hort are driven to the following verdict:

> These difficulties, added to the suspicious coincidence with 1 Cor. 11 24 f. . . . leave no moral doubt that the words in question were absent from the original text of Luke.

Our Revised Version accordingly inserts the marginal note: "Some ancient authorities omit *which is given for you . . . which is poured out for you.*" The subtraction leaves for the Lukan tradition a strangely different representation of the institution of the "covenant" meal and of the significance of the cup and the broken bread. To this we must return hereafter.

But the higher criticism has also evidence to adduce for Pauline influence upon the tradition represented by Mark-Matthew. The general phenomena of our second gospel not only confirm the tradition of its origin in the great Pauline church at Rome, but show clearly the evangelist's dependence upon distinctive Pauline ideas. This is less apparent in mere matters of language than in the evangelist's general attitude of mind, as when he takes up (especially in 4 11) the doctrine of the hardening of Israel, or when he makes the believer's attainment of eternal life depend on faith in Jesus as the Son of God and loyal self-surrender to him, rather than on obedience to precepts or forms of righteous-

[5] Jn. 1 19–34; cf. 2 1–11 and 3 1–30.

ness (chap. 10). We should anticipate in a gospel of this type decided evidences of Pauline modification of the proto-apostolic tradition; and such, we believe, can be shown to be the case with Mark's dating and interpretation of the supper. The Markan dating not only conflicts with the Johannine, but is inconsistent with the narrative taken up by himself. According to Mk. 14 1 f. the authorities are urgent to apprehend Jesus *before* the great feast day (Nisan 14) in order to avoid "a tumult of the people." As the chapter continues, the supper is identified with that of the Jewish passover on the night of Nisan 13–14. The motive is transparent. The evangelist wishes to represent the Jewish (annual) feast as having been superseded and abolished by the institution of the Christian (weekly) sacrament. But the result to the narrative is to make it self-contradictory. The description of the meal of leavened bread (ἄρτος) and wine, without the distinctive passover elements and ritual, together with the ensuing disregard of the legal requirements [6] is perhaps of less moment. But what shall we say of the arrest, trial, and crucifixion, which are now made by Mark to take place on passover night (Nisan 14), the crisis occurring at the very hour which the conspirators are most anxious to avoid! Nothing but the occidental evangelist's antipathy to the oriental practice (reflected in the Fourth Gospel) of an annual commemoration of the crucifixion and resurrection on Nisan 14, the "passover of the Lord," can fully account for the discrepancy. Mark desires to justify the conception of the supper and the mode of its observance current in his own section of Christendom, that is at Rome. Fortunately we have reliable witness of a collision on this point between East and West no later than 154 A.D. We must anticipate, therefore, in the Markan form of the tradition greater or less conformation to the mode of celebration and interpretation prevalent in the church at Rome not long after the time of Paul's letters and residence. For our gospels were not composed to please the critical historian, but to edify and confirm the believer in "the things wherein he had been instructed."

We need pause but a moment for the minute additions of Matthew. The later transcript has "Take, eat," instead of the

[6] Cf. for instance 14 26 with Ex. 12 22.

mere "Take" of Mark, and changes "And they all drank of it" to "Drink ye all of it." It also further defines the symbolism of the "shed blood" by adding "for the remission of sins." This clause is removed from Mark's characterization of the baptism of John and appended here, much as Jn. 1 29 removes from this pre-christian rite all significance with relation to sin and forgiveness, and makes the Baptist merely point to "the Lamb of God," with his baptism of the Holy Ghost, as real remover of "the sin of the world." Manifestly no basis of independent tradition can be claimed for Matthew's changes. They merely fortify the Markan rubric.

If we would subtract from Mk. 14 22–30 the element due to Pauline influence, and thus come back to the basis of pre-pauline (or at least non-pauline) tradition on which Mark is framed, we must first of all try to discover from Paul's own suggestions what was distinctive in his teaching regarding the supper, as compared with the commonly received doctrinal tradition. Fortunately, Paul himself has defined for us the distinctive element in his message, for instance in his report of his vindication of his doctrine of the abolition of the law against Peter in Antioch (Gal. 2 15–21). It was the assertion that the death of Christ has annulled the legal economy; and this doctrine is very closely related to that of mystic union with Christ "in the Spirit." Both factors are typified according to Paul in the sacraments. Knowing what we do from Paul himself (Rom. 7 7–25, Phil. 3 4–11) of the personal religious experience which made him conscious of a message beyond and above all he might gain by intercourse with "those who were apostles before him," we ought to be able to differentiate his distinctive and individual doctrine in 1 Cor. 11 17–34, where he prescribes the mode of observance of "the Lord's supper" and interprets its significance, from the current and general conception taken for granted in the allusions of 1 Cor. 10 1–11 1.

Israel, says Paul in 1 Cor. 10, were baptized in water and the Spirit when they passed through the Red Sea, and were covered by the cloud. So, too, they ate and drank of spiritual food and drink, which is Christ, when they received the manna and the

water from the rock.[7] Their idolatry and fornication at Beth-peor, that brought on them the wrath of God, offer an example of what it should mean for a Christian to go from "the table of the Lord" to "the table of demons" as guest at an idolatrous feast. To become in this way "partners with demons" will "provoke the Lord to jealousy," because, while the idol is nothing, the demonic being represented by it is real, and a repast partaken of in honor of a demon produces fellowship with demons. The admitted proposition that "the cup of blessing which we bless is a fellowship of the blood of Christ," and "the loaf which we break is a fellowship of the body of Christ," carries with it the necessary inference, "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. Ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons."

Here is the basic starting-point. The sacrament is a fellowship (κοινωνία) which unites the believer to Christ; making him a member of Christ's body. It is a "table-covenant," separating the Christian from all alien relationships. It is apparent that the rite of the "communion" (κοινωνία) is practised and understood universally in this sense. Hence the interrogative form, "Is it not?"

The noteworthy thing is that in all the allusions of this chapter to the symbolism of the rite as commonly understood there is no single clear reference to the death of Jesus. It is a "communion" of his "body" and "blood"; but one can be united in "blood-covenant" with a living man, so as to be "of his body and blood" or "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh" without any thoughts of his death. In fact the act of "guest-fellowship" or "table-fellowship" is commonly held to effect a union of life rightly thus expressed. An equally important difference between 1 Cor. 10 and 1 Cor. 11 might be that of *order*, if we could be sure that the change from 11 3 f. ("eat . . . drink") to the reverse order in verses 16 and 21 ("cup . . . bread," "cup . . . table") was a conformation to the customary praxis, wherein the ritual of the cup preceded. But no certain conclusion of the kind can be drawn.

[7] Ex. 16 and 17. The order of events in the narrative makes here the order "ate . . . drank" inevitable.

A paragraph answering the Corinthians' question regarding the costume of women in the assembly (11 2–16) intervenes before Paul continues the subject of the "communion" service. Then in 11 17–22 he rebukes the local disorders, and in 11 23–24 gives specific regulations for the future. These are partly based upon his own interpretation of the significance of the rite, partly are aimed to remove the too convivial and festive character (to give it no worse name) which the Corinthians had been giving to the "Lord's supper," and invest it with the solemnity of a sacrament commemorating "the Lord's death." The emphasis is placed throughout on this relation to "the Lord's death," as the thing needing to be apprehended. With this object the explanation is added, "For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye are proclaiming the Lord's death." [8] If, as many hold, the opening statement, "I have received of (παρέλαβον ἀπὸ) the Lord," is to be understood not of tradition (παράδοσις) but of mystical revelation (ἀποκάλυψις), it can of course refer only to this special aspect of the rite as a commemoration of Jesus' *death*, perhaps to the words twice uttered (vss. 24, 25), "This do in remembrance of me," words central for Paul's thought, but singularly (if not inexplicably) wanting from the Synoptic record. If Paul is here communicating "revelation," we must understand it of this feature only; for the Apostle can hardly have spoken of the generally current tradition of the rite as a special revelation to himself. If he is speaking of a form of the tradition reaching back to Jesus, we must account for the absence of the command, "This do," from Synoptic story as the rules of criticism require; and it is far less likely to have been dropped by transcribers, who sought in every way to enhance the solemnity of the ritual, than added in process of its transmission.

We are justified, then, in tracing (provisionally at least) a distinction between the general significance and mode of observance

[8] The expression τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλετε, as Rev. G. H. Box points out in his admirable article, "Jewish Antecedents of the Eucharist" (Journal of Theological Studies, April, 1902, p. 364), corresponds to the *haggada* (from *higgid*, "to tell a tale"), the ἱερὸς λόγος, of the passover, "which consists mainly of the telling of the story of the Exodus." Cf. Deut. 26 1–11.

of the communion of the Lord's supper, as presupposed in 1 Cor. 10, and the special connection with the doctrine of the cross (Paul's own distinctive doctrine) which he is laboring to give it in 1 Cor. 11. The former interprets the "cup of blessing" as a covenant-cup, not necessarily referring in any way to the Lord's death, but simply cementing, by a rite of almost world-wide observance and of immemorial antiquity, an eternal and indissoluble bond of brotherhood. The latter interprets it as "the new covenant in my blood." Chapter 10 interprets the broken bread simply of "table-fellowship" with the Lord, a "fellowship of the body of Christ, seeing that we who are many are one loaf, one body, for we all partake of the one loaf." It might go back to the "breaking of bread" in Galilee, when Jesus acted as house-father to the little company for whose sake he had sundered the ties of earthly home and kin, as well as to "the night in which he was betrayed." Chapter 11 interprets it as the body "given [some texts read "broken"] for your advantage," introducing a reference to the cross as a vicarious sacrifice.

But let us limit ourselves to the first of these differences, expressed in the words "the new covenant in my blood." The reference is unmistakable to Paul's individually distinctive doctrine of the "new covenant," "not of the letter but of the spirit," developed at length in contradistinction to "the old covenant" in 2 Cor. 3 6–4 6. Jesus is depicted as comparing the blood of his cross to the blood sprinkled by Moses on the altar when he pledged Israel at Sinai to obedience to "all the words of this covenant" (Ex. 24 8). Paul's disciple, the author of Hebrews, takes up the antithesis of 2 Cor. 3 3 and 11, between the tables of stone and of the heart, between "that which passeth away" and "that which remaineth." He further develops it on the basis of Jeremiah's great chapter on the "new covenant" written on the heart. Here, then, in Heb. 8 1–10 25 comes the full elaboration of Paul's conception of "the blood of the new covenant," reaching its loftiest expression in the closing benediction: "The God of peace, who brought again from the dead the great Shepherd of the sheep with *the blood of the eternal covenant*, make you perfect."

Are we to see in this reference to the superseding of the Mosaic dispensation by a new one the real, historic sense of the rite? Did Jesus intend to institute a commemoration of his death as an atoning sacrifice, abolishing the legal and instituting the filial relationship of men to God? Or is this a part of the special revelation of Paul? We must apply such standards as we now possess to Synoptic tradition before we can properly answer this question, endeavoring here also to differentiate Pauline from pre-pauline, or at least non-pauline, conceptions.

Mark 14 22–25 undoubtedly corresponds to the conception and mode of observance of the Lord's supper prevalent in Rome in 70–80 A.D., and forms part of a narrative clearly derived from pre-pauline sources. Yet if we place the story of 1 Cor. 11 24 f. side by side with it, we shall inevitably be struck with the close similarity, and this impression will surely be heightened if subsequently we observe the contrast of this Pauline-Markan-Matthaean account with the Lukan (in the true text) and its kindred. To bring out more distinctly the real nature of such differences as exist we print in Italics the additions in Paul which seem to be of an explanatory character, and in black type those of Mark which imply an independent source.

| Mk. 14 22–25. | 1 Cor. 11 24 f. |
|---|---|
| 22 And as they were eating he took a loaf and blessed (εὐλογήσας) and gave to them and said: **Take,** this is my body. | 23b In the night in which he was betrayed Jesus took a loaf 24 and gave thanks (εὐχαριστήσας) and brake it and said: This is my body, *which is (given) on your behalf. Do this in remembrance of me.* |
| 23 And he took a cup and gave thanks (εὐχαριστήσας) and gave to them, **and they all drank from it,** 24 and he said unto them, This is my blood of the [new] covenant which is shed on behalf of many. | 25 Likewise also the cup after supper, saying: This cup is the *new* covenant in my blood. *This do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.* |
| 25 **Verily I say unto you, henceforth I shall no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.** | 26 *For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye are proclaiming the Lord's death* until he come. |

We note, first of all, a coincidence of order which may prove highly significant. In agreement with the apparent meaning of Paul in the phrase, "the cup after supper" (1 Cor. 11 25), and at all events in accordance with the Corinthian practice of first satisfying hunger in the common repast, Mark (followed by Matthew) states that Jesus took one of the loaves "as they were eating," and instituted *first* the ordinance of bread, *afterwards* that of the cup. Since the record of Luke and primitive Syrian practice as recorded in the liturgy of the Didache [9] reverses this order, the point is worth noting.

Secondly, we note that while Mark neglects Paul's repeated commandment of the Lord, "This do in remembrance of me," as well as the addition of Paul, "given on your behalf" after the bread, he shows decided sympathy with the symbolism Paul is developing. For he inserts after the cup the words "shed for many," and so amplifies from the same Isaian passage which had previously affected his phraseology in 10 45 ("to give his life a ransom for many, cf. Isa. 53 11). As we have seen, Matthew carries the process further by adding "for remission of sins." Thus far there is, on the surface, nothing to indicate Mark's dependence on a source other than Paul's, unless we count as such the omission of the command, "Do this in remembrance of me." The word "Take" in vs. 22 and the clause, "and they all drank from it," in vs. 23 are so easily accounted for as mere editorial enlargement that only independent evidence would lead us to regard them as supplied by a source. This evidence, however, is in fact available, and will appear when Mk. 14 22–25 is placed alongside of Lk. 22 16–18.[10] But this does not affect the general impression of the record. The interpretation put upon the rite as a covenant of *atoning blood* is distinctly and unmistakably Pauline. Only the awkwardness of the double genitive ("my blood of the covenant") suggests amplification of an original shorter form, to make it correspond with 1 Cor. 11 25 ("the new covenant in my blood"). This impression would be

[9] See the passage quoted below, p. 024.

[10] See below, p. 014. Mark borrows Lk. 22 18 in 14 25; the preceding clause (17b) is the source for his additions, "take" and "and they all drank of it," in 14 23 f.

irresistible if we could admit the very early interpolation "new" in the reading "blood of the *new* covenant," but this we unhesitatingly reject. If we proceed further to reject the second genitive ("of the covenant") as well, the formula of Mk. 14 24 will correspond exactly with its predecessor: "This is my body . . . this is my blood," and we shall obtain a formula free from Pauline admixture. But we have no manuscript authority for omitting "of the covenant." The addition (if such it be) must be attributed to the evangelist himself.

Thirdly, we meet an element in Mk. 14 25 which is certainly not of Pauline derivation, though a faint echo of the sentiment is perhaps to be found in the closing words of Paul's final comment (1 Cor. 11 26). With vs. 25 a wholly new aspect of the symbolism is all at once opened up; and the phraseology ("fruit of the vine") is as new as the thought. It is not Paul who has suggested this interpretation of the supper as a symbol of the messianic feast in the kingdom of God. To Paul "the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." There is no occurrence in his epistles of the figure so common in the Synoptic Gospels and the Revelation of the marriage supper of the Lamb, the redemption banquet, in which the elect from east and west and north and south enter into the joy of their Lord and feast with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. At all events, in this closing verse of Mark's record of the supper we are compelled to look to other sources than Paul's for the distinctive thought and phraseology.

And we have not far to look. Turning, lastly, to that element of Luke's record which remains after subtraction of the interpolation from 1 Cor. 11 24 f., we may first of all put in one column the Lukan source, subtracting only the few verses (22–28) demonstrably drawn from Mark, and side by side with it Paul's references to "the Lord's supper" in all the naïveté of its unreformed observance in 1 Cor. 10 1–11 1, together with the passage just noted in Mark.

Lk. 22 15–30 (authentic text).

15 And he said unto them: With desire have I desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer. 16 For I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means eat it until it be fulfilled in the (redemption feast of the) kingdom of God. 17 And he took a cup and spoke the blessing (εὐχαριστήσας) and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves; 18 for I say unto you that henceforth (ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν) I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine (ἀπὸ τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου) until the kingdom of God come.

19 And he took a loaf (of leavened bread) and spoke the blessing (εὐχαριστήσας) and gave it to them and said: This is my body. . . . 28 Ye are they that have continued (διαμεμενηκότες) with me in my trials.

29 And I for my part make covenant appointment (διατίθεμαι) to you, even as my father hath covenanted (διέθετο) to me a kingdom, 30 that ye shall eat (ἔσθητε) and drink at my table in my kingdom (cf. 2 Sam. 9 7), and shall sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel (cf. Ps. 122 5).

(The Covenant of David—as the promise Mt. 19 28=Lk. 22 30 might be called—is employed by Matthew to supplement what he regards as an inadequate statement of the reward promised to Peter and the rest who had "left all and followed" in Mk. 10 28–30.

Parallels in Paul and Mark.

(1 Cor. 5 7. "Ye are unleavened. For Christ our passover hath been sacrificed for us." Mk. takes "this passover," i.e. the annual festival "sanctified" in this rite, to mean the repast actually on the table. The declaration, "I shall no more eat of it," implies to his mind abolition of the Jewish institution.) (Mk. 14 25: "*new in the kingdom of God.*")

(Mk. 14 23, εὐχαριστήσας).

(Mk. 14 22 ff.: "*Take*" . . . "*And they all drank of it. . . .* 25 *Verily I say unto you that henceforth* (οὐκέτι) *I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine* (ἐκ τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου) *until* that day when I drink it new in *the kingdom of God.*")

(1 Cor. 11 20, εὐχαριστήσας).

(1 Cor. 10 16: "The bread which we break, is it not a communion (κοινωνία) of the body of Christ?")

(Lk. 22 28 is a transition verse in which the evangelist returns to this source from the material in vv. 24–27 drawn from Mk. 10 42–44. The language has perhaps received some editorial modification.)

(Mk. 10 39, 40: *Ye shall indeed drink the cup that I drink . . . but to sit on my right hand or on my left is not mine to give.*)

Literary relationship between the (fragmentary) material of Mark which we have already found to be independent of his

Pauline tradition, and that which now appears to form the *complete* Lukan tradition of the covenant-meal, is here undeniable. So close approximation in language as that between Mk. 14 25 and Lk. 22 18 is inexplicable on any other theory than that of direct literary dependence. If appeal is made to the unknown possibilities of oral tradition, the answer is that oral tradition carried to this degree of stereotyped uniformity is equivalent to a document. The issue is then reduced to a mere quibble over the word "literary."

At first thought it is natural, in view of the known employment of our second gospel by the writer of our third, to think of this literary dependence as on the side of Luke. But to this there are at least three insuperable objections: (1) The unity of the Lukan record, inseparably connected as it is with a saying of Jesus not found in Mark, but independently attested by Matthew (Q); (2) the pre-pauline form and interpretation of the rite as compared with Mark's adaptation to his own context and connected argument; (3) peculiarities of style and language. Let us take these considerations in order.

(1) It is important to observe that the Lukan tradition of the covenant-supper is not a mere agglutination of unrelated fragments, but a closely connected whole, having its own very marked and distinctive character, and not even mutilated by serious gaps when subtraction has been made both of the textually unauthentic material from 1 Cor. 11 24 f. and of the Markan material inserted by the compiler of the gospel. The general theme is stated at the beginning in vss. 15 f. The approaching feast of passover—commemorative of Israel's redemption from Egypt—had long been the goal of Jesus' hope. He had wished to celebrate it with the twelve; but his wish is not to be granted. The plots against his life will frustrate the outward observance. Therefore, let the mind be set on the greater redemption feast of which it is the type. "It shall be fulfilled in the kingdom of God."

The ritual observance to which Jesus now proceeds is not that of the passover, but the far simpler one of the *kiddush*, a ritual common to every pious Jewish household, prescribed for the *eve* of every Sabbath and of every feast-day, and deriving its name

(*kiddush*, "sanctification") from the fact that the day (which began at sunset according to Jewish usage) was thus made "holy." [11] The elements employed in this "sanctification" are simply a cup of wine and a loaf of *leavened* bread. The ministrant is the head of the household. The ritual is (1) a blessing of the cup, in the form, "Blessed art thou, O Lord, our God, king of the universe, creator of the *fruit of the vine*. . . . Blessed art thou, O Lord, who sanctifiest the Sabbath." After participation in the cup there follows (2) washing of hands (for which, as Edersheim points out,[12] Jn. 13 1–11 substitutes foot-washing to emphasize Lk. 22 27). This is followed (not preceded) by (3) a similar blessing, breaking, and distribution of the loaf. After this the evening meal proceeds.

Jesus, according to the Lukan record, employs this ritual of "sanctification." But since the ensuing day was not the Sabbath but Friday, we can only understand it as "sanctification of passover," making Luke's chronology coincide with that of the Fourth Gospel, in spite of the fact that the first of the four cups of the passover ritual is reckoned (according to G. H. Box [13]) as the cup of "sanctification of passover."

In the Lukan ritual, at all events, the main point is the institution by Jesus with the twelve of an eternal covenant looking forward to the great messianic redemption feast in the kingdom of God" (cf. Lk. 14 15). It is a blood-covenant like that between David and Jonathan (1 Sam. 20 13–17, 23) wherein David pledged himself, when he should have attained the kingdom, to remember for good the house of Jonathan. As David fulfils this "covenant" in 2 Sam. 9 7, by "appointing" that Mephibosheth, the crippled survivor of the house of Jonathan, "shall eat bread at my table continually," so Jesus makes "covenant appointment" (διατίθεμαι) with those that have endured (διαμεμενηκότες) with him that they shall "eat at his table in his kingdom." He adds a further promise as distinctly Davidic as the blood-covenant with Jonathan. It is based on one of the "songs of ascents; of David," Ps. 122 2–5.

[11] The rabbis interpret the command: "Remember the Sabbath day to *hallow* it" as inculcating the use of the *kiddush*.

[12] Life of Christ, vol. ii, p. 497.

[13] Op. cit.

Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem;
Jerusalem that art builded as a city compact together:
Whither the tribes go up, even the tribes of the Lord,
An ordinance for Israel to give thanks unto the name of the Lord.
*For there are set thrones of judgment,*
*The thrones of the house of David.*

Modern commentators, so far as known to the present writer, have as completely failed to recognize this transparent Old Testament basis for the promise of Lk. 22 30b (=) Mt. 19 28, as they have to recognize the relation of vs. 30a to the blood-covenant of David with Jonathan. Only Andreas of Caesarea in Cappadocia, principally known to us as having employed Papias's "Exposition of the Sayings of the Lord" for his own commentary on Revelation, points out in commenting on Rev. 20 4[14] that such is the unmistakable basis of the promise.

We think it more probable that this development of Ps. 122 25, the song of "thanksgiving" for the "thrones of judgment for the house of David" in the new Jerusalem, should have been added to Jesus' original "blood-covenant" with those who had "endured in his trials" with him, than that Jesus himself should have uttered a promise so at variance with the declaration of Mk. 10 35–40, where he explicitly disclaims authority to appoint to thrones in his kingdom, even for those who have endured his martyrdom with him. But as to the antiquity of the tradition there can be no question. It not only forms part of the Q-element derived by Matthew and Luke from a common source independent of Mark, but is attested over and over again in the earliest documents back to the great epistles of Paul themselves. We have found Andreas of Caesarea justly connecting Rev. 20 4 with the basis of it, perhaps in dependence on Papias. At about the same period (*c.* 93) 2 Tim. 2 12 quotes it as a "faithful saying":

If we died with him, we shall also live with him;
If we endure (ὑπομένομεν), we shall also reign with him;
If we shall deny him, he also will deny us;
If we are faithless, he abideth faithful;
For he cannot deny himself.

[14] "And I saw thrones and they [those who had endured the great trial] sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them, . . . and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years."

Here the liturgical form and the reference to Christ's faithfulness in martyrdom alike suggest derivation from the covenant-ritual. Even the greater Pauline epistles already exhibit allusions to the pledge of "thrones of judgment." In 1 Cor. 4 8 Paul reproaches his converts with proceeding already to the enjoyment of their "reign," while their apostles are still "enduring." In 6 2 they are reminded that "the saints shall judge the world," whereas they have lowered themselves appearing as litigants before heathen judges. In Acts 14 22 the apostles "confirm the souls of the disciples" with the promise, given in direct discourse as a quotation, "Through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God." In Jas. 1 12 the man who "endureth trial" is assured of "the crown of life" which the Lord "promised to those that were lovers of him," and the reference is repeated in 2 5, where those who had been chosen by God as "poor in this world" (cf. Lk. 6 20) are declared to have been "promised a kingdom," as "those who loved him." It is apparent that we are dealing here with elements that go back to the very foundations. From a time indefinitely antecedent even to 1 Corinthians the covenant-meal was celebrated as a pledge that those who endured with Christ should also reign with him. The cup of blessing is a token of living and reigning in union with Christ in the new Jerusalem. The thought is expressed in the ancient Syrian ritual: "We give thee thanks, O our Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David [Ps. 80], which thou madest known unto us through thy servant Jesus." John 14 1 ff. expresses it in the parable spoken at the supper: "I am the true vine. . . . Except ye abide in me, ye cannot bear fruit. . . . If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you. . . . A little while and your sorrow shall be turned to joy."

The Lukan form of the tradition of the supper is therefore a unit. Reference to the covenant-blood sprinkled by Moses on the altar is as completely absent as reference to the blood of the passover lamb. True, the passover is referred to as pointing to something higher, and regret is expressed that its celebration is prevented. But the *kiddush* is not meant to supersede it. It is expected to continue in annual observance as the *kiddush* continues as a weekly rite (so Acts 20 7 ?). There is no reason why

the *kiddush* might not be employed daily (so Acts 2 46, 6 1). There is no connecting of the ceremony with Jesus' death. The whole tone of the ordinance is joyous, the burden is: The feast we now "sanctify" is to be soon "fulfilled in the kingdom of God." Can it be supposed that the compiler of our Luke derived all this from the isolated verse Mk. 14 25, remaining all the time quite unaffected by the predominant Pauline animus of his source? For surely the main significance Mark attaches to the rite is quite other than this, and much more in line with 1 Cor. 11 24 f. Can it be maintained that the relevance of the Q-saying, "I on my part make covenant appointment to you, even as my Father hath appointed to me a kingdom," to the "eating and drinking" of the bread and wine, is a mere happy co-ordination by Luke of logian with Markan material? Or must we not rather admit that the whole Lukan context belongs together; that it is the logion concerning the glories of the kingdom which draws into this singularly inappropriate situation the Markan anecdote of the quarrel as to who should be greatest (Mk. 10 42–44 = Lk. 22 24–27); and, finally, that Mark has taken over in the single verse 14 25 the (unexplained) phraseology and (unconnected) idea reiterated throughout the Lukan source (vs. 16, vs. 18, vs. 29), and not that Luke has effected so extraordinary a development of Mk. 14 25?

(2) We have already indicated by a group of references that the promise of the covenant in Lk. 22 29 f. = Mt. 19 28 belongs to the most primitive factors of Synoptic tradition, and is presupposed in the most varied elements of New Testament literature, including documents as early as the greater Pauline epistles themselves. It remains to show that the entire conception and mode of observance of the covenant-rite as represented in Luke's record, inclusive of the promise, agrees with what we know of pre-pauline conception and practice; whereas the peculiarities of Mark tend in the direction of the changes introduced by Paul, or indicate still later developments. It will be convenient for this purpose to place again before our eyes the real contrast between Luke and Mark, continuing the account of the institution of the covenant a little further for the sake of clearer definition of Mark's point of view.

### Institution of the Communion.

Lk. 22 15 ff.

15 And he said unto them: With desire have I desired to eat this passover with you [before I suffer]. 16 For I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means eat it until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

17 And he took a cup and spoke the blessing and said: Take this, and divide it among yourselves; 18 for I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God come.

19 And he took a loaf, and spoke the blessing and gave it to them and said, This is my body.

(Prediction of betrayal, and quarrel as to "Who is greater?" from Mk. 14 18–21 and 10 42–44 Vss. 21–27.)

28 [But] ye are they that have endured with me in my trials; 29 and I on my part make covenant appointment unto you, even as my Father hath appointed unto me a kingdom, 30 that ye shall eat and drink at my table in my kingdom; and ye shall sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

Mk. 14 22–29 (order transposed).

(Prediction of betrayal "as they reclined and were eating," vss. 17–21.)

23 And he took a cup and spoke the blessing and gave to them, **and they all drank of it.** 24 And he said unto them: *This is my blood of the* [*new*] *covenant which is shed for many.* 25 **Verily I say unto you I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.**

(Singing of the Hymn—the *Hallel?*—vs. 26.)

22 And *as they were eating* he took a loaf and spoke the blessing, and gave it to them and said, **Take ye,** this is my body.

(Quarrel as to "Who is greater?" Mk. 10 42–44 ensuing on the request of James and John to sit with Jesus "in his glory." Jesus answers:

39 Ye shall drink the cup that I drink [The clause "and be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized" is wanting in Mt.]; 40 but to sit upon my right hand or my left is not mine to grant, but belongeth to those for whom it hath been prepared.)

### Prediction of Stumbling.

31 Simon, Simon, Behold, Satan hath obtained leave to sift you as wheat. 32 But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not; and thou, when thou art turned again, establish (*στήρισον*) thy brethren. 33 But he said to him, Lord, with thee I am ready to go both to prison and death.

27 And Jesus saith unto them, All ye shall be stumbled, for it is written, I will smite the Shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered abroad [28 Howbeit, after I am raised up I will go before you into Galilee]. 29 But Peter said unto him, Although all shall be stumbled, yet will not I.

The principal variations in Mark are as follows: (a) The change of order (note the place of vs. 22) in the institution, involving the representation that the passover feast is in progress (note the "hymn" in vs. 26), the bread broken "while they were eating," and the cup consecrated "after supper." (b) Additions in vs. 24 to relate the observance to the covenant of Sinai and to bring out the correspondence between the atoning blood of Jesus and the vicarious sufferings of the "Lamb" of Isa. 53.[15] (c) Removal of the Davidic covenant (διαθήκη) of Lk. 22 28–30 to another context wherein sitting with Jesus in his glory is sought from Jesus by two of the twelve as a reward for endurance with him of his trials, but denied on the ground that he has no authority to grant such rewards, even to those who have "drunk his cup" of suffering. (d) Addition to the prediction of stumbling of a prediction of betrayal (vss. 18–21). Evidence that these verses constitute a later addition appears in the resumption of their opening clause ("as they were eating") in vs. 22, "as they were eating." That is, the announcement has no psychological effect. The twelve continue the meal as unconcernedly as though the overwhelming announcement had not been made. Our Luke has inserted this Markan addition along with the other (strife as to who is greater) in the single paragraph, vs. 21–27, but this only injures the sequence of the story. (e) Addition of vs. 28 to prepare for the (missing) account of resurrection appearances in Galilee.[16] With Lk. 22 23 = Mk. 14 29 the two records begin again to flow in a common channel.

If now we turn from the Markan form with its transpositions of order, additions, and changes (for it is possible in each case to account for the difference as an adaptation by Mark to later and occidental ideas, but not conversely), to the consistent record of Luke, we shall find it to differ to an extraordinary degree from

[15] Italics have been used in vss. 22 and 24 to indicate the changes which bring the record into conformity with 1 Cor. 11 17 ff. and the Pauline point of view. The clauses, "And they all drank of it," in vs. 23, and "Take ye" in vs. 22, which at first might seem to be mere editorial additions, are found on comparison with Lk. 22 17 to have warrant in the older source.

[16] On the significance of this editorial insertion, breaking the connection of vss. 27–29, and its relation to the missing conclusion of Mark, see my Beginnings of Gospel Story, *ad loc.*

the Pauline interpretation of the supper and directions as to its observance; but to correspond in no less striking degree with pre-pauline, or at least non-pauline, interpretation and observance. The latter are known to us partly from Paul's own references, but mainly from ancient sources not affected by Pauline influence.

It is apparent from Paul's rebuke of the Corinthian abuses that "the Lord's supper," as it had been practised, had a character quite too convivial to meet Paul's sense of propriety. The prevailing note was one of festivity and joyousness. The name given it, from which we may safely infer what it chiefly betokened, was "communion" (κοινωνία). Participants entered into "fellowship" with the Lord. Paul would have them remember that it was a fellowship of the Lord's *death*, and lays stress upon this as the real meaning of the symbolism. Clearly this has not previously been prominent in the minds of observers of the rite.

Whether Paul's directions as to the order, involving a postponement of the ritual act until hunger had been satisfied in the common repast, and his declaration that the cup of the covenant was taken by Jesus *after* the supper, which would naturally lead to placing the ceremony of the bread before it, constitute an intentional change from the mode of observance which had prevailed at Corinth or elsewhere, we cannot say with certainty. It is certain, however, that in Syria, even down to a much later period, the ritual of the cup preceded that of the bread, and that the *agape*, or fellowship-repast, followed both, a concluding prayer of thanksgiving being prescribed for its close, "after ye are satisfied." [17]

We encounter a ritual and an interpretation of the observance quite independent of Paul, and much more like that of the Didache, when we interpret the Lukan record for itself, with minds uncolored by the ideas of Paul and Mark. We have indeed a covenant meal, but the institution itself is completely devoid of any reference to Jesus' death,[18] and the covenant in question is not

[17] Didache 9, 10.

[18] The preamble (vs. 15 f.) contains a clause ("before I suffer") which we have enclosed in brackets as perhaps an addition of the evangelist; for the references of Jesus to his "suffering" are so distinctively characteristic of Luke (cf. 24 26, 46; Acts 1 3; 3 18; 17 3; 26 23) that this partial exception must be reckoned of the kind which "proves the rule."

related to that of Moses at Sinai, but to that of David with Jonathan. It is a "blood-covenant"; and Jesus employs the bread as a token of his body, but not as symbolizing its fate. The breaking and distribution of the bread are simply preliminary to sharing in the common loaf, whereby, according to the immemorial laws of guest-friendship, the participant comes to share in the life of his host. The guest becomes for the period of time during which the food is supposed to remain in his body a blood-brother of the host, and is entitled to his protection, as being, in a manner, "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh," a true member of his body. The cup has no other meaning apart from the fellowship thus established and has nothing to do with Jesus' sacrificial death.

The words which introduce the ritual, on the other hand, do refer to the passover and to Jesus' fate as liable to frustrate his wish to celebrate the feast with the twelve. But, so far from indicating that the table before them is that of passover, it goes to show on the contrary that it is the *kiddush* or "sanctification" (of passover ?), the ceremony for the eve of the feast.

As regards the correspondence of this Lukan tradition of the institution of the covenant-meal with ancient observances, as it can be made out from the earliest Syrian and Palestinian sources, we cannot do better than to transcribe from Heitmüller. The following six considerations are to him convincing evidence that

> this [Lukan] form of the Lord's supper, which is moreover traceable to Jewish-Christian, Palestinian soil, comes nearer to the original celebration instituted by Jesus himself, and reflects it more clearly than that known from Paul and from Mark-Matthew,—in short that at the original Lord's supper, as here, the cup and the words of institution of the cup were wanting.

For it is one of the striking features of the Lukan form that the cup not only precedes, but is separate from, the covenant of fellowship in the Lord's body. The cup is simply the "cup of blessing" for the "sanctification" of the coming holy-day. *After* it, in breaking and distributing the (leavened) bread, Jesus bids the twelve make this a covenant-meal by using the shared loaf as a token of union in his body. It should hardly require to be pointed out that the symbol of a draught of human blood, which the later tradition makes to follow upon that of the loaf and to

repeat its meaning, would be, if possible, still more abhorrent to Jews than to ourselves. The covenant of brotherhood by eating from the same loaf, on the other hand, was sanctioned by immemorial usage, and accounts for the dominance in all ancient tradition of the thought of union, unification, concentration, as the central meaning of the rite.

But to return to Heitmüller. The following are the six considerations which lead him to assign priority to the Lukan form, as against that represented by 1 Cor. 11 17–34 and Mark-Matthew:

> (1) We unfortunately possess no direct reports of the communion observances of the earliest Palestinian communities. In Acts 2 46, however, we have the note: "And breaking bread from house to house they did take their food with gladness and singleness of heart." If this remark affords a true picture, the Lord's supper of the most primitive community of believers did not bear the character of a commemoration of the death of Jesus (Paul and Mk.-Mt.); on the contrary, the key-note was one of gladness and rejoicing,—just as in the Lukan form of observance the reference to death was wanting, and the mood of joyous hope (Lk. 22 18) predominated. (2) The Lord's supper in Acts is systematically designated the breaking of bread—Acts 2 41, 46; 20 7, 11,—*presumably* an indication that there was no more than the partaking of bread, or that the wine, at all events, was by no means essential. (3) We have an indirect testimony to the Lord's supper of the primitive church in a narrative from the life of Jesus. The feeding of the five thousand (or four thousand) is indubitably intended as a type, a representation of the Communion. (Note in the narratives the same description of Jesus' procedure as at the supper. He took bread, blessed, and brake it, and gave to the disciples, Mk. 6 41, 8 6 and parallels.) In this representation of the Lord's supper there is no mention whatever of the cup. (4) Later (Jewish-Christian) sects inhabiting the region of the Jordan celebrated the Lord's supper without use of wine till long after this period. (5) The peculiar, otherwise unexplained,[19] remark, Mk. 14 23: "They all drank of it," is best explained as a polemic observation aimed at a supposable depreciation of the cup in other circles (cf. 1 Jn. 5 6, Ign. *ad Smyrn.* 6). (6) Finally, it is a suspicious circumstance that the formula of the cup, whether in the rubric of Paul or that of Mark and Matthew, bears a distinctly theological stamp. It interprets the death of Jesus as a covenant-sacrifice, and betrays itself thus as a product of primitive Christian, perhaps of Pauline, dogma.

[19] See, however, above, note 15.

It is certainly inadmissible in view of these considerations—omitting others—to regard that form of interpretation and observance of the supper which we find inculcated by Paul, and which in Mark-Matthew is superimposed upon an underlying narrative of different type—the form which contrasts the "new covenant" in the blood of Christ with the "old covenant" of Moses at Sinai, as the earlier; and to consider that which uses the symbolism of the covenant of David (2 Sam. 9 7; Ps. 122 5), corresponding as it does in order, in phraseology, and in signification with the liturgy of the Didache[20], to be later and derived. The Lukan form and the Didache are alike in containing no reference in the symbolism to the death of Jesus, and this peculiarity is absolutely unaccountable unless referred to sources as yet unaffected by Paul's interpretation and prescription.

In one respect, however, we must withhold complete assent from Heitmüller's observations. It may be admitted that early references and practice show that to the primitive church the essential feature of the observance was the "breaking of the bread" together, and that the cup was not considered an inseparable factor, if we limit the inference to a disproof of the originality of the reference developed by Paul, Mark-Matthew to Jesus' shed blood. The ritual of Luke and the Didache stand in very close interrelation, mutually interpreting one another, and here it is undeniable that the cup plays an important, and even leading, part, though its symbolism is preliminary to, and independent of, that of the covenant-meal, and has, of course, no relation to the shed blood of Jesus. The unity of Lk. 22 15–19a, 28–32, becomes doubly apparent when we observe how the interpretation of the symbolism of the cup (vs. 18) merely repeats the refrain

[20] Didache, 9, "As touching the eucharistic thanksgiving give ye thanks thus. First as regards the cup: We give thee thanks, Our Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David, which thou madest known unto us through thy servant Jesus. (*Response:*) Thine is the glory for ever and ever.

"Then as regards the broken bread: We give thee thanks, Our Father, for the life and knowledge which thou didst make known unto us through thy servant Jesus. (*Response:*) Thine is the glory forever and ever. As this broken bread was scattered upon the mountains and being gathered together became one, so may thy church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom. (*Response:*) For thine is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever and ever."

of the preamble (vs. 16), and that of the loaf (vs. 30a) is closely parallel. Comparison of the ritual of the Didache reveals at once the twofold unifying thought: an antithesis of trial and triumph symbolized in the cup, an antithesis of "scattering" and "gathering" symbolized in the loaf.

For in Luke the attachment here of the prediction of stumbling (scattering) which runs on into the offer of Peter to go with Jesus "unto prison and death" is not without relation on the one side to the ground of the Davidic covenant, "Ye are they that have endured with me in my trials" (vs. 28), nor can we fail to see on the other its connection with Mk. 10 42–44 as well as Mk. 14 27–29. These are all variations on the theme, "the gathering together of the elect," as symbolized in the loaf eaten as the body of Christ. As the "cup of blessing" represents the antithesis of present trial ("Are ye able to drink my cup?") and future triumph (the redemption feast "in the kingdom of God"), so the bread, "once scattered on the mountains, but now gathered together into one loaf," represents in general the "gathering together of the elect," but more especially the sifting as wheat which the twelve are about to undergo, and the rallying again under the leadership of Simon. So Luke; but the Roman gospel has a far different attitude toward the apostolic leaders. Just as the right to sit upon the thrones in Christ's glory is denied to James and John in spite of their having "drunk the cup" of suffering with the Lord, so it is not by "Simon" that the "scattered" flock are to be "gathered" in Galilee. The Shepherd himself—at least in our form of Mark—will intervene to rally them. But here we are entering another and a difficult field, the problem of the ending of Mark. Let us be content with having shown that the earlier and consistent form of the tradition is that of Luke, as interpreted by *Didache*.

(3) It remains to point to a single peculiarity of style, which may serve to connect the Q-logion in which our Lukan record of the institution of the covenant-repast culminates, with certain other Q-material in regard to which the present writer has pointed out heretofore that we are dealing not with *precepts*, where the interest is ethical, but with *narrative*, where the interest centres in the person of Jesus and the significance of his message and min-

istry. The form of the verb in the passage: "Ye shall eat . . . in my kingdom" is not the usual ἐσθίω employed elsewhere in the New Testament, but a form which occurs but in four other passages, and is classified in the lexicons as "rare," "poetic," "obsolete," or the like, the form ἔσθω. Three of the other occurrences are in Q-sections of Luke, two of them in the discourse wherein Jesus vindicates his joyous ministry of forgiveness and healing against those who "were stumbled in him" after the departure of the messengers of John: "For John the Baptist is come *eating* no bread. . . . The Son of man is come *eating* and drinking" (Lk. 7 33 f. = Mt. 11 18 f.). The other Lukan occurrence is in Lk. 10 7, another Q-passage. Elsewhere in the New Testament the form occurs nowhere but in Mk. 1 6, in a passage (vss. 2–6) which shows unmistakable literary dependence on the Q-passage regarding John the Baptist.[21]

Limitations of space will not permit us to dwell upon the relations of Luke's source for his tradition of the supper to other elements of Q. That which has already been adduced should suffice to indicate that here, as in other parts of the Lukan passion story, we are dealing with a source which is at least pre-markan, and in its point of view reflects conceptions and data wholly independent of Pauline influence. To trace this source in the single narrative of the institution of the (Davidic) covenant-meal is a matter of no small importance in determining Jesus' own conception of his mission. To find him here, for example, pointing his disciples forward, not as in Matthew to a "throne of glory" whereon he sits as "Son of man" to judge all nations, but to a new Jerusalem, where he will sit rather as Son of David, surrounded by those who "endured" with him, and who now "eat and drink with him at his table in his kingdom," brings us face to face with a christology which may not be the earliest or most authentic, but whose value to the historical student can only be measured by the breadth of its divergence from long-current and accepted forms. And this is only a beginning. The question of the part played by this source in the development of gospel composition is a problem for treatment on some future occasion.

[21] For a discussion of the relation, with demonstration of Mark's dependence on this element of Q ($Q^{lk}$), see my Beginnings of Gospel Story.

# *JOHN ELIOT, THE APOSTLE TO THE INDIANS*

JAMES DE NORMANDIE

Roxbury, Massachusetts

In the old and worn parchment leaves of the baptismal register of Widford Parish in "pleasant Hertfordshire" we find this record:

> Anno dm. 1604. John Elliott the sonne of Bennett Elliott was baptized the fifte daye of August in the yeere of our Lord God 1604.

There is also this record:

> An° Dm. 1598. Bennett Eliot and Letteye Aggar were married the xxxth of October an° Sup Dicto.

Bennett Eliot had property in several of the neighboring parishes, and about 1608 removed to Nazing, where he died. In his will he directs his executor to pay out of the rents and profits of his lands and tenements, for the space of eight years from 1621, quarterly to his son John Eliot "the sum of eight pounds a yeare of lawful money of England, for and towards his maintenance in the University of Cambridge where he is a scholar."

The home of Eliot was marked by the best religious influences stirring England in these early days of the Reformation and the dawning of the Puritan controversy, for he speaks of his first years as "seasoned with the fear of God, the word, and prayer." He became a pensioner of Jesus College in 1619, took his first degree in 1623, and was early distinguished for his talent and proficiency in the study of languages. Upon leaving Cambridge he was a tutor for a time in a school kept by Rev. Thomas Hooker,—afterwards the founder of the state of Connecticut. Here the influences of his own home were deepened, for he wrote: "Here the Lord said unto my dead soul, live! live! and through the grace of God I do live forever! When I came to this blessed family I then saw as never before the power of godliness in its lovely vigour and efficacy."

Eliot was prepared for the ministry but the bitter enemies

of the Puritans and the advocates of imposing strict conformity on the observance of the ritual of the Church of England were making life intolerable for the nonconformists. A number of the inhabitants of Nazing and the neighboring villages were preparing to go to the new world, some on account of the religious disturbances, some out of that spirit of colonization so active at that period, and Eliot told them that if they wished he would be their minister when they were settled at Rocksborough.

In Winthrop's History of New England it is stated that "on November Twelfth 1631 the ship Lyon arrived at Nantasket. There came in her, the Governor's wife, and Mr. Eliot, a minister, and others, being in all about sixty persons, who all arrived in good health, having been ten weeks at sea." Mr. Savage in a note says, "This was the celebrated apostle of the Massachusetts Indians."

Immediately upon his arrival in Boston Eliot "adjoyned" the church at Boston and, as the pastor of that church was absent, Eliot "exercised" as its minister. The church became at once much interested in him, desired to call him as its teacher, and pleaded their great need of him; but Eliot replied that he was "preingaged" at his English home to his friends there about to settle at Rocksborough, that he would be their minister if they still so desired. As Winthrop says, "Though Boston labored all they could both with the congregation at Roxbury, and with Mr. Eliot himself, yet he could not be diverted from accepting the call at Roxbury; so he was dismissed." At the end of the summer he came to Roxbury, where a church had been gathered with Weld for its pastor and there he was ordained as teacher in November, 1632. His intended wife, Miss Ann Mumford, a name still lingering in the neighborhood of Widford, came over with the same company, and soon after Eliot's settlement over the church they were married. Then began a ministry which lasted over fifty-eight years.

Eliot was twenty-seven years old, vigorous and earnest for work. One account a little later says of him: "The first Teaching Elder is Mr. Eliot, a young man at his coming thither of a cheerful spirit, walking unblameable, of a godly conversation, apt to teach, as by his indefatigable paines both with his flock and

the poore Indians doth appeare, whose language he learned purposely to help them to the knowledge of God in Christ, frequently preaching in their wigwams and catechising their children." Another account says: "He that God hath raised up and enabled to preach unto them, is a man of most sweet, humble, loving, gracious, and enlarged spirit, whom God hath blest, and surely will still delight in, and do good by."

There is a little volume on the early life in New England, printed in 1639, which says that "Boston is a town of very pleasant situation two miles north east from Roxborough," and of Rocksborough it says: "It is a fair and handsome country town, the inhabitants of it all being very rich; it is well wooded and watered, having a clear and fresh brook running through the town. The inhabitants have fair houses, store of cattle, impaled cornfields, and fruitful gardens." The earliest residences were along the street which now bears the name of the old town, and around the hill on which the meeting-house was built, the same site occupied by all its successors, and now one of the best specimens of the old Puritan meeting-house standing in New England. There was a regulation (for safety from the Indians) that everyone must build within half a mile of the meeting-house—and "meeting-house" every one called it, for the word church was an offence to the Puritan. (Cotton Mather said that he found no just ground in Scripture to apply such a trope as church to a house for public assembly.) Simple and rude it was, about twenty by thirty feet in plan and twelve feet high, built of logs, the interstices filled up with clay, with a thatched roof and an earthen floor. Here was the scene of the faithful ministrations of Eliot as for nearly sixty years to all meetings on Sunday or during the week he came from his humble home not far removed.

In all that ministry, with its restless missionary zeal, its busy labor of the scholar, and its deep interest in every social matter touching the welfare of a new community, there is never any hint of a neglect of his parish duties. He watched his flock, small at first but very rapidly growing, like a faithful shepherd. Every new settler was carefully looked after, and if his morals were questionable, there was no peace for him but through repentance

and reformation or banishment from the plantation. No search was ever keener than the Puritan's watch for heresy and for sin. Close by the meeting-house stood the stocks and the pillory, that any neglect of the gospel should soon be followed by the terror of the law.

About all that we can learn of the early ministry of Eliot must be from his records in the parish book. There was a special reason for the minister's making such records, in the Puritan's idea of the church. The church was a company of "visible saints," and its aim was to maintain a high standard of godliness among its members. Each church was a unit to determine its own rules of faith and life,—and as no church had any right or power to interfere with the faith or creed or discipline of any other church, so it had to be a jealous custodian of its own members. There was no disposititon to gloss over the faults of any one who, having once taken hold of the covenant, had fallen from grace. So the minister was quite ready to record his spiritual judgment of his flock. These records of the Apostle Eliot are interesting beyond those of almost any of our New England churches because the man is the most interesting figure in our early history. There is a flavor of humanity and godliness still shedding from these pages because the man was so humane and godly. If you read between these lines, you see what a yearning and tender love, what a broad and deep sympathy are beneath even the sentence of excommunication. Here was a man to whom the unseen things were more real than anything seen or handled. Mather says he once heard him utter these words upon the phrase, "Our conversation is in heaven":—"In the morning if we ask, 'where have I been to-day?' our souls must answer, 'in heaven.' In the evening if we ask, 'where have I been to-day?' our souls may answer, 'in heaven.' If thou art a believer, thou art no stranger to heaven while thou livest, and when thou diest, heaven will be no stranger to thee; no, thou hast been there a thousand times before."

Here is his watchfulness over trade. "The wife of William Webb. She followed baking, and through her covetuous mind she made light waight after many admonitions, and also for a grosse ly in publik, flatly denying $y^t$ after she had weighed her dough,

she never nimed off bitts from each loaf, w$^{h}$ yet was four witnesses testified to be a comon if not a constant practis, for all w$^{h}$ grosse sins she was excommunicated, her ways having bene long a greif of heart to her Godly neighbors. But afterwards she was reconciled to y$^{e}$ Church, and lived christianly and dyed comfortably."

Calling one day on a merchant in his parish, he noticed in his counting-room some books of business on the table, and some books of devotion laid away on a shelf, and said: "Here, sir, is earth on the table and heaven on the shelf; pray do not sit so much at the table, as altogether to forget this shelf; let not earth thrust heaven out of your mind."

"The Church takes notice of six, who humbled themselves by public confession in the Church, and we have cause to hope y$^{t}$ the full proceeding of discipline will doe more good than theire sin hath done hurt."

"These young persons, males, all did publickly, by their own consent and desire, take hold on the covenant, waiting for more grace."

"Robert Lyman was an ancient christian but weak."

"Valentine Prentise, lived a godly life, and went through much affliction by bodily infirmity, and died leaving a good savor of Godlyness behind him."

"William Hills, he removed to Hartford on Connecticott where he lived several yeares, without giving such good satisfaction to the consciences of the saints."

"John Moody had two men servants y$^{t}$ were ungodly, especially one of them. They went to the oyster bank in a boate against the counsel of their governor; they did unskillfully leave their boate afloat, and quickly the tide caryed it away, and they were drowned, a *dreadful* example of God's displeasure against obstinate servants."

"Mary Chase, had a paralitik humor which fell into her backbone, so that she could not stir her body, but as she was lifted, and filled her with great torture, and caused her backbone to goe out of joynt, and bunch out from the beginning to the end, of which infirmity she lay 4 years and a half, a sad spectacle of misery; but it pleased God to raise her againe."

One of our antiquarians searching among the old church records, and finding this account of Mary Chase's trouble wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes, asking him to give a diagnosis of the case in the light of modern medical science. Dr. Holmes sent the following characteristic letter:

> A consultation without seeing the patient is like a murder-trial without the *corpus delicti* being in evidence. You remember the story of Jeremiah Mason and the witness who had had a vision in which the Angel Gabriel informed him of some important facts. "Subpœna the Angel Gabriel." So I should say, carry us to the bedside of Mary Chase, but she has been under green bedclothes so long, that I am afraid that she would be hard to wake up. We must guess as well as we can under the circumstances. The question is whether she had angular curvature, lateral curvature, or no curvature at all. If the first, angular curvature, you must consult such authorities as Bryant, DeWitt, and the rest. If you are not satisfied with these modern writers, all I have to say is, as I have said before when asked whom to consult in such cases, go to Pott, to Percival Pott, the famous surgeon of the last century, from whom this affection has received the name by which it is still well-known of "Pott's Disease," for if a doctor has the luck to find out a new malady, it is tied to his name like a tin kettle to a dog's tail, and he goes clattering down the highway of fame to posterity with his aeolian attachment following at his heels. As for the lateral curvature, if that had existed it seems as if the Apostle Eliot would have said she bulged sideways, or something like that, instead of saying the backbone bunched out from beginning to end. Besides I doubt if lateral curvature is apt to cause paralysis. Crooked backs are everywhere, as tailors and dressmakers know, and nobody expects to be paralyzed because one shoulder is higher than the other, as Alexander the Great's was, and Alexander Pope's also.
>
> I doubt whether Mary Chase had any real curvature at all. Her case looks to me like one of those *Mimoses* as Marshall Hall calls certain forms of hysteria which imitate different diseases and among the rest paralysis. The body of a hysteric patient will take on the look of all sorts of more serious affections. As for mental and moral manifestations a hysteric girl will lie so that Sapphira would blush for her, and she could give lessons to a professional pickpocket in the art of stealing. Hysteria might well be described as possession, possession by seven devils, except that this number is quite insufficient to account for all the pranks played by the subjects of this extraordinary malady.
>
> I do not want to say anything against Mary Chase, but I suspect

that, getting nervous, and tired, and hysteric, she got into bed, which she found rather agreeable after too much housework, and perhaps too much going to meeting, liked it better and better, curled herself up into a bunch which made her look as if her back was really disturbed, found she was cosseted, and posseted, and prayed over, and made much of, and so lay quiet until a false paralysis caught hold of her legs and kept her there. If some one had hollered "fire," it is not unlikely that she would have jumped out of bed, as many other such paralytics have done under such circumstances. She could have moved probably enough, if any one could have made her believe that she had the power of doing it. *Possumus quia posse videmur.* She had played *possum* so long that at last it became *non possum.*

Yours very truly,

O. W. Holmes, M.D.

In addition to such records as these there is little to be noticed about Eliot's early ministry; but these make interesting reading for our day, and let us into the secret of his life. Here is no formality of piety, only the deep, vigorous, serious, constant, bubbling-over life of the spirit. While much gentler and more amiable than his colleague Weld, he was still strenuous and unyielding for the faith he held, and a strong antagonist of the heresies he thought were creeping into the colony, as one may notice in his occasional notes about the Quakers, the Anabaptists, the Familists, and the part he took in the Anne Hutchinson controversy. One of the matters which now seem to us very trivial was his indignation over the sin of men wearing long hair. The discussion waxed so hot that Eliot with others sent a lengthy petition to the magistrates rather discouraging a contribution to the college until this sin was removed from the students, saying: "They are brought up in such pride as doth no wayes become such as are brought up for the holy service of the Lorde, either in the magistracy, or ministry especially, and in particular in their long haire, which last, first took hand and broke out at Colledg, so far as we understand and remember, and now it is got into the pulpit to the great greife and offense of many godly hearts in the country." Eliot's prejudice against long hair or the wearing of wigs seems an unaccountable weakness. He preached against it, he prayed against it; he thought all the calamities which came upon the

country, even Indian wars, might be laid to this fashion which was gaining such strong hold upon the people and especially on the young.

A scholar himself of no mean attainment, and with the best education England could give, he took early and throughout his life a great interest in the education of the young. He established the first Sunday school of which we have any account in this new land. "First our male youth in fitting season stay every Sabbath after the evening [that is, afternoon] service in the public meeting house; where [after they had already attended the two services of two or three hours each] the elders will examine theire remembrance [of the services] that day and any fit poynt of catechize. Secondly, that our female youth should meet [on Monday] in one place where the elders may examine them of theire remembrance yesterday, and about catechize, or what else may be convenient."

He was restless to offer to all young persons the best opportunities for learning, lest in the activities and demands of a new settlement they should be turned away from literary pursuits. Wherever he went he made a plan or a prayer for good schools. In a synod of the churches he exclaimed: "Lord for schools everywhere among us! That our schools may flourish! That every member of this assembly may go home and procure a good school to be encouraged in the town in which he lives. That before we die we may be so happy as to see a good school encouraged in every plantation of the country." Mather writes: "God so blessed his endeavors that Roxbury could not live quietly without a free school in the town, and the issue of it has been one thing which has almost made me put the title of *schola illustris* upon that little nursery; that is, that Roxbury has afforded more scholars, first for the college, and then for the public, than any town of its bigness, or if I mistake not, of twice its bigness in all New England. From the spring of the school at Roxbury there have run a large number of the streams, which have made glad this whole city of God."

The Trustees of the Roxbury Latin School have in their possession the agreement to establish the school, on a beautifully written parchment in ancient characters dated the last of August,

1645,—as follows: "Whereas the inhabitants of Roxburie, in consideration of their religious care of posteritie, have taken into consideration how necessarie the education of theire children in Literature, will be to fitt them for public service, both in Churche and Commonwealthe, in succeeding ages—they therefore unanimously have consented and agreed to erect a free schoole in the said Towne"; and a little later the teacher promises to use his best skill and endeavor both by precept and example to instruct in "all scholasticall, morall, and theological discipline."

Another effort which Eliot very early made, together with his colleague Weld and with Mather of Dorchester, was the preparation of the "Bay Psalm-Book," the first book printed in this country. The intention was good, to turn the Psalms of David into verses to be sung—but the result was awful! How congregations could venture to sing such verses, or to think there was anything musical in them, can be explained only by granting that somewhat of the beauty and harmony of the Psalms had already stolen into their hearts. These men were scholars, they were faithful ministers, but such a work was beyond their gifts. They must themselves have felt the inadequacy of their work, and something of the ridicule with which it might be received by the churches, for they have their apology in the preface: "If the verses are not alwayes so smooth and elegant as some may desire or expect, let them consider that God's altar needs not our pollishings; for wee have expected rather a plaine translation, than to smooth our verses with the sweetness of any paraphrase, and we have attented conscience rather than elegance, fidelity rather than poetry in translating the Hebrew words into English Language, and David's poetry into English Metre." It was reserved for some of Eliot's descendants, Fitz-Greene Halleck with his ringing strains of "Marco Bozzaris," and Ethelinda Eliot Beers, who wrote "All Quiet along the Potomac," to compensate for the signal poetical failure of their ancestor.

Eliot's efforts for a good school did not cease with the founding of the Roxbury Latin School. A short time before his death he gave an estate of about seventy-five acres of land to certain persons and their heirs for the support of a school and schoolmaster in that part of Roxbury then called the Pond Plains, or Jamaica

Plain; to provide teaching for the children of that end of the town, "together with such Indians and negroes as shall or may come to the school, and to no other use, intent, or purpose whatever." That school had been established some years before, but by reason of the generous gift of the Apostle Eliot his name was given to it and it continues to the present time. Today it is an industrial school, designed, in the words of Eliot, "to remove the inconvenience of ignorance."

It is impossible to learn when Eliot first turned his attention towards the native Americans, and felt that his life-work was to be for them. Several of the ministers hereabout were interested in them, and joined in visiting and preaching and in endeavors to convert them to Christianity, but no one else who, in the large spirit of humanity which marked Eliot's whole life, regarded them as the children of God, and believed that if the gospel was for God's children it was for the red man as much as for the white, and that if civilization was a benefit, they should share in that benefit. Many of the early charters expressed an interest in the Indians, as also did some of the early settlers, but generally they were looked upon as savages to be exterminated, or as children of Satan deserving little sympathy; and the curiosity or welcome or friendly offices which were so often manifested upon the first arrival of the whites soon turned into bitter hostility as the natives found their possessions taken from them and themselves driven further and further away to seek new hunting-grounds.

Eliot had been in the ministry here about ten years, mingling with the Indians, whom he saw daily in the village or hiding between the trees watching with piercing eyes these strange white creatures and their strange ways, when it came to him that his chief mission was to learn the Indian language, and preach the gospel to them in their own tongue. He believed, and it was not an uncommon opinion in his day, that the Indians belonged to the lost tribes of Israel; and after the Captivity had made their way into America from the extreme parts of Asia. He also believed that in their language he would find some traces of the Hebrew, which he firmly believed was the language of heaven, in which by God's own voice the Old Testament had been given to men, and

which would be forever the only language of the redeemed. Eliot was a remarkable Hebrew scholar, and had such a love for this language that he thought it better fitted than any other to become the universal language of mankind. "It had need be so," he writes, "for being the language which shall be spoken in heaven, where knowledge will be so enlarged, there will need a spacious language, and what language fitter than this of God's own making and composure? And why may we not make ready for heaven in this point, by making and fitting that language, according to the rules of the divine artifice of it, to express all imaginable conceptions and notions of the mind of man in all arts and sciences?" However, as he went on in his studies he found the Hebrew did not help him to understand the Indian language.

In 1643 he began the study of their tongue. He found a bright young Indian who had been a servant in an English home, and "him," he says, "I made my interpreter and thus I came at it, we must not sit still and look for miracles. Up and be doing, and the Lord will be with thee. Prayer and pains through faith in Jesus Christ will do anything." He made such progress that in three years he attempted to preach to the Indians. It was on the 28th of October, 1646, at a place called Nonantum, a part of Newton. As Eliot with three friends accompanying him drew near to the wigwam of Waban the chief, he met them with expressions of welcome, and led them to his wigwam, where quite a large company were gathered. Eliot began the service with a prayer in English, "being," he said, "not so farre acquainted with the Indian language as to express our hearts herein before God to them." There was the feeling, probably, of looking upon prayer as a more serious and sacred matter than preaching, so that any errors of speech might make it ludicrous. Perhaps, too, there was something of the feeling which many have that it might be rather difficult for the Almighty to understand any other tongue as well as their own. The story is told of an Indian squaw, who might have been an unusually neat one, and kept her wigwam cleanly swept, who had learned only the word "broom." She became deeply concerned about her salvation. Her Christian friends begged her to pray. She supposed she must pray in English, but she had only that one word. Her anxiety grew intense,

and at last, throwing herself upon her knees, and lifting up her eyes in the attitude of prayer she kept repeating, "Broom! broom! broom! broom! broom!" Was it not as acceptable, and as well understood, as the most ornate and finished prayer?

> Prayer is the burden of a sigh,
> The falling of a tear,
> The upward glancing of an eye,
> When none but God is near.

After the prayer, Eliot preached a long sermon from a passage in Ezekiel, "Prophesy unto the wind." The name of Waban signified wind, so that the Indians thought it was the same as if he had said "prophesy unto Waban," and as if it were a call from the Scriptures to him to be converted and join the Christians, but Eliot told them he had no thought of such an application when he selected his text.

At this first meeting Eliot began a custom, continued through his preaching, of having the hearers ask whatever questions they chose, either for a clearer understanding of what had been spoken to them, or for light upon any point which had exercised their minds. "We asked them," said Eliot, "if they understood all that which was already spoken, and whether all of them did understand all that which was then spoken to them, or only some few. And they answered with multitude of voyces, that they all of them did understand all that which was spoken." It is somewhat doubtful if any congregation today could understand all that the Apostle preached to them that day. "It was," says Eliot, "a glorious affecting spectacle to see a company of perishing, forlorne outcasts, diligently attending to the blessed word of salvation then delivered; it much affected us that they should smell some things of the Alabaster box broken up in that dark and gloomy habitation of filthiness and uncleane spirits."

The questions of the Indians at some of these meetings make an interesting study of their minds when presented with the statement of a religion and a theology of which nothing had been heard; for Eliot not only spoke of the pure living it required of them, but with that he entered into some of the abstrusest dogmas of the faith which the greatest of Christian theologians have

never been able to state with clearness. Eliot never reproached them for the insufficiency or falsity of their own religion, he only presented with earnestness what he thought was the heaven-descended and glorious faith; and if they were not won from their own, they received it in a respectful silence out of their love for him. And never through his long missionary work among them do we find a trace of the experiences the Jesuit fathers relate as frequently theirs. The Indians would give to them, in their slight knowledge of the language, the most vulgar and obscene words, and the priests would use them with the most sacred offices of their religion and notice the Indians convulsed with laughter over the mistakes that were made.

There is a story of a later date which ought to be a wise lesson to all missionaries. One of them was instructing a group of Indians in the truths of his holy religion. He told them of the creation of the earth in six days, and of the fall of our first parents by eating an apple. The courteous savages listened attentively, and, after thanking him, one related in his turn a very ancient tradition concerning the origin of the maize. But the missionary plainly showed his disgust and disbelief, indignantly saying, "What I delivered to you were sacred truths, but this that you tell me is mere fable and falsehood!" "My brother," gravely replied the offender Indian, "it seems that you have not been well grounded in the rules of civility. You saw that we, who practise these rules, believed your stories; why, then, do you refuse to credit ours?" There are many of the Indian myths and legends about creation quite as helpful and spiritual as the story of the fall of man by eating the apple. Any genuine appreciation of Christianity ought to dispose us to be kindly and courteous and receptive of the best in any other religion; ought to urge us to a careful study of what that best is, and not to despise it, or call it all false because its traditions or its forms or its views may be so contrary to our own—and all this without yielding the least of any principle of faith or life which we regard as essential.

Some of the answers the Apostle gave to the questions of the Indians have, also, a far-off interest. Let us look at a few of both. "Do not English spoil their souls when they say that a thing

costs them more than it did cost, and is not that all one as to steal?"

"If a man talk of another's faults and tell others of them when he is not present to answer, is not that a sin?"

"Why did not God give all men good hearts that they might be good?"

"Why did not God kill the devil that made all men so bad?"

"If a man should be enclosed in iron a foot thick, and thrown into the fire, what would become of his soul? Could the soul come forth thence or not?"

"Were the Englishmen ever at any time so ignorant of God and Jesus Christ as themselves?" Answer: "There are two sorts of English men. Some are bad and live wickedly, and these are as ignorant in a way as the Indians now are. Another sort are good men and love Christ and honor him. Once they were all as ignorant of God and Christ, as the Indians are, but the Indians shall know him if also they seek him."

"What do you get by praying to God and believing in Jesus Christ? You are as poor as we, and we take more pleasure than you do. If we could see that you gain anything by being Christians we would be so too." Answer: "There are two sorts of mercies. The little ones [which he illustrated by holding up his little finger], and the great ones [which he signified by extending his thumb]. The little ones are riches, good clothes, houses, pleasant food; the great ones are wisdom, the knowledge of God and Christ, of truth and eternal life. Though God may not give you any large measure of the little mercies, he gives you what is much better, the greater blessings."

Eliot's first missions among the Indians were so encouraging that every day his enthusiasm and hope increased. The work became a fervent zeal which went out only with his death. In the summer of 1650 Natick, or "the place of hills," was chosen as a fit spot for a town where the converted or praying Indians could be gathered into a community of their own, renounce their roving habits, and follow the arts of civilization. The town was laid out in three streets, two on one side and one on the other of the river Charles, with a foot-bridge the Indians themselves built. Each family had a lot, and they built a large house, the lower part to

be used for their worship on Sunday, and a room in the upper part set apart for the Apostle whenever he should visit them. A form of government was arranged for them, entirely from the Scriptures, and since they had no previous conception of laws, Eliot thought it would be easy for them to adopt that form to which he was sure all the world must finally come, with the Lord for their judge, the Lord for their lawgiver, the Lord for their king.

These praying Indians took the gospel as it has been said the Hebrews took their religion, with a gush, with a joy. They received its precepts and its ceremonies with great seriousness, and made them a large part of daily life. A great reason for their lapsing into indifference was that they soon found the English were so loud in their professions and so lax in their lives. One of them, lodging at the home of an Englishman one night, asked the next day why the man at whose home he stayed did not pray in his family as Eliot had taught the Indians to do every day. Then he concluded there were *matchet* Englishmen as well as *matchet* Indians, men who did not practise what they professed, —*matchet* meaning wicked.

Eliot's heart was full of joy. He had found the better side of the Indian character. They trusted and venerated him. He never deceived them; he treated them with absolute sincerity; he believed they were quite as worthy in the sight of God as himself; they never faltered in their allegiance to him as a benefactor and friend. In vision, he saw the whole race coming into the Christian fold. His labors knew no end: on week-days, reaching them wherever he could by walking or on horseback; on Sunday, when he could leave his own flock; and on longer journeys, when he could spare the time; down as far as Cape Cod, up through Concord and Lowell as far as the forests of New Hampshire, back into the state as far as Lancaster, and on west as far as Brookfield; with no roads, no bridges, no inns for lodging or refreshments; fording swollen rivers, riding in drenching rains; in midsummer heat or winter storms; following lonely paths through dense forests with only blazed trees to mark the way—wherever he could find a little gathering of the red men, in their wigwams, or under some broad-branching tree, there the Apostle was to be

found. He gave his strength and his money, and faced danger and perils and death, with the quiet, undaunted spirit of the early martyrs. Often with no shelter, wet to the skin all day long, halting to rest at night by the hospitality of some Indian or only the forest's shade; wringing the water from his stockings, cold and hungry, he speaks of it all with joy. "God stepped in and helped, for I considered that word of his, 'endure hardness as a good soldier of Christ.'"

Then, when the day's work was done, or the journey ended, in the evening in his study teaching his Indian classes, or long into the hours of the night, by the light of a tallow candle, with a physical endurance and a mental force and a spiritual zeal hardly ever equalled, translating the Scriptures and books of piety for his Indian converts. The story of those missionary labors has gone throughout Christendom. A few years ago I found a "Life of Eliot" in Greek, published at Malta.

Now, however, a far greater task confronted the Apostle. It was difficult enough to learn the Indian language, of which Mather says: "If their alphabet be short, I am sure the words composed of it, are long enough to tire the patience of any scholar in the world. One would think they had been growing ever since Babel, unto the dimensions to which they are now extended: if I must translate 'our loves,' it must be 'Noowomantainmoonkamnownash.' I pray you count the letters."

After learning the language so as to converse with them, and preach to them, and pray with them, there was something more to be done. Eliot could not visit them as frequently as they were pressing him to come; and his voice would soon be silent. He was Christianity to them; they could listen to no other, and they must have the Bible and religious books in their own language to read when he could no longer counsel them. Then began that mighty task of translating the Bible into the Indian language; although in the beginning of his work of translation he had not the faintest idea that he could ever live to complete it all. "Since the death of the Apostle Paul," writes Edward Everett, "a nobler, truer, and warmer spirit than John Eliot never lived; and, taking the rudeness of the age into consideration, the state of the country, the narrowness of the means, the history of the Christian

church does not contain an example of resolute, untiring, successful labor, superior to that of translating the entire Scriptures into the language of the native inhabitants of Massachusetts, a dialect as imperfect, as unformed, as unmanageable as any spoken on earth; a labor performed not in the flush of youth, nor within the luxurious abodes of academic ease, but under the constant burden of his duties as a minister and a preacher, and at a time of life when the spirits begin to flag."

First came a little catechism in 1654, supposed to be the first book in the Indian language; the book of Genesis in 1655; a few of the Psalms in 1658; the whole of the New Testament in 1661, and the completed Bible in 1663.

If we had among us now some Indians who thoroughly understood the Algonquin language, which was the dialect most used hereabout in Eliot's time, and could tell us how his translation of the Bible was received, how some of the long chapters of genealogies or some of the rapt passages of the prophets, or the sublime pictures of nature in the Psalms, or the metaphysical arguments of Paul, or the profound and far-reaching moral requirement of the epistles, or the sublime, heaven-descending beatitudes and spiritual utterances of Jesus, fell upon the ears or entered the hearts of the red men of the woods,—what an interesting revelation it would be! All this has gone beyond recovery. Or, if we had some one who, better acquainted with the language, could show us the imperfections of the Apostle in trying to put the Scriptures into any meaning they could grasp! That too is impossible. With all the incredible toil and profound interest at heart, what an elementary work must have been the result! If only Eliot himself could have left on record some of the mistakes into which he was led for the lack of words, or his knowledge of them, to convey the meaning of the Scripture! We have but one instance, and this may be somewhat apocryphal. When he came to translate the verse in Judges, "The mother of Sisera looked out at the window, and cried through the lattice," he could find no word for lattice. He asked one after another, he described it as a framework with open spaces, as netting, as a kind of open basket-work or wicker. At last they gave him a long, unpronounceable word; and years after, when he understood the language better, he was

much amused to find that he had rendered it: "The mother of Sisera looked out at the window, and cried through an eel-pot." What of it all? They may have got the pith of the bloody story, and it might have soothed their consciences in some similar tragedy in their own wigwams, as in the tent of Jael.

One of the most pleasing incidents in Eliot's life must have been a visit paid to him by another who shared the same zeal for these tribes of the woods. Of the devoted Jesuit missionaries of the Northwest, few were more active than Father Gabriel Druillettes. On one of his expeditions he came from Quebec down the waters of the Kennebec, and at last embarked for "Rogsbray," to visit a minister he had heard much of named "Heliot." He came to Eliot's and found him instructing some savages. "Eliot," he wrote, "received me with respect and affection, and prayed me to pass the winter with him." At a time when the religious antipathies of the Protestants and Romanists were most bitter, here we find two men in the vigor of life, yet to pass their fourscore years in their loved and poorly rewarded labors, met in simple, fraternal fellowship, comparing notes about their methods, successes, disappointments, hopes. The aims of each were the same, but their methods very unlike.

Of Eliot's personal appearance we know nothing. No portrait of him is in existence. He kept no diary full of self-depreciatory, self-conceited, self-lauding exclamations, like Cotton Mather's, now bearing witness to God's special providences to him, now confessing himself the vilest of worms, and now telling of his wonderfully persuasive eloquence and gifts, and wide influence. His ministry was one of utter unworldliness, of self-exacting toil, of entire surrender to the good of others, of a daily walk hid with Christ in God. He had no time to write daily notes of self-introspection. Every gift and every strength and every movement was devoted self-renunciation. "His apparel," says one of his biographers, "was without any ornament except that of humility. Had you seen him with his leathern girdle (for such a one he wore) about his loins, you would almost have thought what Herod feared,—that John Baptist was come to life again. He that will write of Eliot, must write of his charity, or say nothing. His charity was a star of the first magnitude in the

bright constellation of his virtues, and the rays of it were wonderfully various and extensive. His liberality to pious uses, whether public or private, went much beyond the proportions of his little estate in this world. Many hundred pounds did he freely bestow upon the poor; and he would, with very forcible importunities, press his neighbors to join with him in such beneficences. He did not put off his charity to be put in his last will, as many who therein show that their charity is against their will, but he was his own administrator and he made his own hands his executors, and his own eyes his overseers."

The story, familiar as it is, must always be added to any sketch of his life, of the treasurer of the parish who on paying him his quarterly salary, knowing well his lavish expenditure for the relief of others, put the money in a handkerchief and tied it in as many hard knots as possible to compel him to carry it home. On his way thither, he called to see a poor sick woman, and told her that God had sent some relief. Then he began to untie the knots, but there were Indians waiting in his study to be taught, and, growing impatient with the delay to get at his money, he threw it all into her lap, saying, "Here, my dear, take it, I believe the Lord desires it all for you." And charity in its deeper sense was shown, when to a minister, complaining of injurious treatment from some of his parishioners, Eliot said, "Brother, learn the meaning of these three little words, bear, forbear, and forgive." And when a friend asked him how he was in his last sickness, he replied: "Alas! I have lost everything. My understanding leaves me, my memory fails me, my utterance fails me; but I thank God my charity holds out still. I think that rather grows than fails."

Eliot's preaching must have been of a very high character for that day, to judge by occasional references which have been preserved. One may be sure it was long, and filled with Biblical quotations, without any regard to the context, or to their meaning at the time,—they were all God's words and it did not matter much how they were used. His sermons were prepared with all possible care and mental effort, as he said upon hearing a good preacher, "Brother, there is oil required for the service of the sanctuary; but it must be beaten; I praise God that your oil was

so well beaten today." His other labors were so distinguished that his preaching has been little noticed. The agents of the Labadist community, in the record of their visit in 1680, speak of Eliot as a very old man, and "the best of the ministers we have yet heard in Boston and its vicinity." And John Dunton, a bookseller from London, describes him in 1686 as "the glory of Roxbury, as well as of all New England." In his old age he said that he feared his friends Cotton of Boston and Mather of Dorchester, who had been in heaven a long time, would suspect that he had gone the wrong way because he stayed so long behind them, and added, "I wonder for what the Lord Jesus Christ lets me live. He knows that I can do nothing for him." He was compared to Moses because his face was continually shining as a result of his communion with God; and to Homer's Nestor from whose lips dropped words sweeter than honey. There was a tradition that the country could never perish as long as Eliot was alive.

In several letters we find him taking much interest in the progress of medical science, and he speaks in high praise of the studies and results of the College of Physicians in London. "By the blessing of God upon them, they seem to me to design such a regimen of health, and such an exact inspection into all diseases, and knowledge of all medicaments, and prudence of application of the same, that the book of divine Providence seemeth to provide for the lengthening of the life of man again in this latter end of the world, which would be of no small advantage unto all kinds of good learning and government." Then he adds his curious and ever-ready confirmation of his opinion from the Scriptures: "Doth not such a thing seem to be prophesied in Isaiah? If the child shall die one hundred years old, of what age shall the old man be? But I would not be too bold with the Holy Scriptures."

So wore this long and faithful ministry out, until with laboring steps he made his way up the meeting-house hill, and once, leaning upon his deacon's arm, he said, "This is very like the way to heaven, 'tis up hill; the Lord by His grace fetch us up." And spying a bush near by, he added, "And truly there are thorns and briers on the way."

What remains of all these labors? His Indian Bible not a per-

son in America can read. It is worthless except for the enormous price set upon it by the hunters of literary relics. The Indians have all vanished from the scenes of his teaching, loving sympathy, and guidance. Even before the Apostle died, he had to grieve that the evils of civilization were creeping upon them beyond the power of the gospel to stay. The settlers as a rule had always been suspicious of them, and their treatment of them, like that of the government with its broken treaties since, only strengthened and deepened whatever treacherous traits they had; and at last, after the war with Philip, the chief settlements at Natick were broken up, and by order of the State the families were all removed to Deer Island in Boston Harbor. There is hardly another scene so pathetic as when the Apostle, bending in old age, had to bid them submit to the decree of the Court, and with tearful eyes, bidding them farewell, said, "You will learn that through much tribulation you are to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Were these plodding toils of the scholar and the missionary all in vain? We may think he might have spent his gifts in a higher service. He did not think so. Was this life a waste or a failure? Is any life spent in such entire devotion to what it regards as a special mission in the uplift of any part of humanity as the service of God a failure? Think what a change two centuries have wrought! What prosperity, what power, what luxury! What results of agriculture, mining, manufactures, and commerce! What comfortable homes! What opportunities and obligations! Our problems may be far more intricate and perplexing and threatening; are we giving ourselves to them with the heroism, the consecration, the deep love of humanity, the undisturbed faith in the Eternal which marked the Apostle Eliot? Is it a time to forget those who, in the day of small things, laid the foundation of all we enjoy?

The tumult and the shouting dies,
  The Captains and the kings depart:
Still stands their ancient sacrifice,—
  An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget,—lest we forget!

In the church, on the site of the Apostle's ministry, a tablet has been placed which bears the following inscription:

JOHN ELIOT

Apostle to the Indians

Born at Widford 1604 his first years
seasoned with the fear of God the word
and prayer Educated at Jesus College
Cambridge Came to the new world 1631
Preingaged to the Church in Roxbury
Ordained as preacher with Weld 1632
Whom he succeeded as Pastor 1641
1645 founded the Roxbury Latin School
1689 the Eliot School in Jamaica Plain
One of the authors of the Bay Psalm Book
1646 began his marvellous work among
the native tribes of New England
1660 founded at Natick the first Indian
Church in the Massachusetts Colony
1663 completed the translation of the Bible
In zeal equal to Saint Paul in charity
equal to Saint Francis he traversed the
land for forty years in perils of the
wilderness in perils of the heathen in
hunger and thirst with gentleness and
fearlessness to bear the gospel to the
children of the woods who were to him
the children of God

Died May 21 1690
First among Puritan Saints

# *THE EVIL ONE: A DEVELOPMENT*

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It is proposed in this paper to consider, largely from the standpoint of the philosophy of religion, one religious idea: the idea of a power or powers of evil, or, to grasp the whole in one symbol, the idea of the Evil One. Such a discussion should have its interest. The idea of the Evil One, or the Devil as we commonly call him, is perfectly familiar to the average person. There is no need therefore of any elaborate definings. One has only to note that by the Evil One is meant that force or power which is constitutionally—on principle, one might say, if that phrase did not seem a bit out of place—the champion and fosterer of chaos and discord and calamity, of evil and harm and wickedness in general. Or, to put it negatively,—as we perhaps more often think of it,—the Devil is the leader of the opposition as regards the hopeful, the progressive, the divine, with all the meaning which may be packed into that last word.

Look first, then, at the origin of this idea, so far as one may surmise it. On the stage of primitive religion, the savage sees every day happenings which he does not comprehend, which he therefore refers to powers beyond and above those of men. This notion of superhuman, "supernatural," actors in the world is natural enough. Early man with a rudimentary sense of orderly thought sets up by this idea of the supernatural a logical classification of that large number of events which for various reasons cannot be fitted into his ordinary relations with the men about him. That the category "supernatural" is always personal for primitive religion is due to the make-up of the savage mind, which is too far from abstruse to be able to grasp the thought of an abstract impersonal action or, as we should say, force. The reasons for assigning events to supernatural agency are chiefly that the happenings in question are odd or affrighting, or perhaps merely incomprehensible. Of course for the savage much comes under these descriptions. The matter may be illustrated from

what is often seen in the life of our domestic animals. When we see the cat start at an unexpected noise, or the horse prick up his ears at a motor-car or an odd-looking pile of wood, we are cognizant of a state of mind which explains much in the past of our race. We are looking on at almost precisely the mood of the savage over against many events in nature about him. The animal forgets, when the queer occurrence is past; but primitive man, already a reasoner, grasps all such events together as similarly based and caused. A surprising fall of a tree, a flood, an eclipse, a fortunate coincidence, such as the appearance of an animal just when one is in dire need of food, the phenomena of insanity or dreams, the stumbling over a stone of peculiar shape or color, the frequent encountering on some one day of one particular species of bird or beast, even the mere feeling that certain places or situations are uncanny,—heights, deep woods,—all these incidents, accidents we should call them, were for primitive man the plain and not unreasonable indications that there was here involved something beyond himself or any man like him. Chance was an explanation foreign and even impossible to him; in fact a high degree of sophistication is in any case demanded to grasp the idea of chance at all. Thus the savage speedily peopled his surroundings with supernatural powers. Where these found their mode of expression chiefly in animals, we have "totemism," in objects "fetichism," in certain men "shamanism." But even where the superhuman was thus localized, the thing was never exclusive. The savage is inevitably a polytheist. Powers of various energy and skill and danger are for him not in his totem or fetich or medicine-man only, they are all about him also.

At the earlier stages primitive men did not distinguish between benevolent and malevolent divinities. It was necessary to propitiate them all and carefully to avoid affronting any power whatever. There was in practice no need to draw a line between the good and the evil powers. It might perhaps be supposed that evil happenings would be ascribed to demons and beneficial ones to gods, but that was not the case. The category of good and evil, helpful and harmful, is very important and keenly remarked by the savage, but it does not give him the clew for making a distinction between good and evil powers. For an evil event may be

due to the displeasure of a being ordinarily well-disposed, while a good event might be the attempt of a really evil power to beguile.

As time goes on, however, this distinction arises; and it probably appears when the savage becomes "acquainted," so to speak, with certain divinities, marking them off and in a way recognizing them. That is to say, some happenings recur and become well-known so that the propitiating activity can be regular and the power in question can be assigned a name, a function, in brief a place in savage society. Now these familiar powers tend to be regarded as gods and friendly, while all others are looked upon as demons and unfriendly, on the general principle of the uncivilized that every stranger is an enemy. Of course under the savage conditions of life, the trustworthy, more or less manageable, powers are few in number, while the unfamiliar are encountered far more often. The savage lives in a world of terror such as we, after centuries of protecting civilization, can probably in no way imagine. He therefore believes, and it is scarcely surprising, in demons and devils more than in gods, just because he is so seldom surely and consciously safe. Savage religion has something of cultus, but much more of that exorcising or conjuring of demons which we call magic. By degrees, with the receding of ineptitude and fear and the advance of security and knowledge of the world and its ways, the gods relatively increase and the demons become less numerous and insistent, relegated to the background—though a very persistent background in all higher religions.

The next step is taken when these superhuman powers begin to take on a degree of order, no longer existing for thought as an unrelated, promiscuous welter of differing individual gods on the one hand and demons on the other. They all exist still but are arranged in a unity of some sort. With the gods this comes in differing ways. It may be that one of them becomes more and more powerful, while the rest come to be correspondingly subordinate and negligible—as in Greece and Rome. Or one deity may rise to an importance such that he is regarded as the only real divinity, of which accordingly all the others are expressions—as Brahma in India. This unifying process is not so common in the case of the evil powers. The tendency in the case of the elevation of the chief or only god is for the evil

ones to fade into mere memories, pale relics and survivals, lurking on as almost ineradicable superstitions among the more ignorant, and ready to revive to titanic energy at any weakness of the older established religions. This last has happened often in the history of religion, witness especially the recrudescence of exorcisms and conjurations and orgiastic rites at a time when the Greek and Roman religions were decrepit and Christianity had not as yet established itself. In the regular order of things, however, when religion is normally strong and commonly accepted, the evil powers become superstitions, as jinns, harpies, gorgons, evil geniuses, were-wolves, vampires, trolls, witches, and the rest.

If this were the only course of development in the ideas as to evil beings, then the discussion of the evil powers in religion would be a plain and simple one. There would be a steady evolution from the savage beliefs and magic in general, with less and less credence till the evil powers were on the point of vanishing altogether,—a result which would really come to pass when education with its salutary mental and spiritual sanitation had become universal. We are obviously far from it as yet, but that point would be a theoretical end of the evil one and all that is his. As matter of fact, however, this steady development toward monistic belief has not been the exclusive type of development, so that the prophecy of a disappearing evil one is not the only outlook. In certain quarters, alongside of the unifying of the gods, the evil powers, too, have coalesced to form an ordered whole over against the good. A classical illustration of the finished result of such a dualistic development is to be found in the later aspect of Persian religion, commonly called Zoroastrianism.

By Zoroastrianism [1] the world is conceived as a great battlefield for a life-and-death struggle between Ormuzd, the power of light, and Ahriman, the power of darkness, each having his numerous henchmen and followers. Ormuzd is the stronger, and is at length to conquer after various cycles of years—there is that degree of monism even here—but at this present the dualism is irreconcilable. The whole world is filled with supernatural

[1] For this sketch of Zoroastrianism I am largely indebted to E. Lehmann, in Chantepie de la Saussaye, Religionsgeschichte, 3d edition.

powers, evil as well as good. Of the evil ones, there are devas and drujs—demons all over the earth, all about and in us. In every corner they do their baleful work. No home and no individual is free or safe from them. Daily purifications, sacrifices, prayers, exorcisms, and the like are necessary to ward them off. Every sin and shameful act, every suffering and calamity, has its demon. Sickness and death, winter and famine, unchastity and drunkenness, envy and arrogance—these all and every other evil are due to the personal energy of Ahriman and his workers. The domain of the demons upon earth is constantly spreading in certain directions and narrowing in others, for all false thinking and unbelief is an addition to Ahriman's realm. All violent sinners are regarded as his recruits, and after death themselves become demons. In time the Persians came to classify all their political enemies as followers and helpers of Ahriman. So the Turanians, the Greeks and Romans, the Turks and Arabs, are to stand in the last battle between Ormuzd and Ahriman and fight on the side of the evil power. The task of the devas is therefore to wrest from Ormuzd the control of the world. Their method is partly by material calamities and devastations, partly by seducing men, corrupting in all possible ways their virtues. This war is going on in every nook and corner of earth. For every piece of ground which Ormuzd brought into existence at the creation, Ahriman at the same time made something evil which should spoil it,—bad soil or bad climate or poisonous insects or evil passions of men. Barrenness and sterility is always a sign of the evil one's presence. Desert, swamp, and moor, rock and dreary heath, are his favorite dwelling-places. Alike in winter-freezing and in summer-sicknesses the work of Ahriman is plainly apparent. Death is the peculiar element of the devas. When a good man passes away, a druj comes for him with glee, but when an evil person dies, they bear him off with sadness and lamentings in view of the loss thus sustained by the forces of evil upon the earth.

It ought to be noted that this religion is very practical in its moral emphases, all of which rest solidly upon its dualism. Every planting of waste ground, every curing of sickness, every overcoming of sin, is a definite driving out of Ahriman and an

extension of the domain of Ormuzd. Worship and purifications have their place, but they are not all-important. Morals and industry in all practical ways, in ploughing, sowing, digging, casting forth, educating—all that means the banishment of barrenness and waste and filth and ignorance—is a driving away of evil and as much the service of Ormuzd as is any formal worship. Is it not clear that in the Persian development of belief in the evil one there is not so much superstition as a positive and useful morality and religion? The belief in an evil one in the form which it here takes can hardly be put aside with contempt as a mere survival of primitive ideas.

Turn now to a brief consideration of the Hebrew religion in which the figure of an evil power is by some believed to be derived from the Persian ideas just portrayed. The religion of the Hebrews is the more significant in that all the notions of the devil which are found in our Western civilization go back, largely if not wholly, to the Old and New Testaments. Satan—to use his Old Testament title—is a late idea in the religion of the Hebrew scriptures, not making its appearance till such books as Zechariah and Chronicles and Job, while Azazel, undoubtedly resting upon a popular superstition regarding a demon of that name, is mentioned in one of the late portions of Leviticus, itself a late book. The idea of an evil one would thus not appear to be indigenous to the Hebrew religion, probably for the reason that the more religious of the Jews were stiffly monotheistic. There is, indeed, the story of the temptation in the Garden of Eden. The tempter, however, is not Satan but a serpent who speaks,—as do all Æsop's serpents, and on occasion the animals of folk-tales generally. The narrative in the first chapters of Genesis is in fact not a description of historical incidents but a tale, no doubt often retold before it was written down, and designed to account for various things, namely, the uncanny dislike felt by human beings for snakes, the crawling of that animal—plainly a most surprising and humiliating mode of progression, the origin of birth-pangs, the reason of the strange and harsh dispensation whereby men have to toil and to die.[2] It is not evil in general but certain particular evils upon which in naïve and beautiful folk-fashion this narrative reflects in its picture of the serpent-tempter.

[2] See Gunkel, Genesis, 2d edition, pp. 17–19.

Aside from this exception, which is thus only apparent, the figure of Satan does not appear until the latest books of the Old Testament. Even there, be it noted, Satan is not what he afterward becomes in the development of the Hebrew religion. At his first appearance he is no hostile power of evil over against God, but is a servant of God, returning to him and reporting among the others; so with especial clearness in the prologue to the book of Job. His peculiar task is the accusing of men by reminding God of their evil qualities, as a sort of heavenly "prosecuting attorney." As one scholar puts it, he may be said to personify the judicial severity of God, not opposing but serving and even, in so far, representing God. Even in Job, however, Satan takes a certain delight in his task, and this magnifying of his office helps to explain the full-fledged, God-defying Prince of Evil whom we know in the New Testament.

It should be remarked that the notion of Satan appears not only late but precisely after the exile gave association with Persian ideas, and that it is found during the time of the Persian influence. This suggests that Satan is derived from the Persian Ahriman, just as Persia is certainly responsible for the recrudescence of angels and demons in the later Old Testament period. But the figure of Satan as a servant of God is far removed from the Persian notion of him, and this consideration leads to doubt whether Persian influence be at all the source of the idea of the evil one in Palestine. If the development known to us began with the Apocrypha or the New Testament, Persian influence might be taken for granted, but in view of the characteristics of the evil one at an earlier period, it becomes improbable. It is, further, not impossible to explain the appearance of this figure in Hebrew literature on other grounds. In spite of the silence of the prophets as to Satan or demons, there may well have persisted among the great mass of the people survivals of primitive religious notions as to devils which would have sufficed to produce the Satan of later prophecy and of Job. This is the more likely in that Satan at first appears as one of the angels in Jahveh's service and yet as on the opposite side a paradox,—which looks like the resultant of two different religious ideas, namely, the popular belief in

demons, which has been said [3] to "stand at the beginning of all human religious development," and the stark, unbending monotheism which became for the Jewish nation more and more axiomatic. But at any rate Satan makes his entrance into Hebrew literature as a vassal of Jahveh and not until after the exile, and then presently appears as the traditional opponent of all that is right and good.

In the New Testament we read of demons innumerable, thought of as causing abnormalities and diseases of every kind, but most of all as bringing about mental derangements. The phrase "possessed of a devil" as a synonym for insanity is well known to every reader of the Bible. Another point of view is characteristic of the epistles, where the gods of the heathen are called demons,[4] a suggestion of which Milton makes splendid use in his catalogue of the nobles of Satan's realm. Theodore Parker came very close to translating it into modern thought when he said to a narrow theologian who ascribed unworthy cruelty to the Divine Being, "Your God is my Devil!" But the New Testament knows not only devils of various sorts: it is certain also of a Devil, the leader and champion of evil, always opposed to God and the good—a single commanding figure gathering up into itself all the appeal and danger and wickedness of sin, called by various names and significations, such as Beelzebub, the prince of the power of the air, the prince of this world, the god of this world, as well as the more familiar devil or evil one. The New Testament is not entirely and consistently sure that all temptation is due to the evil one or his minions. It is sometimes implied that it comes from God, as for example in the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation!" The Epistle of James [5] refers to God's responsibility for our temptation as a current idea which it emphatically denies, ascribing evil solicitations not to God, nor even to Satan, but to one's own evil desires. But, speaking by and large, temptation is in the New Testament ordinarily thought of as coming from the evil one. Sin and the solicitation to sin is his specialty, his department of the activity of the superhuman, spiritual world. More than this, this idea of the devil's

[3] Bousset, Die Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, p. 331.

[4] 1 Corinthians 10 20, 21, cf. 1 Timothy 4 1. [5] 1 13, 14.

peculiar work is projected into the past, and, in particular, Satan is identified in the period of the New Testament with the serpent of the Garden of Eden in Genesis. So for the future the work of the evil one is to continue until there comes at length a final catastrophe comparable to a similar casting up of accounts in the Persian religion. In a word, evil and the devil are set over against God from all time and into the dim future, till at last according to the Book of Revelation the devil and his angels are cast into the lake of fire and brimstone.

Advancing with the development of Christianity, we may note that in the writings of the church fathers of the second and third century the devil plays an important rôle. All the Roman imperial system and all that opposed Christianity was regarded as a part of his kingdom. As the prince of this world, he is the rival and caricature of the divine, "God's ape" as Tertullian says. Cyprian calls him "the author of all delusions and heresies." He is the owner of men by reason of their sin, and a release can be obtained only by the death of Christ in which Satan overreached himself—since Christ never sinned, accordingly never deserved death—and was in fact intentionally and most cleverly outwitted. This idea of the atonement as made by a payment to the devil held sway in the church's thinking for over a thousand years, and the same aspect of Satan as one easily hoodwinked appears in many different quarters throughout the centuries. Ben Jonson wrote a play the title of which asserts that "The Devil is an Ass." Many folk-tales tell of peasants who get the better of him, such stories representing the naturalization, even with a play of humor, of the notion of an evil one. This very fact of humorous treatment indicates the great importance of the idea and the deep familiarity of the people with it. In fact, during the Middle Ages in general the belief in the devil was absorbing. Saints and others conceived themselves to be in constant conflict with him. It was a fixed idea with everybody, the climax being reached perhaps in the fifteenth century. Luther, for example, saw and fought the devil more than once. He threw an inkstand at him one day at the Wartburg—the inkspot resulting is still one of the sights shown to tourists at that castle. In the miracle plays the devil is one of the leading char-

acters, and his figure found its way into greater literature. One need only mention Dante's devil at the centre of the earth, crunching in his three mouths the three arch-traitors, and by the motion of his wings sending a cold wind throughout all hell. Milton's Satan is a magnificent incarnation of indomitable pride and perseverance, who appeals to us by his sublimity and courage far more than he affrights or shocks us—for it is generally agreed that, although the writer meant otherwise, Satan is the hero of *Paradise Lost*. Indeed, the idea of the evil one, so clear-cut and so widely familiar as it had become, was sure to be largely utilized—whether one believed in him or not—as a convenient stock symbol for literature from the middle ages on. It was employed by Marlowe in his *Doctor Faustus*, by Goethe in his *Faust*, with its polished eighteenth-century Mephistopheles, not to pause upon such more recent treatments as Hauff's *Memoiren des Satans* or Molnar's *The Devil* or Andreev's querying, doubting, fearing *Anathema*. All these present and mould the idea in different fashions, recurring to it again and again, as well they may, for it is a deep-lying human notion, leaping out and flaming forth at the slightest opening. One may recall the witch-trials for a sad chapter in this folk-idea, or Mrs. Eddy's "malicious animal magnetism" for a comic one.

But what shall be said as to the religious meaning and validity of this idea of the Evil One? In the first place this at least, that superstition in the strict sense can never have any religious value. Detailed representation of the evil one and his doings may delight children and some few adults with the thrill of its pleasing horrors, but there is in it no more religious meaning than in the tales of the "Invisible Cloak" or "Fortunatus's Purse." The superstitious ideas of the devil which have continued alongside monotheistic religion are only to be reprobated—or laughed at. But, having said this, we must also say that the idea of an evil power over against good is not too hastily to be dubbed either irrelevant or a superstition. It may be an integral part of religion. From the point of view of belief in a power of evil in the world, there are today two types of religion. The one rejects the devil scornfully and contemptuously. The other believes in him; not because it prizes him, but because it regards that

belief as necessary to practical life and morality. To some this statement may sound incredible and even silly. It will lose somewhat of this oddness, however, when I hasten to add that the word "Devil" is meant and used as a convenient symbol for the abstract expression, "a positive and real force of evil."

There are religious men today who assert and believe in the reality of evil and there are those on the other hand who deny its essential existence. Of course we are all familiar with the view of those people—the "tender-minded" Professor James called them—who will never admit that there is any real danger anywhere. These blatant optimists are ever to be met with, they who are sure that, however things may seem, everything is bound to come out right. Another expression of this same state of opinion is yielded by the Christian Scientists with their never-ceasing assertion that all pain is an "error"; and there are also the violent partisans of the "larger hope" who, with Tennyson,

> "Can but trust that good shall fall
> At last—far off—at last to all,
> And every winter change to spring."

All these more or less consciously deny that evil is a fact. Or, to use our symbol, they deny the existence of the Evil One. There is, they admit, sin in the world, but they deem it more accurately described as immaturity—a greenness of the fruit which will be outgrown with time and development. There is harm, calamity, anguish, but our idea that these are evil is due to our limited and distorted vision which is unable to see things whole. Only take the standpoint of an eternal All-knower, and evil is not, has not been, and never will be. It seems to be, it is true, and the saner idealists will even grant it to be a part of experience, but that seeming is not real. The chief exponents of this view of evil—Spinoza in the past, and at present the absolute idealists like Professor Royce—attempt to solve the problem of evil by denying its real existence, or rather—to put it positively—they cut this age-old Gordian knot by asserting roundly and dogmatically the power and ultimate triumph of goodness, breathing their souls full with the certainty that

> "God's in his heaven,
> All's right with the world."

Now this type of denial of the Evil One has its great value, and even its element of truth. It may be seriously questioned whether men could do their best without a deeply-felt belief, usually vague and inarticulate no doubt, that all, *all* is at bottom properly managed and good. Only so does the work that men do *hold*, so to speak, in place of falling back into the abyss. The positive faith-*motif* which underlies absolute idealism and much of the theoretical denial of evil is deeply practical and religiously helpful; the comfort and hope of it is undeniable. But in the details of its working out, and especially in what it denies, it betrays weakness and even a lack of moral earnestness.

For look at the other type of religious thought in this matter, the point of view which asserts that evil and the powers of evil are real and robustly alive in themselves, as well as in our thought of them. There are at least two considerations in favor of this assertion of the real existence of evil:

First, evil is not usually—so far as experience goes—a negative matter, a sign of immaturity alone or chiefly: it is positive, keenly hurting, affrighting. Look at sin. It is vital, emphatic, no mere lack of goodness. One may theorize in one's study, as though it were negative, but for those who have struggled with a habit that is ruinous, or have felt the grip of a hard temptation, sin is something with its own appealing individuality, with its own thews and muscles, and loves and hates. To put the same matter in another fashion, this is but to say that the evil-minded, the champions of evil, the selfish, are not pale negatives of the righteous; they are living, red-blooded human personalities. Go into politics, fight for a clean municipality, and one must soon realize that evil is, though not so strong in the long run, yet every whit as positive and real a fact as good. It is those who know evil and sin best from their own experience who most naturally accept and assert the reality of evil. We have in our vocabulary—that accumulated insight of many generations—the words "fiendish" and "devilish"; they are positive and for us all they are sometimes the only words that really fit a mood or an action or a person. One need only read of such a character as the sea-captain in Jack London's *Sea-Wolf* or Thénardier in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, to grasp what is meant by the positiveness of the evil in

humanity. So with calamity, sickness, microbes, they are not mere "growing pains"; they have a hateful, devouring, crushing aspect. They live for themselves and against what is for our weal. Physicians know well the uncanny entities, almost individualities, which lurk behind diphtheria or typhoid fever or tuberculosis. We often speak of the "meanness" of *la grippe* or the treachery of typhoid fever. The thing is largely true of all that pains us directly or remotely. In fact, it should be noted that pain, in particular, is for psychology at the present moment not the absence of pleasure, not even the subjectively disagreeable alone; it is regarded as a separate, vital sensation by itself and for itself, sometimes useful, sometimes agreeable even, but always positive. In fine, it is admitted that some evil is only apparent, but much, the great majority of it, is real and emphatic. This all is a fact of experience which can scarcely be gainsaid.

And, secondly, a belief in the reality of evil is necessary to a steady, strenuous, complete morality and so to a true religion. It is well to love goodness and purity and to live in their atmosphere, but there is need often, in this actual world, of fighting evil, too; of withstanding poverty and injustice and crime and self-seeking and other evils without us, and of opposing to the death evil tendencies, lusts, foul thinking, sloth, and all the rest within us. Now for this strenuous struggle with the powers of darkness it is a necessary preliminary that one believe that they are not apparent only, but real and dangerous, having an outcome, if not checked or scotched, which will be actual destruction and even damnation. The existence of the evil one must in so far be an article in our creed, if we are earnestly and with any success to overcome him and his works. A phantom foe will be half-heartedly opposed. A sham fight cannot have in it quite the stir, the verve, the agonizing thrust which a real battle with a real enemy will compel. It is all very well, as a moral holiday now and then, to forget the power and reality of evil in the world, but for that righteous indignation and downright eagerness for purity and justice which must have their places in every life, a belief in the Evil One and his potencies for harm is a mighty and indispensable stimulus.

A word in conclusion as to the modern representatives of what

may be called, not unfairly, a belief in the reality of evil. First and foremost, William James in the last chapter of his *Pragmatism* dwells on the value of appreciating the reality and danger of the struggle with evil, as over against the quietism of the easy "waiting game" of absolutism. Nor is this a matter of the pragmatists alone. It is not far from the truth to say that the reality of the power of evil is congenial to all the present-day opponents of absolute idealism—and these are many, as those acquainted with current philosophy know. These opponents include, besides the pragmatists, the pluralists (not always the same as the pragmatists) and the present-day realists,[6] definitive opponents of pragmatism whose programme has recently appeared, and who bid fair to become a reigning school in philosophy. One may then be modern, and yet hold that there is a force for evil which exists and may long exist, which may even, as some assert, forever exist. The belief in an Evil One is not necessarily a superstition. To assert it is perhaps nearer the truth than to deny it, though it is granted that much can be said on both sides.

Whether or not one go on to believe that it is characteristic of the real evil in the world to be personal, will depend upon how fundamental to reality of existence the concept of personality is held to be. There are many, like myself, who cannot conceive an impersonal positive force for evil. The important truth, however, the precious result of the long-evolving, religious notion of the Evil One, is not that of the personality or impersonality of evil, still less of a literal traditional Devil in a flaming hell with horns and hoofs and tail and the rest; the vital and valuable residuum of it all is the sober assertion of the real existence in the universe of a positive tendency to harm and destruction and sin and death, which evil tendency it behooves men individually and society collectively to fight at every possible opportunity.

[6] Because this type of philosophy is less known than it should be among theologians, let me quote here from Professor Perry, himself a realist, in his book, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 329. "Realism . . . rejects the doctrine that things must be good. . . . The universe, or collective totality of being, contains things good, bad, and indifferent. . . . It is the practical function of intelligence, not to read goodness into the facts, but to lay bare the facts in all their indifference and brutality."

# *THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS: ITS FIDELITY TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE*

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After the critical proving as by fire to which the Bible has been subjected during recent years, Protestant apologists have succeeded in re-establishing its claim to a position of central importance in our religion. They have achieved this end by abandoning Calvin's vicious logical circle, which based the authority of Scripture upon the approving testimony of the Spirit and tested the Spirit by the standards of Scripture, and by adopting the more powerful lines of argument deduced from the accepted canons of general literary criticism. "I know that the Bible is true because it finds me," said Coleridge, and thus he achieved in a single sentence what the labored casuistry of centuries had failed to establish. The Bible is true, we say in this generation, because it presents persistent types of profound religious experience which may be verified, "always, everywhere, by all men."

In particular the critic asserts, and for Christianity at large this is the most reassuring dictum of contemporary scholarship, that the teaching of Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, constitutes a body of truth quite untrammelled by the narrowing circumstances of time and place. In the Sermon on the Mount we stand in a "celestial everywhere and forever." Occasional dissenting voices have not destroyed the wide-spread conviction that modern scholarship in thus vindicating the universal validity of Jesus' words has achieved, if not its perfect work, at least a signal contribution to contemporary faith.

To the permanent validity of Jesus' teaching the present day has been compelled, however, to take one large exception. The eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels apparently controverts all reasonable standards of universality, and confines one to the "preposterous then and there." This age frankly acknowledges its inability to ascribe present spiritual significance to the

apocalyptic programme of religious progress, whether presented by uncanonical or by canonical writings. The problems raised by those portions of Jesus' teaching cast in this mould are confessedly serious. "We must all of us agree," says a recent essay,[1] "that unless some consensus of opinion among Biblical critics justifies us in denying the authenticity of certain of the sayings of Jesus . . . we shall find this attack upon our citadel the most dangerous in history. For even now things sidereal continue as they were since the beginning of creation."

Every student of the New Testament has felt the inadequacy of the familiar solutions of this problem. An earlier objective-minded orthodoxy found a justification for and a fulfilment of Jesus' words about the catastrophic consummation of the age in the happenings of Pentecost. This hypothesis does credit to our predecessors' ingenuity rather than to their candor. Later subjective-minded believers have spiritualized the whole subject, and thus avoided its obvious dilemmas. But in such exegesis the Ritschlians merely strike hands with the Alexandrians in their familiar preference for faith-values, and Luther is right when he says, "Allegories serve well for such preachers as have not studied much, who know not rightly how to expound the histories and texts, whose leather is too short and will not stretch; we should accustom ourselves to remain by the clear and pure text." Most persons, unsatisfied with both these arbitrary solutions, preserve their faith in the spiritual immediacy of Jesus' words by denying the authenticity of the apocalyptic matter accredited to him, and dismissing it as a later Jewish accretion upon the substratum of the original gospel. But this expedient is open to serious critical objections. For, whatever may be the relation of these passages to the current messianic categories, they form part of the groundwork of the oldest tradition, and from a literary standpoint must stand or fall with that record as a whole. Of the thirty "doubly attested sayings," cited by Burkitt, at least seven are distinctly apocalyptic in form and substance. The urgency of practical religion may warrant the believer in culling out an eclectic gospel for his private needs, but from the point of view of Synoptic procedure we have no more warrant for rejecting the twenty-fourth

[1] Ambrose W. Vernon in the Hibbert Journal for October, 1910.

chapter of Matthew, for example, than for rejecting the Sermon on the Mount.

Common recognition of the place of the eschatological matter in the primitive gospel has led to a re-examination of the whole field. Criticism now enables us to trace a slight development and expansion of the original idea during the period in which the gospels were taking form. Professor von Dobschütz has also recently argued that part of Jesus' teaching about the last things, when compared with contemporary apocalyptic literature, constitutes a "transmuted eschatology," that is, a dematerialized eschatology. Yet when these concessions have been made, there are still large blocks of discourse, neither accretions, nor yet a transmuted conception of the messianic consummation, which must be attributed to Jesus himself. It has, therefore, become necessary to review, as best we may, the development of Jesus' messianic self-consciousness. Few disciples of the present day are inclined to deny the validity of Jesus' belief in the perpetuity of his own person and the growth of the Kingdom. We are also coming to see that when Jesus sought to formulate and express these ideas he had only the messianic categories of his own day. We may regret that Jesus was compelled to have recourse to modes of thought which from the vantage-ground of later centuries seem scientifically inaccurate and baldly unspiritual; but what are the conceivable alternatives? Had he striven to express himself in any other terms, the dilemma would be infinitely more serious. That he prophesied his immediate return upon the clouds of glory may be a very real stumbling-block to his disciples of the twentieth century; but had he been a great anachronism and foretold his part in the realization of the increasing purpose, in terms of the "ascent of man," he would be a hopeless riddle. The present-day believer may very properly prefer some sober terminology to the catastrophic language of the Book of Enoch when he seeks to describe spiritual progress, but he does not make the person of Jesus more significant for faith by demanding in a man of the first century the terminology of the twentieth. Even the most jealous conservatism is now repudiating that conception of the incarnation which would make of Jesus a thesaurus of all wisdom, past, present, and

to come. Dr. Sanday expresses the conviction of many true Christians when he says, "The human thought and tongue of Jesus—and it was only through human thought and speech that even He could communicate with His disciples who were also His brethren—could only express themselves with that relativity which attaches to all that is human. The language of the Apocalypse, in one or another of its forms, was almost the only language available." Thus far has criticism brought us. Jesus expected the more or less immediate and catastrophic consummation of the kingdom, and his own return as the climax of that event. We are willing to acknowledge that, believing as he did in the ultimate realization of the messianic programme, his appropriation of this terminology was not only natural but inevitable. We accept the fact of the increasing realization of the Kingdom and the continued operation of the person of Christ in the sphere of faith as proved, while we recognize in the form of the apocalyptic matter of the gospels "that relativity which attaches to all that is human." And yet for most present-day disciples, when all these concessions have been made, the thirteenth chapter of Mark, the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, the seventeenth and twenty-first chapters of Luke, still remain "dead hypotheses." In Coleridge's words they do not "find us." They have no direct contribution to make to our common religious life.

This general indifference and antipathy to the apocalyptic matter in the gospels seems to arise, not from a repudiation of that mental relativity which led to a use of the old imagery of Daniel, but rather from a profound distrust of the catastrophic mood which colors all Jewish eschatology. We can forgive the apocalyptist his symbolism, but we cannot accept as religiously valid for the present day his theory of chaotic and discontinuous progress. The sayings of Jesus about the end of the age are dominated by two ideas, suddenness and unforeseeability. These ideas constitute the continually recurring theme of all Jesus had to say about the future. "As the lightning cometh forth from the east and shineth even unto the west, so shall the coming of the Son of Man be." "Of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son." "Therefore be ye ready, for in an hour when ye think not." "In a day when

he expecteth not, and in hour when he knoweth not." "Ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at even, or at midnight, or at cockcrowing, or in the morning, lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping." These words anticipate vague and nameless crises, lying outside the natural sequence of cause and effect, which are to burst upon the believer in the unexpected moment. The scientific and historical imagination find it all but impossible to translate this language about undefined, uncorrelated phenomena into the religious vernacular of the present day.

Over against this characteristic Jewish theory of change must be set the scientific conventionalism of our own day. "Nature," said Lamarck, "is never brusque," and when this dictum is applied to spiritual processes the believer finds that the Synoptic eschatology will not bear the test of such standardization. "The growth of historical study in the nineteenth century," says Professor Bury, "has been determined and characterised by the same general principle which has underlain the simultaneous development of the study of nature, namely the genetic idea. . . . Human history is a causal, genetic process." "The doctrine of the continuity of history," writes Professor Robinson in the same spirit, "is based upon the observed fact that every human institution, every generally accepted idea, every important invention, is but the summation of long lines of progress reaching back as far as we have the patience or means to follow them." Upon this point the difference between the modes of thought of the first and the twentieth centuries is absolute. The Jew knew nothing of a gradual evolution, while the modern believer knows of no progress without such evolution. From this difference the "problem" of the Synoptic eschatology arises.

The scientific presuppositions with which the Biblical critic approaches these apocalyptic utterances prove upon examination to be those of a quarter of a century ago. It is now just over twenty-five years since Henry Drummond wrote his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, and, though his contention that the laws governing the two realms are identical has been generally discounted, the presumption that they are analogous still prevails. When Harold Begbie tells us, therefore, that this genera-

tion "does not believe in a sudden heaven or a sudden hell," he merely re-echoes for the generation a conception of spiritual evolution which has very generally dominated religious thought since Drummond's day. A résumé of Drummond's introductory chapter will suggest the difficulties which this now familiar theory of progress places in the path of the apocalyptic programme. For Drummond does not hesitate to affirm at the outset that "catastrophism" has been "dismissed as a final form of science," since the lie of things in the spiritual world, as arranged by a catastrophic theology, is not in harmony with the world around. This proposition leads to an inevitable apotheosis of the "Principle of Continuity,"—the capitals are Drummond's,—which is said to be "growing in splendor with every discovery of science." This law of continuity is the acknowledged *a priori* basis for all the subsequent argument. It is said to be the ultimate ground upon which man as a moral and rational being may hope to stand. It is our final assurance that our intellect shall not be insulted nor our confidence in nature abused. "The Principle of Continuity may be said to be the definite expression in words of our trust that God will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion. . . . To premise a region where the principle of continuity fails would be to overthrow Nature, then science, and last the human mind." Obviously, within such a scheme there is no room for the apocalyptic order with its emphasis upon the sudden and the unforeseen. If this rejection of the catastrophic be the last word of science, then the eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels, not merely in form, but in essence, must be abandoned as archaic and untrue.

But such is the "relativity which attaches to all that is human" that science has faced about upon itself, and the whole theory of change is being carefully re-examined. "No one," writes Professor Bateson, "can survey the work of recent years without perceiving that evolutionary orthodoxy developed too fast, and that a great deal has got to come down." It now seems quite possible, if not probable, that our familiar conceptions of a continuous mechanical evolution must be radically modified, and modified, such is the irony of the situation, in the direction of the catastrophic programme, which the earlier evolutionists

boldly repudiated. When Darwin began to examine the subject of variation, he made a distinction between the slight differences which constitute ordinary variation and the rarer but more marked variations which seemed to arise spontaneously. This distinction has always been preserved and is now familiar to us as "continuous variation" and "discontinuous variation." The old Darwinian doctrine of evolution depends essentially upon the cumulative effect of those minute variations which constitute a continuous series. The examples of discontinuous variation were for the orthodox biologists the exceptional "sports" which proved their rule. Since Darwin's day a partially successful effort has been made to formulate the law of continuous variation, by which the fluctuations of a given individual from the norm may be anticipated. Now, however, that the law has been formulated, it appears to deal with phenomena too minute for natural selection to utilize. On the other hand a faithful empiricism does not hesitate to declare that life is more "brusque" than Darwin admitted. The school of biologists of which Bateson is the zoölogical and DeVries the botanical leader has, therefore, turned its attention to those individuals which illustrate the larger variations—the "mutations" as DeVries calls them—and which presumably constitute a "discontinuous series." Their contention that these considerable mutations make a perceptible difference in the individual's chance of life, and offer firmer holding-ground for natural selection than the insensible differences, is apparently incontrovertible. Whether or not one may be willing to agree with these scientific men that "Every new specific character may be assumed to have arisen by mutation," one must, at least, realize that the burden of proof has been shifted from the new to the old evolutionism, since "an evolution of species proceeding by definite steps is more, rather than less, easy to imagine than an evolution proceeding by the accumulation of indefinite and insensible steps." Of these mutations science can only say that they do not appear in accordance with any discernible law, but "suddenly, abruptly, . . . and unexpectedly, . . . perhaps once or twice in a century, perhaps even only once in a thousand years."

The significance for the question in hand of these changing con-

ceptions of physical evolution would not be so great were they not substantiated by the most significant movements in contemporary philosophy. Professor Höffding tells us that "the greater empirical discontinuity," which recent research has discovered, "has made us all open our eyes for new possibilities to arise through the *prima facie* inexplicable 'spontaneous' variations which are the condition of all evolution. This point is one of peculiar interest. Deeper than speculative philosophy and mechanical science saw in the days of their triumph, we catch sight of new streams, whose sources and laws we have still to discover."

Presumably the ablest and the most suggestive development of this line of thought is to be found in Bergson's *Creative Evolution.* Bergson has cast down the gauntlet before all the mechanical theories of psychical evolution, and is the acknowledged champion of the doctrine of "a new creation." Arguing against the traditional axioms of the past quarter of a century, but from the facts of life, he reiterates the statements of Bateson and DeVries that to foretell the form of a coming individual is beyond our powers, since each new stage of development involves original situations, never before realized. Since these conditions cannot be predicted until they appear, the mechanical theory of evolution has nothing to say of the future. Restating these hypotheses with immediate reference to the realm of personality, Bergson continues: "If our action be one that involves the whole of our person and is truly ours it could not have been foreseen. It is quite certain that if we could view the evolution of life in its entirety, the spontaneity of its movement and the unforeseeability of its procedures would thrust themselves upon our attention."

Bergson is quite conscious of his heresy, but like the true heretic he dare not recant. He reviews the law of continuity with candor, only to abandon it. Like a philosophical Childe Roland, he advances to the Dark Tower of logical infidelity, winds upon his horn and—*pace* Drummond—"overthrows Nature, then science, and last the human mind." "Against this idea of the absolute originality and unforeseeability of forms," he writes, "our whole intellect rises in revolt. The essential function of our intellect, as the evolution of life has fashioned it, is to

be a light for our conduct, to make ready for action on things, to foresee for a given situation, the events favorable or unfavorable, which may follow thereupon. Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science. To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, and go counter to the natural bent of the intellect."

What the influence of these conclusions may be upon the problem in question we can only vaguely anticipate, but that they will be great we may be certain. Our unutterable confusion regarding Jesus' words about the last things arises from our persistent determination to read them as a scientific description of the realization of the kingdom rather than as a presentation of actual life. Bergson continually reminds us that, as science has only to do with given facts, its eyes are forever turned toward the past. But eschatology is *ipso verbo* a theory of the future, and is not, therefore, a legitimate field for scientific investigation. Consequently, the thirteenth chapter of Mark, with its parallels and Q-supplements, cannot in the very nature of the case furnish any ground for theological speculation. Either they must be read as religious utterances only, or they must be ignored. For to read in retrospect chapters having to do with the religious experience of the future is to become a critical Mr. Facing-both-ways, and a criticism divided against itself cannot stand.

If we are to read these words about the last things in the only way they may be read, we must be willing to "do violence to the mind, and go counter to the natural bent of the intellect." In other words, we must be willing to ignore the conception of continuity which has hitherto seemed a necessity for science, and we must turn to experience itself, as it is given in life. The general recoil of religious thought in this day away from theory toward action should achieve our emancipation from doctrines which have unquestionably blinded us to the actual progress of experience. Whether or not one can see the catastrophic and apocalyptic depends upon one's whole attitude toward life. The theorist still asserts, with Miss Jane Harrison and those who worship the idols of the fathers: "Continuous evolution leaves no gap for revelation

sudden and complete." But the empiricists say with Father Waggett: "There is another view of life, equally valid and practically sometimes more important, which recognises the immediate and lasting effects of crises, difference, and revolution. Our ardor for the demonstration of uniformity of process and of minute continuous change needs to be balanced by a recognition of the catastrophic element in experience."

There is, perhaps, no religious phenomenon in which this contrast between the substance of experience and scientific description is more sharply drawn than in that of sudden conversion. Protestantism is apparently proceeding upon the assumption that Professor James's two classic chapters on Conversion in the *Varieties of Religious Experience* have destroyed that illusion for theology and banished the fact from religion. The experiences of S. H. Hadley and David Brainerd and Henry Alleine and the others of that notable communion to whom a sudden and a revolutionary manifestation of reality was granted, remain for the academic mind interesting psychological illustrations of the encroachment of the subconscious upon the conscious self. But this is the language of the laboratory and not of life. Religion cannot speak in these terms, just because the movements of the subconscious are never given in advance. The discovery of the subliminal self has unquestionably furnished psychologists with a clew to the immediate antecedent causes of sudden conversion, but this discovery has not altered the content of the experience for the convert or diminished its revolutionary values for consciousness.

This is unquestionably the implication of Mr. Begbie's telling "Footnotes" to the *Varieties*. He sees that religion is being taken from the learned, who are crippled by theories, and given to the simple, who accept facts. The facts which he presents lie, it is true, outside the beaten track of ecclesiastical conventions, but they bespeak a profound spiritual reality, which our stereotyped programmes of orderly but uninspired continuity lack. These are confessedly the men and the women whom the state and philanthropy and science had abandoned to the logically suicidal ravages of their own transgressions, but a religion which brought them the sudden and the unforeseen achieved their salvation. There is, to use Carlyle's phrase, "a felt indubitable certainty of Experi-

ence" in these records, which the decent mechanical theology of the times cannot boast.

The problem for the religious man is not whether he will be able to explain experience once it is given, but how he will meet it as it comes. If he worships the Principle of Continuity to the exclusion of all catastrophism, the unforeseen opportunities of the future and its as sudden trials must inevitably find him sleeping. If he insists upon denying the reality of these experiences, his life is by just so much impoverished. The real problem of the gospel eschatology for the present-day Christian is not whether the archaic imagery of the Book of Daniel may be ingeniously dovetailed into contemporary conditions, but whether the continually repeated warning, "Watch, for ye know not," has, in an age which craves the certainties of science, a divine immediacy. The latest utterances of biology and the ablest modern treatise in philosophy are at one with the testimony of profound religious experience in asserting that Jesus' conception of the future, as involving the sudden and the unforeseen, is still as faithful to life as the Sermon on the Mount and the parables of growth, those ancient premonitions of the theory of gradual evolution upon which we have built our modern faith.

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